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Introduction to the Problem
The philosophy of John Hick, who is famous for his religious pluralism, has
received vigorous study in terms of its epistemology, authority, the concept of God, and
Christology. However, less attention has been given to his pareschatology. As explained
below, initial investigation shows that there is a need for in-depth study of Hick’s
religious philosophy in this area.
The Problem
Based upon preliminary research, Hick’s religious pluralism seems to reveal a
critical problem with external correspondency, as follows. His pareschatology, which is
an attempt to accept all eschatologies of major world religions as valid, may as a
consequence tend to invalidate them all in the end. Moreover, other factors may indicate

the presence of inconsistencies in Hick’s pareschatological model, which may reflect
upon the adequacy of his overall model of religious pluralism.
The Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to address and critically evaluate the external
correspondency and internal consistency of Hick’s eschatological model, which may
provide the basis for a critical evaluation of his religious pluralism as a whole. The
evaluation of John Hick’s religious pluralism in light of his pareschatology will be
accomplished through the lenses of the correspondence and coherence theories of truth.
Conclusions
Hick’s pareschatology, as discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 5, and summarized
in chapter 6, is open to various criticisms when judged by correspondence and coherence
theories of truth. From my research of Hick’s pareschatology, I uncover and present
reasons which back twenty criticisms of Hick’s concept of pareschatology. Based upon
these twenty criticisms, the first general conclusion of my dissertation is that Hick’s
notion of pareschatology does not show sufficient internal coherence, and it is also not
fully coherent with his pluralistic model of world religions. The second general
conclusion is that there is lack of external correspondence with the noumenal Real and
with the phenomenal pareschatological manifestations of religious experiences in
particular religions. As a result, questions may be raised whether his pareschatological
model can be regarded as a convincing theological philosophical scientific construct.
These considerations also have important implications for Hick’s religious pluralism,
which lead to the final conclusion of my dissertation. I find Hick’s religious pluralism as
a whole to be weakened by the problematic condition of his pareschatology.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Problem
Religious pluralism is one of the most influential philosophical approaches in the
postmodern world. It is to be understood in the light of philosophical pluralism, which is
“a philosophical perspective on the world that emphasizes diversity rather than
homogeneity, multiplicity rather than unity, difference rather than sameness.” 1 Religious
pluralism, 2 according to John Hick, is “the view that the transformation of human
existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness is taking place in different ways
within the contexts of all the great religious traditions. There is not merely one way but a
plurality of ways of salvation or liberation.” 3 Along with many other theologians and
philosophers, a contemporary British philosopher of religion and theologian, John Hick
(1922–) 4 has offered “one of the most sophisticated and influential pluralistic
1

Calvin O. Schrag, “Pluralism,” The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed.
Robert Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 714.
2

From now on “pluralism” refers to religious pluralism unless otherwise
mentioned.
3

John Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism (New York: St. Martin’s, 1985), 34.

4

See John Hick, John Hick: Philosopher of Religion and Theologian,
http://www.johnhick.org.uk/, 2007 (accessed September 24, 2007). He currently holds
the following titles and positions: “an Emeritus Professor of Claremont Graduate
University, California; University of Birmingham, UK; Fellow of the Institute for
Advanced Research in Arts & Social Sciences, University of Birmingham, a Vice1

philosophies of world religions.” 5 The research of this dissertation concerns Hick’s
pluralistic model of world religions, what he frequently calls “religious pluralism,” or
“the pluralistic hypothesis”—“The idea that each of the great world religions is response
to the ultimately real, and that each is a context of human salvation.” 6 More particularly,
the focus will be on Hick’s eschatological model within the entire system of religious
pluralism.
According to the modern and postmodern mind-set, a person’s religion is no
longer the true religion but only one of many equally valid alternatives. While the
diversity of world religions was an undeniable phenomenon in the past, as Gordon D.
Kaufman notes, in the present the diversity of world religions has been more fully
recognized, experienced, and sometimes even positively evaluated by adherents of all
President of British Society for the Philosophy of Religion and of the World Congress of
Faiths” (ibid.).
5

Paul Eddy, “Religious Pluralism and the Divine: Another Look at John Hick’s
Neo-Kantian Proposal,” Religious Studies 30, no. 4 (Dec. 1994): 467. Many admit that
John Hick is one of the most influential thinkers on religious pluralism. See Yong Huang,
“Religious Pluralism and Interfaith Dialogue: Beyond Universalism and Particularism,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 37, no. 3 (June 1995): 128; William L.
Rowe, “Religious Pluralism,” Religious Studies 35, no. 2 (June 1999): 139.
6

John Hick, A Christian Theology of Religions: The Rainbow of Faiths
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1995), 41. See John Hick, “The New Map of
the Universe of Faiths,” in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, ed. Steven M. Cahn
and David Shatz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); idem, Problems of
Religious Pluralism, 47; idem, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the
Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 231, 233; idem, A Christian
Theology of Religions: The Rainbow of Faiths, 11, 31, 34, 41, 42, 43.

2

world religions. 7 “What is questionable is the ‘pluralistic theology’ that is proposed by
many of the writers” 8 in the postmodern world, according to Gavin D’Costa.
From the Christian point of view, for example, there have been several
approaches toward understanding other religions. These approaches are summarized by
Alan Race in three categories: exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. 9 This threefold
typology was more fully developed by Gavin D’Costa, who defined the terms more
precisely from the Christian perspective: (1) exclusivism 10 —“only those who hear the
Gospel proclaimed and explicitly confess Christ are saved”; (2) inclusivism—“Christ is
the normative revelation of God, although salvation is possible outside of the explicit
Christian church, but this salvation is always from Christ”; (3) pluralism 11 —“all religions
are equal and valid paths to the one divine reality and Christ is one revelation among
7

Gordon D. Kaufman, God—Mystery—Diversity: Christian Theology in a
Pluralistic World (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), xii.
8

Gavin D’Costa, ed., Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 2004), iii, iv.
9

Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian
Theology of Religions, 2nd ed. (London: SCM, 1993). These same attitudes can be
applied to any religious tradition toward others.
10

The basic attitude of exclusivism is expressed well at the Fourth Lateran
Council (1215) when it repeated “the Cyprianic maxim: ‘Extra ecclesiam nulla salus’
(outside the church there is no salvation) (Carl E. Braaten, “The Problem of the
Absoluteness of Christianity,” Interpretation 40, no. 4 [Oct. 1986]: 342). This attitude is
also seen in Hegel’s philosophy of religion which refers to Christianity as the “absolute
religion” (ibid.). It is clearly repeated in Parson Thwackum’s word as he said, “When I
mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but
the Protestant religion; and not only the Prostestant religion, but the Church of England”
(John Hick, The Center of Christianity [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978], 70, 71).
11

Hick prefers the term “pluralism,” to “relativism” to describe the view that all
religions are only different responses to the same divine Real and thus salvific as
totalities. John Hick, “Pluralism and the Reality of the Transcendent,” in Theologians in
Transition, ed. James M. Wall (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 61–62.
3

many equally important revelations.” 12 Hick has responded to this threefold typology
with regard to “both truth-claims and salvation-claims.” 13 He argues for pluralism, 14
listing the reasons that exlusivism is problematic, 15 and that inclusivism is not sufficient
and inevitably leans toward pluralism. 16
Hick’s influential and sophisticated pluralistic model of religions is well described
in A Christian Theology of Religions: The Rainbow of Faiths. He says: “Christianity is
only one among several great world religions. Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism
now appear to many as different but, judging by their fruits in human life, equally
authentic responses to . . . the Real.” 17 The basic thesis of Hick’s pluralism is centered
12

Gavin D’Costa, “Christian Theology and Other Faiths,” in Companion
Encyclopedia of Theology, ed. Peter Byrne and Leslie Houlden (New York: Routledge,
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As Edward G. Schied notes, “For Hick the Christian forms of exclusivism and
inclusivism are inappropriate and insufficient to correctly interpret the plurality of
religions because they leave finite, historical Christianity at the center of the universe of
religious expressions as normative judge over all” (Edward G. Scheid, “Scripture and
Theology of the Religions: On the Theological Interpretation of Sacred Scripture in
Christian Attitudes toward World Religions” [Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University,
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Hick, A Christian Theology of Religions: The Rainbow of Faiths, 19. He says
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there is no salvation” (ibid.).
16
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upon the concept of the Real, 18 which has a complex definition in Hick’s pluralistic
hypothesis. The Real, which he calls “the ultimate Reality, not one among others,” is “an
unknown and unknowable Ding an sich.” 19 The Real in itself as the ultimate noumenon is
only known through multiple phenomenal appearances. 20 His explanation of the Real
relies on a Kantian analysis of differences between the noumenal and phenomenal. 21 The
former, the Real as it is in itself, is never the direct object of religious experience, while
the latter is perceived and experienced differently in every religion. 22 Hick, however,
proposes some ideas about the Real and its salvific act on the lives of every religion’s
adherents. 23
Two important elements—theocentric and eschatological—must not be
overlooked in Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis of world religions, because the first is a
theoretical basis upon which other elements are built and the latter an inevitable result of
18

John Hick, God Has Many Names (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1982), 36. See
also idem, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, 10, 11.
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self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness is taking place” (ibid., 240).
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his theocentrism. First, Hick’s thoughts on the theocentric model 24 of world religions
play a key role in his pluralism. In his book God and the Universe of Faiths, he offers his
proposal for a “Copernican revolution” as applied to Christianity and the world religions,
according to which “God takes the place of Christ (or church) that becomes the center of
religions.” 25 Great world religions are, according to this model, seen as their own
responses to the Real, which may be different depending on time and culture. 26
The second important aspect in Hick’s proposal of religious pluralism is
eschatology or pareschatology, 27 which is a result of his theocentric model of world
religions. Eschatology must be dealt with in light of his soteriology, which Hick
considers one of the common elements of major world religions. 28 To him, all major
world religions are their own responses to the Real and salvific, and provide
eschatologies of their own in different forms as a result of their own theologies. Hick
examines the survival of man, the resurrection of the person, and the reincarnation after
death in his Death and Eternal Life. He describes, explains, and compares the various
24
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eschatologies held by each major religion and insists that all major world faiths point
toward a common belief in the final and eternal state. However, he is not satisfied with
this task of simply discussing and comparing various eschatologies from East (e.g.,
reincarnation of Hinduism or Buddhism) and West (e.g., heaven or hell of Christianity)
and integrating them. Rather, he tries to introduce something new, which he calls “a third
possibility, other than eternal-heaven-or-hell or repeated earthly reincarnations.” 29 He
suggests a new idea that there are “a series of lives . . . lived in other worlds in spaces
other than that in which we now are.” 30 According to Hick, there will be several
afterlives in many different worlds before all will ultimately be saved. 31
Some questions may be raised: Does Hick’s eschatological model provide a real
solution, as perceived by critics, for all apparent dilemmas consequent upon mutual
exclusivity in eschatological claims? Does an inconsistency exist in Hick’s theology
when he endorses all eschatologies while not accepting any one of them? These questions
lead to the problem statement.
Statement of the Problem
Based upon preliminary research, Hick’s religious pluralism seems to reveal a
critical problem with external correspondency, as follows. His pareschatology, which is
an attempt to accept all eschatologies 32 of major world religions as valid, may as a
29
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consequence tend to invalidate them all in the end. Moreover, other factors may indicate
the presence of inconsistencies in Hick’s pareschatological model, which may reflect
upon the adequacy of his overall model of religious pluralism.
Purpose of the Research
The purpose of this dissertation is to address and critically evaluate the external
correspondency and internal consistency of Hick’s eschatological model, which may
provide the basis for a critical evaluation of his religious pluralism as a whole.
Justification for the Research
Though it is true that Hick’s pluralism attracts great attention from scholars of
both liberal and conservative circles, 33 his eschatological model has been largely
overlooked. Hick’s eschatological model cannot, however, simply be ignored, because it
is an inevitable result of his pluralistic hypothesis of world religions.
Hick’s eschatological model may function as a yardstick in evaluating the validity
of his religious pluralism, because his eschatological model has theological ramifications
relating to religious beliefs about the existence of God, life after death, and the
experience of salvation. Therefore, studying Hick’s model of eschatology is one of the
effective ways for evaluating the validity of his pluralistic model of world religions.
Scope and Delimitations
Hick’s pluralistic model has been examined, evaluated, and criticized by
numerous theologians, scholars, and philosophers of many different perspectives around
33

Many scholars from conservative circles have challenged his pluralism, while
many others from liberal circles have been in agreement with his view, as will be
discussed.
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the world. For example, several dissertations have been written on Hick’s religious
pluralism in areas such as epistemology, authority, the concept of God, and
Christology, 34 but not on his eschatological model. Therefore, this study will focus on the
eschatological model of Hick’s religious pluralism, namely his pareschatology.
Most of John Hick’s published works will be used for the discussion, while a
special emphasis will be given to works such as An Interpretation of Religions: Human
Responses to the Transcendent; and Death and Eternal Life.
Methodology
Hick has written and edited many books and produced numerous articles,
advocating and defending religious pluralism over thirty years. He has tried to avoid
apparent dilemmas and contradictions of each religion in its encounter with others in
truth claims by developing his own first theocentric and later realocentric model of world
religions. His eschatological model is one of the crucial components that should not be
overlooked, because it is a natural product of his pluralistic hypothesis. His goal in all of
his theories of pluralism and its eschatological model is to create internal coherence. The
fundamental difficulty in evaluating Hick’s proposed eschatological model, however, is
that theologically it has no parallel theological system or model to compare with.
Thus, Hick’s eschatological model will be evaluated within his own system of
34
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thought, whether he is coherent to himself. Two basic theories of truth 35 will be used to
evaluate Hick’s eschatological model, because Hick himself employs them in his
argument for his theory of world religions. An obvious example is that when Hick
encounters the different and sometimes mutually contradictory concepts of God and
experiences of salvation in religions (e.g., theism with atheism and heavenly kingdom
with nirvana), he tries to resolve the dilemma of being mutually contradictory by
employing the concept of the Kantian distinction between the noumenal and
phenomenal. 36 In other words, he does not want to be contradictory to himself by
accepting mutually exclusive claims of two different religions.
The following will be the design of the rest of this dissertation. Chapter 2 will be
biographical, including Hick’s personal and theological journey. This chapter will serve
as a preliminary work for the study, because it will show his presuppositions and what
kind of personal burdens he has.
Chapter 3 will be the investigation of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis, which is a
necessary prerequisite to a discussion of Hick’s eschatological model. His pluralistic
35

Two major theories of truth include the correspondence theory of truth and the
coherence theory of truth. The former is perhaps the most widely held and employed
account of truth by numerous thinkers throughout history. The theory holds that a belief
is true when there exists a fact corresponding to it. See Paul Horwich, “Truth,” The
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge; New York:
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Kirkham, “Coherence Theory of Truth,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Edward Craig [London; New York: Routledge, 1998], 9:470). Every claim that Hick
makes, for example, must be consistent with other claims that he makes somewhere else
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hypothesis, particularly his theocentric model of world religion, is the basis of other parts
of his theoretical system, and must be dealt with as a theoretical framework in order to
understand his eschatology.
Chapter 4 will address in detail Hick’s proposal for a new model of eschatology,
which is a natural consequence of his pluralistic hypothesis of world religions. This
chapter will focus on the eschatological claims of Hick’s religious pluralism, along with
related issues essential for a proper understanding of the nature and destiny of human
beings. These include the origin of man, the soul, afterlife, death, reincarnation, and
resurrection as discussed in Death and Eternal Life. This discussion will set the stage for
an evaluation of Hick’s pareschatology, which is one of the crucial components of his
entire pluralistic hypothesis.
In chapter 5, using his own logical principles, Hick’s pluralism will be evaluated
in light of his own eschatological model, pareschatology. This evaluation will be done by
assuming the correspondence and coherence theories of truth. Accordingly, this chapter
will address the issue of internal consistency and inconsistency of his eschatological
model, which will give a critical evaluation of Hick’s religious pluralism.
Chapter 6 will present the summary and conclusions of the dissertation along with
some suggestions for further study.

11

CHAPTER II
JOHN HICK, THEOLOGIAN AND PHILOSOPHER
Introduction
Looking at the life of John Hick is key to understanding his belief in religious
pluralism. A person’s theology does not arise from a vacuum but from one’s lifelong
theological journey and experience as a theologian. John Hick’s own theological
understanding has gone through many transformations from an evangelical Christianity to
a liberal one, and finally to religious pluralism—“from exclusivism, to inclusivism, to
pluralism” 1 —throughout several periods of his life. Thus, it is crucial to look at Hick’s
life journey in order to gain a better understanding of his religious pluralism. In this
chapter I will take a closer look at Hick’s life from his earliest childhood to the present to
see how he was brought up as a person and a theologian as well as a philosopher.
Being a shipping family in Scarborough, England, and having never been either
noble or notable, John Hick’s family tree goes back to “before the registration of births,
deaths and marriages in England in 1837.” 2 Hick’s ancestors were leading shipping men
in the late nineteenth century in Scarborough. Hick’s mention of a group picture of his
grandfather’s generation in his dining room, taken probably in the 1880s or ‘90s “when
1

Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, An Introduction to the Theology of Religions (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2003), 283.
2

John Hick, John Hick: An Autobiography (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002), 1.
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they were the leading shipping family in Scarborough,” 3 shows Hick’s view of his
ancestors. He must have been proud of his ancestors who appeared in the picture, “most
of whom have been at sea for many years, have faced dangers and hardships, and who
have been successful in life.” 4 However, Hick’s own grandfather, Albert Edwin, in his
generation was the only one who did not go into the shipping business among his siblings,
and instead became a solicitor, “setting up on his own in Scarborough at the age of
twenty-three or four.” 5 Hick’s grandfather was a public figure and was actively involved
in many public services in the town. This great involvement in public service must have
been possible through the wealth that his wife inherited from her father. Hick’s father,
Mark, was also a solicitor, but his real interest was tennis. 6 As a matter of fact, Mark was
one of the British seeded players at Wimbledon (1912–1925), and won several regional
championships big and small. 7 In his short descriptions of his ancestors, Hick shows that
his ancestors were successful people in their own areas.
Biographical Background of Hick
John Harwood Hick was born and raised in a conservative Christian family in
Scarborough, England. His autobiography, John Hick: An Autobiography, describes his
life journey well and will be the main source of this biographical sketch. The way in
3

Ibid., 9.
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which he describes his life is very precise and detailed, perhaps because he had a habit of
keeping records of his life events that stemmed from teenage years.
Early Life
Family Background and Childhood
“John Harwood Hick was born in Scarborough, England in 1922, the son of a
solicitor,” 8 Mark Hick, who himself was a second-generation solicitor. Due to a
considerable amount of inheritance from his grandmother Maria, and his father’s
successful investment in the stock market which would have increased his inheritance,
his early childhood was spent in what “seemed to be a well enough off middle class
family, employing a cook and a maid, an occasional handyman, at one time a nanny and
later a tutor.” 9 However, Hick’s family went through a major financial disaster when his
father’s big investment in the east did not turn out to be successful in 1939. 10
John Hick’s relationship with his father was not always very good, maybe
because of their different views on issues such as politics and war. Hick specifically
described and listed the differences between him and his father and said: “On his side, he
was politically conservative whilst I was a socialist, he was disappointed that I switched
from the Law to the Presbyterian ministry, and during the war he was a conventional
patriot whilst I was a conscientious objector.”11 Continuous tension existed between them,
particularly when World War II approached, because of their drastically different views
8
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9
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Ibid., 19.
14

on war. For example, Hick’s diary, kept in July 1939, shows the tension that existed
between them: “[I] had a bad quarrel with Dad at dinner today. I do not know how it
began, and I myself was more of a spectator than a combatant, but Dad was very annoyed
over my lack of patriotic bias in viewing history! M. [Mark] appeared in tears afterwards
asking me not to let it happen again.” 12 The gap between father and son became even
greater when Hick became an actual conscientious objector after the war broke out.
Mark’s genuine patriotism must have been damaged by his son whose idea of war was
totally different from his. Hick was against the idea of violence and became a
conscientious objector due to the conviction that “the teachings of Jesus were utterly
incompatible with the mass violence of war.” 13 Mark must have thought that he lost his
reputation in the town with his “conchie” son. This was only one of many reasons why
they were in constant conflict. Though Mark appeared to be irrationally attached to his
own ideas, he was not at all unintelligent. He was a man of great talent in many areas
such as chess and bridge, playing both for Yorkshire.
Education
Hick had a bad experience in grade school in Lisvane, which was just around the
corner from his home. This was a private school that he attended, and Hick remarked that
his experience there was awful. Afterwards he was homeschooled for a while by a tutor
with his brother Pentland, who was two years older; and then at the age of fifteen Hick
went to Bootham school in York for two years, where he finally enjoyed his time. He
read many books, particularly the Penguin Classics that dealt with philosophical writings,
12
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in 1935, 14 and also began to enjoy writing and even published some of his works in the
school magazine.
As the son of a solicitor, regardless of his philosophical bent, Hick, after he left
Bootham, began to work as an articled clerk at Hick & Hands (his father’s law office).
While he was there, he took some special tutoring at home and passed the Law Prelim
and attended law lectures at the University College (now the University of Hull) to be a
solicitor like his father and grandfather.
From age seventeen, Hick began to read philosophers such as Nietzsche, Leibniz,
Mill, Schopenhauer, Whitehead, Freud, and Russell. He thought that he had a natural bent
for philosophy. 15 In the diary that he kept when he was seventeen, he said: “I wonder
whether thinking is necessary. I think it is for some people and not for others. It is for
me!” 16 He even wrote, “Real philosophers in my opinion are born, not made, and I think
that I was born one.” 17 Hick began to show his strong interest in philosophy from his
early college years. “It was a revelation to read about Plato, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley
and Hume, and above all Kant,” 18 said Hick.
About this time, Hick had a chance to meet with Edward W. Hirst, his mother
Aileen’s uncle, who had been “a Lecturer in Christian Ethics at Manchester University
and in the United Methodist and Harley Colleges.” 19 After reading Hick’s essay called
14
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‘The Dreamer’s Vision,’ Hirst suggested that he should go to a university and study
philosophy and could teach at a university in the future. Hick, however, thought that the
Law was a safer prospect and began to take law classes at the University of Hull to be a
solicitor while also taking philosophy classes. 20 He must have thought that he could
maintain his life through his profession as a solicitor, and at the same time enjoy
philosophy as his hobby.
Religious Experiences
As an average Englishman of the time, Hick was brought up in a Christian family.
He was baptized as a baby in the Church of England and attended services as a child and
teenager. To him Christianity seemed to be “utterly lifeless and uninteresting,” its
services “a matter of infinite boredom.” 21 Hick’s early exposure to Christianity was
through his Granny (Aileen’s mother), who was very much involved in all sorts of
religious activities. She took him to religious activities during his early teenage years.
One specific event that left a big impression on his early years was when a well-known
evangelist, George Jefferys, laid his hands on his head in a farewell prayer meeting. Hick
had this unique experience when he was twelve. He described his experience in the event
as follows: “I was kneeling at a chair when Jeffreys, coming round the circle, laid his
hands on my head. I immediately felt a strong physical effect, like an electric shock
except that it was not a sharp jolt but a pervasive sensation spreading down through my
20
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body. I was in floods of tears—not of sadness or fright but, I suppose, a tremendous
emotional impact.” 22
Apart from his Granny’s influence, there was his mother, Aileen, who was also a
very religious person whose spiritual interest took a different form than her mother’s and
must have made a considerable impact on his life. She believed in Spiritualism, which
flourished during World War I. She was also thought to be psychic and frequently saw
apparitions. Hick had some chances to observe spiritualists performing spiritualism, but
he found them unconvincing. He had “a strong rationalist streak” which came out quite
often in his diaries. 23 He however had no doubt about the reality of extrasensory
perception, or telepathy, which seemed to be a result of his mother’s influence. He had a
chance to encounter publications by the Society for Psychical Research and was
impressed by them. He was “a member of the Society for many years, reading its regular
publications,” 24 having joined at the suggestion of his Oxford doctoral supervisor, H. H.
Price, who was an author of philosophical discussions of psychical research, or
parapsychology.
Hick also read some theosophical literature through one of Aileen’s friends who
was a Theosophist. 25 At the age of eighteen, when he was an articled clerk, he was
“attracted by theosophy as the first coherent religious philosophy that I had met—much
22
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more so than the Christianity I knew.” 26 Not long after Hick developed a strong interest
in it, he consciously dismissed it. However, he professed that he gained a strong interest
in the Eastern religions, which was not active during his evangelical Christian experience,
but then came back at a later period in his life. At this time, though Hick did not believe
in the God of traditional Christianity, he had a strong conviction during this time that
there was some sort of divine reality. This belief in a divine reality played a major role in
his pluralistic hypothesis of world religions, because this reality was the center upon
which all other elements of religions are focused. This idea of divine being is the basic
concept for his “Copernican revolution.”
At the age of eighteen, when he was studying law at University College, Hull,
Hick had a strong conversion experience into traditional and evangelical Christianity.
“The converting power” that he experienced was, he recalls, “the New Testament picture
of Jesus Christ.” 27 He described his unforgettable conversion story as follows:
For several days I was in a state of intense mental and emotional turmoil, during
which I became increasingly aware of a higher truth and greater reality pressing in
upon me and claiming my recognition and response. At first this was highly
unwelcome, a disturbing and challenging demand for nothing less than a
revolution in personal identity. But then the disturbing claim became a liberating
invitation. The reality that was pressing in upon me was not only awesomely
demanding but also irresistibly attractive, and I entered with great joy and
excitement into the world of Christian faith. Some of my fellow students were
members of the InterVarsity Fellowship, the evangelical campus organization;
and throwing in my lot with them, I accepted as a whole and without question the
entire evangelical package of theology—the verbal inspiration of the Bible;
Creation and Fall; Jesus as God the Son incarnate, born of a virgin, conscious of
his divine nature, and performing miracles of divine power; redemption by his
26
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blood from sin and guilt; Jesus’ bodily resurrection, ascension, and future return
in glory; heaven and hell. 28
Hick likes to refer to this experience as “a fundamentalist conversion,”29 which
accepts “the entire evangelical package of theology” that he later considered as
intellectually unacceptable.
This conversion experience into traditional Christianity completely changed his
life. Planning to serve as a minister of the Presbyterian Church of England that his
InterVarsity Fellowship friends belonged to, he transferred to Edinburgh University,
switching from the Law to the Christian ministry. He remained an evangelical
fundamentalist in his college years as well as during his time in the Friends Ambulance
Unit. 30 He claimed that he was “highly orthodox” during his time as a student at
Westminster College, and even after college at Belford church as a minister, at Cornell,
and Princeton Theological Seminary as a professor.
During this period after the war, Hick’s theology began to be open to more liberal
thought. For instance, he began raising some questions of intellectual doubts: “Could one
understand the sun standing still for about a day as recounted in Joshua 10:13?”; “Can
biological evolution responsibly be rejected just because it is contrary to the book of
Genesis?”; “And could it really be an expression of infinite love to send the majority of
the human race to eternal torment in hell?” 31 Confronted with these questions, Hick
seemed to feel that “they were dangerous and ought not to be raised, and that they
28
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constituted a temptation to backsliding.” 32 Though he did not disregard all of his former
faith, Hick was starting to stray from his fundamentalist view of Christianity.
Publications
The pilgrimage of Hick from a conservative Christian theologian to a pluralist
philosopher is well revealed in his writings and publications. They are one of the
barometers by which to see his theological development throughout his lifetime. It is
almost impossible to include all his writings and publications over sixty years of his
writing career ever since he began to write his diary at the age of seventeen. He has been
quite actively involved in writing and publishing many books and numerous articles on
the scholarly world in the past several decades. Today in his late eighties, Hick still
writes and publishes books. For example, even after publishing his autobiography, John
Hick: An Autobiography (2002), Hick did not stop writing. Two new books recently
came out: The New Frontier of Religion and Science: Religious Experience,
Neuroscience and the Transcendent (2006), and Who or What Is God? And Other
Investigations (2008).
In this section, I will examine a few of Hick’s major works that were monumental
to his development of ideas in the theology of world religions. In order to see his change
of theological presuppositions, some of his major books will be listed and described in
chronological order. His first book, a revision of his doctoral thesis at Oxford, Faith and
Knowledge (1957), 33 came out while he was teaching as an assistant professor of
32
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philosophy at Cornell University. During this period he was still a conservative
theologian who held onto the Chalcedonian orthodoxy, which is particularly concerned
with the complete divinity of Jesus Christ.
While he was at Princeton Theological Seminary, Hick was asked to be featured
in a special project commissioned by Prentice-Hall to write “a new series of short books
on all aspects of philosophy, the Foundations of Philosophy series.” 34 Hick was asked to
write on the area of philosophy of religion. This is how his most widely sold and read
book until then, Philosophy of Religion (1963), came out. There we can find some open
discussions about common elements of religions which would lead to the philosophical
turn to pluralism later on, yet no hint of religious pluralism was evident.
Hick published his third book, Evil and the God of Love (1966), which has
become one of the classic books in the area of theodicy. In this book he tries to prove that
the classical understanding of the problem of evil that Augustine and his followers
advocated is not valid anymore. Instead, he tries to show that the validity of an Irenaean
understanding of the problem of evil is more appropriate than the Augustinian. Hick
claims that Irenaeus distinguished two stages of the creation of people. In the first stage,
human beings are created in God’s image, that is, into existence as intellectual beings
who are still immature creatures. In the second stage, they are created in God’s
“likeness,” into existence transformed from human animals to God’s children. This book
builds a theoretical basis for the future development of religious pluralism.
In 1973, Hick published a monumental book entitled God and the Universe of
Faiths, which is a fresh and shocking book on religious pluralism, composed of a series
of essays that he had written previously. Here Hick suggests a new idea called the
34
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“Copernican revolution” 35 in regard to our understanding of world religions. Hick’s selfdescribed Copernican revolution in theology involves “a radical transformation in our
conception of the universe of faiths and the place of our own religion within it.” 36 In
other words, it involves a shift from a Christian-centeredness or church-centeredness to
God-centeredness in the view of the universe of faiths. Thus, the great world religions are
essentially the same, but are different human responses or perceptions to the one divine
Reality due to the different historical and cultural circumstances.
Having launched his pluralistic theology of world religions and particularly of
God in God and the Universe of Faiths (1973), Hick must have felt the need to explore an
eschatology that fits his theory of world religions. As a result he published his new book,
Death and Eternal Life, in 1976, which tries to present a global doctrine of death and
afterlife. It is in this book that he introduced and explored his own eschatological model,
namely pareschatology. This work was one of the concluding parts of his theoretical
framework of religious pluralism, which inevitably has to show the end result for his
pluralistic hypothesis. What Hick tried to do was to present an eschatology which
embraced the models both from East (Buddhism and Hinduism) and West (Christianity).
In other words, he suggested a new idea that there will be a series of lives in other worlds
before we all will be saved ultimately.
In 1987, Hick edited with Paul Knitter Myth of Christian Uniqueness, which is
composed of essays presented by the twelve contributors at the Claremont Graduate
School in the previous year. Hick found other theologians and philosophers who were in
35
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general agreement with his pluralistic theology of world religions. In the Preface, Knitter
claims that the pluralist approach is “a move from the insistence on the superiority or
finality of Christ and Christianity toward the recognition of the independent validity of
other ways.” 37 The contributors describe this kind of approach as “the crossing of a
theological Rubicon” through three bridges: The Historical Cultural Bridge; The
Theological Mystical Bridge; and The Ethico-Practical Bridge.
It was also during this period when Hick was at the Claremont Graduate
University that he published his well-known book An Interpretation of Religion (1989),
which is an expanded version of his 1986–7 Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University
of Edinburgh. 38 This volume is undoubtedly one of the most comprehensive and most
influential books advocating religious pluralism. Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis that the
great world religions are different yet valid responses to the one Real is most extensively
presented in this book. Hick even claims that “An Interpretation of Religion has been
widely discussed, and indeed almost every treatment of the problem of religious diversity
since has had something to say about it. It has helped to stir up a number—at the moment
nearly thirty—books about my work, mostly by conservative Christian theologians and
philosophers, a few of them making useful critical points.” 39 This was no doubt his
magnum opus, which received the 1991 Grawemeyer Award for the most significant new
thinking in religion. However, Hick never stopped writing and publishing books and
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articles until very recently. I end my descriptions of his publication here for now, which
will be further expanded later.
Teaching Career
Hick’s pilgrimage as a theologian and philosopher is also reflected in his teaching
career. In this section, I look at his teaching career, going from a minister of a local
congregation to a university professor in the States and Great Britain over three decades.
His life journey in his career clearly shows his change of theological and philosophical
position.
Hick started his career as a minister of the Belford Presbyterian church, which is
located “in Northumberland about fifteen miles south of Berwick-on-Tweed on the
Scottish border.” 40 Hick started his ministry early in August 1953 and at the end of the
month he married Hazel in the church. The Belford church had 296 members, which was
“then the largest rural congregation in the denomination.” 41
Hick’s main job was to preach two sermons on Sunday and to go out visiting in
the cottages and farms during the weekdays. He spent his mornings preparing two
sermons, and when he was done with his sermons, he took the rest of his mornings
revising his Oxford thesis into a book. His sermons were “biblically based and directed to
a rural congregation few of whom had much education.” 42 There was no vestige of
religious pluralism during this time in his career as the minister of Belford Presbyterian
church.
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On Christmas day of 1954, Hick received a letter of invitation from Cornell
University to teach philosophy of religion as an assistant professor. Wanting to accept the
job offer and at the same time not to leave Belford so precipitately, he asked to postpone
it until January 1956. He says that he really enjoyed Belford and felt in many ways sorry
to leave there. Yet he did not want to miss the opportunity to go into the academic world.
Cornell University (1956–1959)
Hick’s teaching career as a university professor started at Cornell University in
New York in January 1956. 43 Cornell University was one of the prestigious Ivy League
schools and was in general an academically liberal institution. During that time “Cornell
had one of the strongest philosophy departments in the country, with a distinctive
character as the leading US centre for the study of Wittgenstein, who had visited there not
long before his death in 1951.” 44 Though he learned a lot about Wittgenstein, he “was
never drawn into the Wittgensteinian thought world, and retained a kind of independence
from the dominant school of thought and the wider range of interests.” 45
Hick’s first philosophy of religion lecture was an overwhelming one because of
its size. There were over three hundred students waiting for his lecture, which he realized
later was the legacy of Burtt whom he was replacing. Hick then considered Burtt as half a
Buddhist, whom he thought to be too liberal, while seeing himself then as “a conservative
43
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Christian.” 46 He says in his autobiography that his mind was closed to Burtt’s wider
vision during that time. 47
His three-and-a-half-year stay at Cornell was a good opportunity to have many
different experiences as a scholar and theologian. He not only had a chance to have an indepth study about philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Moore, but also learned how to
teach while he was there. He was able to meet some prominent theologians and
philosophers who came to visit Cornell, which later had a big impact on him. Among
them were Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Robert Calhoun. During the later period at
Cornell, Hick was invited to McGill University to give a lecture; there he first met
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, who later became a mentor and friend. They became lifelong
supporters of each other on the study of world religions, particularly religious pluralism.
It was also during this period that Hick published his first book, Faith and
Knowledge (1957), that he had already prepared to publish in Great Britain but had not
been successful. Hick also published a significant article on Christology, “The
Christology of D. M. Ballie,” 48 in the Scottish Journal of Theology while he was at
Cornell. What Hick did in this article was to criticize the Scottish theologian Donald
Baillie’s Christology. 49 Hick admits that at the time he expressed his orthodox version of
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Christian faith in his article. Hick began departing from Chalcedonian orthodoxy in his
criticisms on Donald Baillie’s famous book, God Was in Christ. 50 There was not a big
change in his view of Christianity while teaching at Cornell.
Princeton Theological Seminary (1959–1964)
After Hick’s three years at Cornell ended, both McGill and Princeton Theological
Seminary were interested in calling him. He accepted the call to teach at Princeton
Theological Seminary beginning in the summer of 1959. At that time he considered
himself to be a conservative theologian who could teach in a seminary where ministers
were being trained. However, as the chapter title of his autobiography—“Heretic at
Princeton Seminary”—implies, his experience there turned out to be rather unpleasant.
With some regrets Hick recalls his experience then and expresses his mixed feelings as
follows:
The Seminary regarded me as soundly conservative in my theology, as indeed I
thought I was—otherwise I would have opted without hesitation for Union or
McGill, both of which were much better environments for free thinkers. However
it turned out before long that I was not conservative enough. But this was the
largest and leading Presbyterian seminary in the country with a number of firstrate scholars on its faculty; Princeton was a very attractive town with a great
university and excellent schools, the Seminary’s offer was generous—and we
went there. 51
With its almost one-and-a-half-century history, Princeton Theological Seminary
then was the largest theological school in the American Presbyterian Church, with over
five hundred students. Hick’s position was professor of Christian philosophy. From the
first lecture Hick argued that there is no Christian philosophy while there are Christian
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philosophers. Hick basically taught the philosophy of religion in his class, along with
some seminars on the issue of evil, God’s love, and Paul Tillich’s ideas. 52
As is the custom in the Presbyterian Church, Hick as a Presbyterian minister
applied to join the Presbytery of New Brunswick. 53 Interestingly, the chair of the
committee which made the final decision about the applications was Clyde Henry, “a
disciple of J. Gresham Machen, author of The Virgin Birth of Christ (1930)” 54 whose
theological position was very conservative. Of course Henry’s theological position was in
agreement with his mentor’s, and he asked Hick’s opinion about the Westminster
Confession (1647). Hick’s opinion about it was that though theologically conservative, it
was completely out of date. He describes how he answered as follows: “I mentioned the
literal interpretation of the first two chapters of Genesis—the six days creation of the
world, and Adam and Eve’s eating of the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden,—and
then the doctrine of double predestination to heaven and hell, and eventually arrived at
the virgin birth of Jesus, which I did not deny but did not affirm and did not regard as
essential to the central doctrine of incarnation, which I did affirm.” 55 Hick shows his
distinction between the several teachings that he did not affirm and one that he did affirm
in this answer.
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Though Hick did not deny them, there was a sign of departure from the traditional
teachings of Christianity. He still showed his conviction in regard to the doctrine of
incarnation because he calls it “the central doctrine of incarnation.” What Hick was not
sure of and did not affirm was only one aspect of Christian theology, according to him,
namely the virgin birth of Jesus. He expressed his view on the issue of the virgin birth of
Jesus in the second of two presbytery meetings at which this subject was discussed. He
made himself clear on the virgin birth of Jesus while generally accepting other traditional
Christian doctrines. He described it as follows:
Now a word specifically about the virgin birth of our Lord. Left to myself I do not
have anything to say about this at all—and in this, as the ministers here will
certainly know, I am following the example of the majority of the New Testament
writers: Paul, John; Mark, Peter, James and Jude all believe in Christ as the Word
Incarnate, but none of them mentions the idea of a virgin birth; and I am content
to follow them in this. However, if I am specifically challenged to say something
about it, I have to say simply that I do not affirm it; it plays no part in my personal
faith. I do not assert that it is impossible, or that it may not be true; and I have no
quarrel with those who do affirm it; but I am not myself able to affirm it. 56
Though his answer was satisfactory to most members of the Presbytery and he
was received as a member of the Presbytery at that meeting, his reception by the
Presbytery was rescinded later through the influence of Henry and others who were
against him. However, after a long period of debate between both parties, 57 even getting
the attention of the press, the Judicial Commission of the General Assembly (Denver,
May 1962) finally made the decision that the designating of specific doctrines as essential
and necessary was discountenanced. Hick and his supporters won the controversy. His
theological position on the issue of the virgin birth, whether it was an essential and
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necessary doctrine to the system of Presbyterian doctrine, particularly to the Incarnation,
was “the first noticeable departure” 58 from traditional Christian doctrine. He even
claimed that he made some contributions to his mother church in her doctrinal
development and said: “The Presbyterian church had taken a tiny step in the direction of
credibility in the modern world.” 59
Cambridge University (1963–1967)
Hick’s move to Cambridge happened through a Guggenheim Fellowship during
the 1963–64 academic year to write his new book on the philosophical problem of evil.
As a result, his Evil and the God of Love was published by Macmillan in London and
Harper & Row in the States in 1966, revised in 1977, and reprinted in 1978, 1979, 1985,
and 2001. This book became one of the classics on the problem of evil and the issue of
theodicy, and caused a great amount of discussion.
In this book, Hick tried to compare the traditional Augustinian answer to the
problem of evil with that of the Irenaean model. Hick argued that the idea that evil is a
privation of good rather than some kind of reality was a concept Augustine received from
the Neo-Platonists. 60 According to the Augustinian model, Hick states, “Evil was not a
reality in its own right but the going wrong of something good—as blindness is not
anything positive but something negative, a lack of the proper functioning of the eye,
which in itself is good. Thus evil has not been created by God who is therefore not
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responsible for it.” 61 To Hick the idea of evil as a privation of good was logically invalid
as well as incoherent. The basic argument was that a wholly good creation going wrong
would be a self-contradiction. The creator of the entire universe would be ultimately
responsible for his creation and its outcome whatever they are, including evil itself.
As a better alternative, Hick chose the Irenaean model of the problem of evil.
According to Irenaeus, there were two stages in the creation of human beings. Irenaeus
distinguished the concepts between “image” and “likeness” of God in the creation of
humans in Gen 1:26. God created humans in the “image” of God at first, but not in the
“likeness” of God yet. In the first stage of creation, humans were created as intelligent
and ethical beings, but it was in the second stage of creation that they would be created
into his likeness as children of God through their own choice. Stretching this
understanding of Irenaeus to its furthest extent, Hick developed his own hypothesis that
the ideal state of humans is not found in the Garden of Eden in the past but it is found in
the future when they reach an ultimate good. The publication of Evil and the God of Love
was the major event during Hick’s stay at Cambridge; there was no noticeable move
toward pluralistic thought during his stay at Cambridge.
Birmingham University (1967–1982)
During the third year at Cambridge, which was the last year for the initial
appointment before a tenure appointment until retirement, Ninian Smart moved from the
H. G. Wood chair at Birmingham to start the new Religious Studies department at
Lancaster, and Hick applied for the vacant chair. In 1967, Hick moved to Birmingham
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University and was appointed as a chair, which would gave him a greater freedom. 62 It
was during his fifteen years at Birmingham that Hick began to develop his theory of
religious pluralism. The city of Birmingham was the perfect soil for religious pluralism
because it had been “a multicultural, multiracial and multireligious city.” 63 Briefly
describing the city of Birmingham, he said:
This city, in the middle of England, is an industrial center, which was one of the
main receivers of immigration during the 1950s and 1960s from the Caribbean
islands and from the Indian subcontinent. There was thus a sizable presence of
several non-Christian traditions, consisting of the new Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu
communities, as well as a small but long-established Jewish community;
subsequently there have come to be several Buddhist groups. Immigration was
then a hotly debated issue, and the neo-Nazi National Front was active in the area,
generating prejudice and hatred and promoting violence against black and brown
people and against Jews. It was a challenging time and place in which to find
oneself. 64
As a city with many cultures, races, and religions, Birmingham provided him with
an open view in regard to other religious faiths. Particularly Hick’s encounters with other
religious groups such as Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, and Jews convinced him that his
Christianity-centered view of religion was narrow-minded and he needed to have a
pluralistic view of religions. In 1969, having met with them and even attended their
worship services as chair of the religious education panel in the Community Relations
Committee (CRC), Hick expressed his feelings about them and said:
As I spent time in the mosques, synagogues, gurudwaras and temples as well as
churches something very important dawned on me. On the one hand all the
externals were different. In a Hindu temple, for example, the sights, the sounds,
the smells, the colours were those of India and I could imagine myself (after I had
been in India) back there. And not only the externals, but also the languages, the
concepts, the scriptures, the traditions are all different and distinctive. But at a
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deeper level it seemed evident to me that essentially the same thing was going on
in all these different places of worship, namely men and women were coming
together under the auspices of some ancient, highly developed tradition which
enables them to open their minds and hearts ‘upwards’ towards a higher divine
reality which makes a claim on the living of their lives. They are called, in the
words of a Hebrew prophet, ‘to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly
before their God.’ At this basic level the religions are at one. 65
Hick, on a practical level, must have already been moving in the direction of
religious pluralism, which he began to develop in the later period. I am not sure whether
this was what he felt then, because the description of the experience there was written
about three decades later. It was during this early period of his stay at Birmingham when
he had active encounters with other religious groups that the religious pluralism was
being conceived on a practical level.
He was strongly interested in interreligious dialogues as well as in establishing
community relations organizations that would act against social injustice and cultural and
religious conflicts between religions. For example, he was involved in establishing “All
Faiths for One Race” (AFFOR), which was originally formed to protest against the allWhite South African Cricket team planning to arrive in England, and continued as an
organization to deal with the injustices of racism due to racial, cultural, and religious
misunderstanding. “All Faiths for One Race” 66 was an independent activist organization,
of which he was one of the founders and the first chair, 67 while the Birmingham
Community Relations Committee was government-sponsored. Another time, Hick’s
activist spirit made him propose “the creation of a Birmingham Inter-Faiths Council, and
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this was created in January 1975.” 68 Hick was chosen as its first chairman, and five
religious groups, Hinduism, Chrisitianity, Islam, Judaism, and Sikhism were included. 69
While Hick was at the University of Birmingham for fifteen years, he not only
had several opportunities to meet with other religious groups and to be exposed to their
faiths, but he also had chances to visit India (Hinduism), 70 Punjab (Sikhism), 71 and Sri
Lanka (Buddhism), 72 where he was able to encounter their faiths in their historic context.
During this period Hick was deeply involved in the interreligious activities which made
him not only conceive the thoughts in regard to religious pluralism, but give birth to the
theology of world religions and mature religious pluralism in his later period there.
Though being deeply active in various interreligious dialogues and activities,
Hick was not at all unproductive in his academic activities. During his stay at
Birmingham, Hick never stopped writing and publishing books and articles. 73 It was
during this period that his coedited book with Michael Goulder The Myth of God
Incarnate 74 came out. By the time Hick edited this book he had been exposed enough to
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other faiths that they made a great impact on his journey as a philosopher who viewed the
world from the Christian perspective. Hick came to see that the central problem between
Christianity and other religions hinged on the doctrine of the incarnation. If Jesus was
God the son, Christianity must be superior to all other religions and be the only route for
salvation. Investigating this central doctrine of the incarnation, Hick tried to take a closer
look at the traditional doctrine and its history. The basic thesis of his argument was that
“the Jesus of history” is not the same as “the Christ of faith.” 75 There was a gradual
deification of Jesus going on in the history of the Church. Hick claimed that “it was not
the Jesus of history but the Christ of the faith as officially defined at Nicea (325 CE) and
Chalcedon (451 CE) who proclaimed himself as sole savior of the world.” 76
In “Jesus and the World Religions,” the concluding chapter of The Myth of God
Incarnate, Hick insisted that since the dogma of the incarnation is only “poetry . . .
hardened into prose” and “a metaphorical son of God” escalated to “a metaphysical God
the Son.” 77 Hick’s basic thesis in the book was that “the language of divine incarnation,
in which we speak of Jesus as God incarnate, God the Son, Son of God, Second Person of
the Trinity living a human life, is symbolic, mythological, or poetic language.” 78
The Myth of God Incarnate-The Truth of God Incarnate, by John Hick and Michael
Green, Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 21 (Dec. 1977): 67–71.
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Therefore, Hick argues, Christians should not insist that Christ is the only way for
salvation, and thus Christianity is only one among many religions.
Claremont Graduate University (1978–1992)
In 1978 while he was attending a conference held in San Francisco, Hick was
asked to give a lecture at the Claremont Graduate School near Los Angeles. After that, he
was invited to occupy the position of Danford Professor of the Philosophy of Religion,
which was going to be vacant. He accepted this offer, and in the following three years he
taught only in the spring semesters and returned to Birmingham for the rest of the year
until he and his wife moved to Claremont in 1982. 79 Hick was attracted by Claremont
Graduate University for two reasons. First, he was delighted that he could teach only
graduate students at CGU, whereas he had to teach mostly undergraduate students before.
Second, he liked the academic climate in the United States, which was “much more open
and enquiring than in Britain.” 80 Another reason that he enjoyed CGU is that while
Birmingham was a secular university where the philosophy of religion occupied a
marginal place, the religion program at CGU took a central position.
Hick was deeply involved in organizing numerous “philosophy of religion
conferences” nationwide as well as internationally. Through being involved and
arranging these conferences he was able to meet several leading authorities in their areas,
such as Wilfred Cantwell Smith from Harvard, Muhammed Arkoun from the Sorbonne,
79
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Takeuchi Yoshinori from Kyoto, and Zwi Werblowsky from the Hebrew University,
Jerusalem. 81
The Claremont Graduate University was one of the best soils for his still growing
idea of a pluralistic hypothesis in religions to be fully matured to its maximum potential.
His seminars, teachings, and life at CGU were all melded together in his most
comprehensive book on the study of religion, An Interpretation of Religion, 82 which was
published in 1989 by Macmillian and Yale University Press and won the Grawemeyer
Award in Religion in 1991. 83 He sums up his book as follows:
This is a fairly comprehensive book, arguing for the rationality of basing beliefs
on religious as well as sense experience; noting the subjective contribution to all
conscious experience, so that religious experience takes different forms within
different religio-cultural traditions; and suggesting that in order to make sense of
this variety, we have to postulate an ultimate ineffable (or transcategorial) Real
whose universal presence is humanly experienced in these different ways. This is
my “pluralistic hypothesis.” 84
Hick remarked that his presence there made it possible for him to write his book
An Interpretation of Religion and said: “I am not sure that I would have been able to
write this if I had not gone to Claremont with its pervasive spirit of openness to the global
reality of religion. At any rate it was here that I developed my ‘pluralistic hypothesis’
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about the relation between the religions.” 85 As a matter of fact, his presence at CGU had
a major impact on his career as a philosopher of religion.
Along with several other scholars whom he met, Wilfred Cantwell Smith was a
major influence in his career and became a good friend and mentor. Smith was a leading
scholar in comparative religion whose specialization was in Islam. 86 His contribution
particularly in the history of religions was deeply influential, because it rejected the idea
that Christianity was the only true religion and way of salvation, which has been
proposed and widely recognized. In that sense, as Hick calls him, Smith was “the father
of contemporary religious pluralism.” 87
It was also due to his influence that Hick saw the religious traditions as “not
static entities but living movements.” And he adds, “they are not tightly homogeneous
but have each become in the course of time internally highly various.” 88 That is why, he
insists, as there are large differences between Christianity in the first century and
Christianity today, so are Buddhism, Islam, and Hinduism in their early stage and in the
later stage. As Hick observes, Smith “traces the development of the concept of a religion
as a distinct and bounded historical phenomenon.” 89 It is from this idea that Hick must
have drawn the concept of “religious traditions,” which shows the movement and
ongoing progress rather than static “religions.”
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Since his retirement in 1992 at the age of seventy, Hick has been still deeply
productive in writing books and articles and giving lectures. He not only teaches as “an
emeritus professor of both Birmingham University UK and the Claremont Graduate
University, California,” but is actively involved in other activities under titles such as “a
Fellow of the Institute for Advanced Research in Arts and Social Sciences, University of
Birmingham UK, and a Vice-President of the British Society for the Philosophy of
Religion and of the World Congress of Faiths.” 90 Though he is retired officially from the
University, he never stops being a teacher, philosopher, and social activist.
Personal Journey: From Theologian to Philosopher
Having looked at John Hick’s biographical background diachronically, it is time
to look at him from a slightly different angle. In the previous sections Hick’s life has
been examined and described in three dimensions on the basis of historical development.
From here on, I will look at Hick’s life and analyze and synthesize it in two aspects,
mostly on the basis of the biographical background that has been covered. First, in this
section, Hick’s personal pilgrimage from a theologian to a philosopher will be the focus,
discussed in two parts. Second, in the next section, Hick’s view of Scripture, which he
presupposes as a theologian, will be discussed.
Early Hick: The Theologian
For practical reasons, I have divided Hick’s life into two parts: (1) an early
Hick—the theologian; and (2) a later Hick—the philosopher. On the basis of information
provided in the previous sections, in this section I will see how his life pilgrimage
90
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progressed and changed decade by decade as a theologian from the right (the evangelical)
to the left (the liberal). This section will include the period from the 1940s to the 1960s.
The Evangelical Period (to 1940s)
Hick was born and raised in a traditional Anglican Church like average English
children of the time. During his childhood, including his early teen years, though he was
not very excited about the religious activities in the church, as he recalled his life he said
that he had “a rather strong sense of the reality of God as the personal and loving lord of
the universe, and of life as having a meaning within God’s purpose.” 91 In other words,
even before his conversion he believed in “absolutely some sort of divine reality, though
not the God of Christian orthodoxy.” 92 This sense of God’s presence in life must have
been a prevailing experience throughout his life as a theologian as well as a philosopher,
which would be a theological foundation for his religious pluralism.
At the age of eighteen, while studying law at University College, Hull, Hick had a
strong evangelical conversion experience that happened forty-two years before 1982 and
he still remembered clearly. 93 Hick described the excitement of that experience which
happened “on the top deck of a bus in the middle of the city of Hull” as follows: “It was
as though the skies opened up and light poured down and filled me with a sense of
overflowing joy, in response to an immense transcendent goodness and love. I remember
that I couldn’t help smiling broadly—smiling back, as it were, at God.” 94 This experience
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of the ultimate divine Reality and an “evangelical conversion under the impact of the
New Testament figure of Jesus,” 95 Hick insists, became possible through the
circumstances available to him at that time. According to him, he happened to have this
conversion experience into Christianity because his “closest friends at Hull were
members of the InterVarsity Fellowship, the evangelical campus organization.” 96
In this context, Hick came to accept what he calls “the entire fundamentalist
theological package” without hesitation, as mentioned earlier. To him, the Bible was true
and its teachings were literal and historical. I would call this period “the evangelical
period” because during this time Hick was almost a fundamentalist who accepted all the
claims of the Bible as true, just as other evangelical Christians believed.
This dramatic conversion experience completely changed his life direction from
law to Christian ministry. Of course, since he was a member of the InterVarsity
Fellowship, which then had a strong affiliation with the Presbyterian Church of England,
Hick intended to do Presbyterian ministry. Hick remained as what he loved to call an
“evangelical fundamentalist” for the rest of his time at Hull and the first year at
Edinburgh. 97 During that first year, Hick was deeply involved in the activities of the
Christian Union, “attending virtually all its Bible studies, prayer meetings, and talks.” 98
When war broke out, he served in the Friends Ambulance Unit as a conscientious
objector on the basis of Christian conviction that Jesus was against the mass violence of
war. This evangelical type of Christianity in Hick’s life must have been dominant even
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after the war, though there was a sign of departure from the “biblical fundamentalism.”
When he returned from the war, at Edinburgh he stayed away from the Christian Union,
but he still continued to be theologically conservative. His experience in war and
philosophical training must have made some major impact on his life to raise “awkward
questions” 99 as follows: “Could one understand the sun standing still for about a day as
recounted in Joshua 10:13?” “Can biological evolution responsibly be rejected just
because it is contrary to the book of Genesis?” “Does the infinite love of God go well
with eternal torment in hell?” “Are there,” he insisted, “not innumerable contradictions
between this biblical text and that?” 100 Though there were some signs of change in his
theological position, he did remain “a very conservative Christian” 101 during his school
years at Edinburgh and Oxford.
Philosophical Turn to the Pluralistic Thinking
(1950–1960s)
In the beginning of the 1950s, Hick started his theological training to be a
minister at Westminster Theological College, Cambridge. During this period at
Cambridge, Hick still showed his orthodox views in Christian theology. For example,
there he remembers “being profoundly shocked by a graduate student who argued that
Jesus was not God incarnate but a remarkable human being.” 102 This experience shows
that his Christology, in general, must have been still conservative and orthodox.
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After a strong fundamentalist Christian period, Hick’s pilgrimage as a theologian
and philosopher really began to take place during his teaching career. As noted above,
Hick started his career as a minister of a local Presbyterian church in Northumberland,
near Scotland. Hick began his ministry along with his married life there in Belford
Church. He stayed there two and a half years, preaching two sermons every week. His
sermons, he insists, “are biblically based.” 103 Nothing particular on his theological view
is noticed during this period.
Hick began his teaching career at Cornell University as a professor of the
philosophy of religion. During his Cornell years, Hick remained a conservative
theologian and published an article criticizing the Scottish theologian Donald Baillie’s
Christology in Scottish Journal of Theology, showing his still conservative views on
Christology.
However, as the title of the chapter in his autobiography “Heretic at Princeton
Seminary” implies, Hick had a bitter experience while he was at the Princeton
Theological Seminary, which shows a minor but sure turn toward pluralistic thinking. As
a professor of the Seminary, he needed to have his ministerial credentials transferred
from England to the United States. He was asked if there was anything in the Westmister
Confession of 1647 to which he took exception. He admitted that some articles he did not
affirm and did not regard as essential to the central doctrine of incarnation, including “the
literal interpretation of the first two chapters of Genesis,” 104 “the predestination of many
to eternal hell, the verbal inspiration of the Bible, and the virgin birth of Jesus.” 105 The
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majority of the New Testament writers, he insists, admit that Christ was the Word
Incarnate, but “none of them mentions the idea of a virgin birth.”106 His agnosticism
centered upon the last point: “The virgin birth of Jesus” was a beginning sign of his drift
from evangelical Christianity. His point was that his agnosticism in regard to the doctrine
of the virgin birth of Jesus did not hurt the affirmation of the “central Christian faith in
the incarnation.” 107
Having taught in universities in the United States for over eight years, Hick
returned to England, teaching as Lecturer in Divinity at Cambridge University. He
remained as a Lecturer there for three years from 1964 to 1967. There he published his
Evil and the God of Love (1966), which became one of the classics in that area of study.
He advocated the “Irenaean theodicy” (soul-making theodicy), while arguing against the
traditional Augustinian model with its emphasis on the doctrine of the original sin that
humans inherited from the first parents after the fall. The Irenaean theodicy laid a
foundation for the later development of an eschatological model, 108 which will be dealt
with in depth in following chapters.
One noticeable beginning of Hick’s shift toward the left, though it was not a
theological one yet, was observed in his article “Christology at the Cross Roads”
published in Prospect for Theology in 1966. Discussing the nature of Christ and his
uniqueness, Hick was inclined to say that Christ’s uniqueness is “a uniqueness of
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degree” 109 rather than of kind as the traditional Christology claims. “He had one nature,”
he also insisted, “and this nature was wholly and unqualifiedly human.” 110 In other words,
Jesus must be fully human yet different “in degree of human possibility, such as faith,
obedience to God, or openness to divine grace.” 111 This was a sign that Hick was taking
another step toward an end to his identification with orthodox Christianity.
In 1967, Hick moved from Cambridge to Birmingham University to acquire the
chair of H. G. Wood Professor in the Theology Department. He preferred a position with
more academic freedom to a university with a high reputation. This move to Birmingham
made a dramatic change in Hick’s career as a theologian and philosopher. During this
period, Hick’s pluralistic theology of religions, as Hick himself remarks, did come as a
result of many interrelated factors that he encountered. First, based on his Irenaean
theodicy proposed in his recent book Evil and the God of Love (1966), the idea that the
good God would not destroy the majority of human beings but rather save them all
eventually paved the way to arrive at his pluralism in the near future. Second, as Hick
himself said, his move to the multicultural, multiracial, and multi-religious city of
Birmingham as well as what he calls “race relations” and “community relations”
contributed to his pluralistic hypothesis of world religions. 112 Third, Wilfred Cantwell
Smith’s book, The Meaning and End of Religions (1962), which presents the “convincing
109

John Hick, “Christology at the Cross Roads,” in Prospect for Theology, ed. F.
G. Healey (London: James Nisbet, 1966), 140. Here Hick called it a “Degree or NeoArian Christology.” As Eddy noted, Hick presented the “agape incarnational
Christology” (Eddy, “John Hick’s Pluralist Philosophy of World Religions,” 112).
110

Hick, “Christology at the Cross Roads,” 164.

111

Ibid., 140.

112

Hick, God Has Many Names, 17.
46

critique of the concept of a religion and of the notion of religions as contraposed
sociotheological communities,” 113 made a big impact on his development of religious
pluralism. According to Smith, “A true relationship to God may occur in the lives of
people in each of the great religious traditions.” 114 The final sign of his move to
pluralistic theology is observed in his Christianity at the Center (1968), which rejects the
orthodox system of belief such as “the infallible inspiration of the scriptures, or the fall of
man, or the virgin birth, or the bodily resurrection, or contra-natural miracles, or the
sanctity of the church.” 115
During this period Hick showed major changes from Orthodox Christianity to a
more liberal one, and even to the beginning stage of the pluralist mode. However, he was
not yet fully pluralistic in his theological approach, as will be discussed in the following
section. John Hick, in this period, could be seen as a theologian or Christian philosopher
rather than a philosopher or pluralist.
Later Hick: The Philosopher
John Hick was no longer a Christian theologian in a traditional sense, but a
philosopher or religious pluralist, from the 1970s and onward. He was fully converted to
religious pluralism and became a passionate advocate of it. In this section, I will divide
Hick’s life into two periods: (1) Pluralist from a Christian perspective (1970s); and (2)
Pluralist from a Philosophical perspective (1980s–present).
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Pluralist from a Christian Perspective (1970s)
On top of the three influences noted above that paved the way for Hick to
advocate religious pluralism, in 1970 Hick was planning to “write a major work on
eschatology,” as D’Costa observed, “based on eschatological thought” on the major
world religions. 116 This project was reinforced by his trips to India (1974 and 1975–
1976) and to Sri Lanka (1974), where he had real encounters with Hinduism and
Buddhism and their doctrine of reincarnation. As a result, six years later Hick’s magnum
opus in the global theology of eschatology, Death and Eternal Life (1976), was published
and made available to all adherents of religion. In this book, the concept of his
eschatological model called “pareschatology,” which is a combination of the
eschatologies from the Eastern and the Western religions, was proposed finally as a result
of his theology of the “God” who is center of all.
However, in 1973, while he was still working on his global theology of
eschatology, Hick published his first full-fledged pluralist book, God and the Universe of
Faiths (1973), which was a compilation of articles. Also, for the first time, he presented
the idea of a “Copernican revolution” 117 in the theology of religions. Hick’s selfdescribed Copernican revolution consisted of “a paradigm shift from a Christianitycentered or Jesus-centered model to a God-centered model of the universe of faiths.” 118
The great world religions, he insisted, are different human perceptions of the same divine
Reality due to the different historical circumstances. Hick, as Paul R. Eddy observes, tries
to relegate “any theological position—from any religious tradition—that attempts to
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maintain the superiority or normativity of its belief system over against those of other
religions to the category of Ptolemaic theology.” 119
Having launched a new paradigm shift from Church-centeredness or Christcenteredness to God-centeredness in regard to the world religions, Hick now faced some
Christological questions. If Jesus, Hick argued, was literally God incarnate (the Son of
God and one of the Trinity) and Christianity was founded by him, “it is then very hard to
escape from the traditional view” that salvation is only available through Christianity
because Jesus is the only way for it. 120 Then, as he used to affirm, “the whole human race
ought to be converted to Christianity.” 121 The solution for this dilemma was well
presented in his newly edited book Myth of God Incarnate (1977). As D’Costa suggests,
“Hick argued that biblical criticism (and here he relied heavily on his co-contributors)
and the evidence from other religions required a mythological, rather than literal,
understanding of incarnational language.” 122 As expected, this book caused major
controversies among scholars as well as conservative Christians. The book argues that the
historical Jesus did not claim to be divine, that incarnational doctrine is a result of the
church’s theologization, and that the incarnation story of Jesus is not to be taken literally,
but rather mythologically. “If Jesus was literally God incarnate,” Hick argues, “and if it is
by his death alone that men can be saved . . . then the only doorway to eternal life is
119
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Christian faith.” 123 Therefore, Hick argues, “the Christian pluralist should see the idea of
divine incarnation as a metaphorical rather than a literal idea.” 124
During the 1970s, Hick still appeared to be developing the theology of pluralism
from the Christian perspective. In other words, though developing the radical views of
religions and religious pluralism, he was doing it as a Christian philosopher. His heavy
use of Christian vocabulary—God, Jesus, Incarnation—was one of the sure evidences
that his starting point was still Christianity.
Pluralist from a Philosophical Perspective
(1980s–Present)
However, from the 1980s, Hick the philosopher began presenting his theory of
world religions from a completely different perspective. As Eddy observes, whereas
“prior to this, Hick had primarily . . . defended his pluralist perspective from the vantagepoint of a Christian theology of religions,” now, “Hick made the conscious attempt to
develop a (tradition-independent) pluralist philosophy of religions.” 125 As noted above,
though the original move toward pluralism had started much earlier, his move to a radical
pluralism began to take place in the 1980s.
For example, in 1980, Hick published his new book God Has Many Names,
composed of several essays directed to a new approach of religious pluralism. Here, our
own religion, he claimed, is not the only one but only “one of several—Buddhism, Islam,
Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and so on.” 126 Thus, Hick added, “we have been like a
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company of people marching down a long valley . . . unaware that over the hill there is
another valley, with another great company of people marching in the same
direction . . . ; and over another hill yet another marching group—each ignorant of the
existence of the others.” 127 This metaphor implies that every religion is in illusion that
each one is the only group going to the final destination, yet everyone is on the right track.
On answering to the commonly asked question on the phenomenal multiplicity of
God, Hick presents his own solution by adopting Kant’s distinction between noumenon
and phenomenon. There are, Hick suggests, “the single divine noumenon, the Eternal One
in itself” and “the plurality of divine phenomena, the divine personae of the theistic
religions and . . . of the Absolute in the nontheistic religions.” 128 This distinction between
noumenal God and phenomenal God is a philosophical answer to the multiplicity of god.
Therefore, Hick insists, as his book title God Has Many Names suggests, God has not
only many names but many faces as perceived by the different religions. He concludes
the article “God Has Many Names” as follows: “I mean that the Eternal One is perceived
within different human cultures under different forms, both personal and nonpersonal,
and that from these different perceptions arise the religious ways of life which we call the
great world faiths.” 129 According to him, the great world religions are basically the finite
“different human perceptions” of the infinite Eternal One, or the Real. 130
Hick’s move to Claremont in 1982 made him even more devoted to his already
growing religious pluralism and helped it mature into the pluralistic hypothesis.
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Claremont was the perfect place where he could interact with other religions in the
context of the East and West interaction. As Danforth Professor of the Philosophy of
Religion at Claremont Graduate University, Hick did have the opportunity to organize
numerous conferences and lectures. Also, two of his colleagues, the process theologian
John Cobb Jr. and the Buddhist scholar Masao Abe, gave him a chance to refine and
clarify his pluralistic hypothesis.
In 1987, Hick published Myth of Christian Uniqueness, another monumental
contribution to his pluralistic hypothesis, as a result of a conference held under the
auspices of the Blaisdell Lecture Series at Claremont planned by Hick and Paul Knitter. It
was a compilation of twelve essays which showed its strength, getting a consensus from
other Christian theologians—“Protestant and Catholic, female and male, East and West,
First and Third World.” 131 The principal gain of this publication was that Hick found
strong fellow scholars and advocates of religious pluralism from all over.
The year 1989 saw the publication of Hick’s magnum opus on the pluralistic
hypothesis: An Interpretation of Religion, an expanded version of his prestigious
1986–87 Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh. This book no doubt is one of
the most comprehensive and most refined volumes among Hick’s books on religious
pluralism. As Eddy notes, “the major philosophical and religious issues to which Hick
has devoted himself over the years” are available in this “comprehensive interpretation of
religion.” 132
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Though he was officially retired from full-time professorship at Claremont in
1993, Hick has never retired from his rigorous writing and lecturing. He has published a
number of books since then, clarifying and refining his theory of world religions. Now in
his late eighties, Hick is still refining his thoughts through writings and lectures.
In this section, I have sketched Hick’s personal pilgrimage from a theologian to a
philosopher, from an evangelical Christian to a pluralist religionist. The question is: What
made this dramatic change in his life from a fundamentalist Christian to a pluralist
philosopher of religion? The issues related to this question will be discussed in the
following section, because a theologian’s change in theological position relies, in part, on
how he or she views the Scripture.
Hick’s Starting Point: Views of Scripture
Here I examine Hick’s views of Scripture, which reveal his theological
presuppositions. How he viewed the Scripture made the whole difference in his theology
and theories of world religions. Thus it is crucial to look at his views of Scripture to
understand his theological starting point. For example, his interpretation of the first two
chapters of Genesis formed his view of man and his destiny, 133 so that it made a great
impact on his whole system of theology.
Theological Presuppositions
The religious pluralism of John Hick must be seen and analyzed in his life-long
struggle with Christian theology and its relationship with other world religions. As noted
earlier, he began his theological journey as an extremely conservative—what Hick calls
fundamentalist—Christian following his powerful conversion experience. During his
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early teaching career, some theological changes began to take place gradually. First of all,
while Hick was at Princeton Theological Seminary, he began to question some Christian
doctrines such as “the six days creation of the world, and Adam and Eve’s eating of the
forbidden fruit” in Gen 2, and “the doctrine of double predestination” and “the virgin
birth of Jesus.” 134 Even before Hick published his radical book on religious pluralism,
God and the Universe of Faiths (1973), he already showed his list of Christian doctrines
that were “either quite untenable or open to serious doubt” 135 as follows: divine
revelation, creation ex nihilo, original sin, atonement, virgin birth, miracles of the Bible,
resurrection, regeneration, heaven and hell. However, these were only a beginning
compared with his complete rejection of the historicity of the Bible through mythological
interpretation.
What are the factors that caused those gradual and eventually dramatic changes in
his theological position? Hick’s major concern in doing his theology seemed to focus on
two factors: (1) His concern for “contemporary scientific knowledge”; (2) another
concern for “the newly encountered fact of the other religions.” 136 Hick insists that
theology is “an on-going activity in which the Church continually adjusts or (in times of
rapid change) reconstructs” 137 its doctrines. According to this principle, the theological
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system can anytime be modified or reconstructed on the basis of the new discoveries of
science or other religions.
First of all, though he seems to reject the naturalistic theory of the universe,
namely naturalism, 138 by claiming that “the naturalistic theory is incompatible with
Christian belief,” 139 Hick cannot escape being accused of founding his theological system
on the basis of naturalism. For example, he adopted the basic presupposition of the liberal
theology that “there is no conflict between science and religion.” 140 Then Hick added,
“There is in fact no point at which the theological claim clashes with scientific
descriptions.” 141 Problems, however, arise when they seem to clash with each other. For
instance, when the six-day creation story seems to clash with modern scientific
knowledge, 142 it is interpreted as a myth rather than a historical and literal event. Thus,
138
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according to his reasoning, all Christian doctrines “must pass the tests of reason and
experience, and one’s mind must be open to new facts.” 143 As a result, science or reason
takes the place of revelation.
There is another concern that contributed in shaping Hick’s theological system,
“coming from the wider religious world.” 144 As a Christian theologian his gradual
exposure to other religions such as Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and many others made
continuous and eventually dramatic changes in his view of Christianity and other
religions. Through his lifelong teaching career and experiences with other religions, he
came to the conclusion that “Christianity represents one major historical strand among
others.” 145 “What we call a religion,” Hick insists, “as an empirical entity that can be
traced historically and mapped geographically, is a human phenomenon.” Thus great
world religions are human responses to the Divine, and are human creations.
These two factors radically reshaped Hick’s Christian theology and its
relationship with other religions. Thus, to Hick, theology is not “a body of divinely
revealed truths” anymore, but “a continuing process of human reflection and theorizing
aiming to clarify the meaning of man’s religious experience.” 146 In this theological
system the restriction to the religious data of a single tradition (an exclusive revelation) is
not allowed. On the basis of these theological presuppositions, I now look at his views on
certain issues of Christian doctrines.
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Some Examples of Interpretation
On the basis of theological presuppositions mentioned above, I take a closer look
at his views on certain issues of Christian doctrines. Among many other texts, two
examplary cases that are crucial to traditional Christianity are included for discussion: the
creation story of Genesis, and accounts of Jesus in the four Gospels.
The Creation Story of Genesis
As noted above, Hick already in 1970 included the doctrine of creation ex nihilo
in the list of Christian doctrines that is “either quite untenable or open to serious doubt”
in his article “The Reconstruction of Christian Belief for Today and Tomorrow.” 147 The
literal understanding of the creation of the universe and humanity seems to have some
obvious conflicts with modern scientific knowledge. Adopting the claims of natural
science, in his Death and Eternal Life (1976), Hick affirmed the doctrine of a long-agecreation of life by God rather than the six-day creation of the Bible. He said:
We must assume that the picture being built up by the natural sciences of the
origin of man, both individually and as a species, is basically correct and is
progressively becoming more adequate and accurate as research continues.
According to this picture, life on this planet began with natural chemical reactions
occurring under the influence of radiations falling upon the earth’s surface. Thus
began the long, slow evolution of the forms of life, a process which has eventually
produced man. And each human individual comes about through the partially
random selection of a specific genetic code out of the virtually infinite range of
possibilities contained even in the portion of genetic material lodged in his
parents. . . . And Christianity does not offer a different or rival account of our
human origins. 148
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Hick calls the literal understanding of man’s creation in Gen 2 the “Hebraic myth
of man’s genesis,” 149 which shows a spirit of contempt for the literal understanding of the
Bible. Thus regarding the creation of human beings, he insists, “It has taken many
hundreds of millions of years of biological evolution to produce him.” 150 To Hick, the
origin of life is not through God’s supernatural act of creation as recorded in Genesis, but
through the natural process called evolution. Yet, Hick considers himself “a creationist”
in the sense that he believes that “the universe is God’s creation,” and he believes that
“God’s creative work is progressive and continuous and that biological evolution is a part
of it.” 151 Accepting both creationism and evolutionism that God created the universe
through the process of evolution, Hick can be called a theistic evolutionist. This is only
one of many examples of how Hick views the teachings of the Bible.
Accounts of Jesus in the Four Gospels
As discussed earlier, Hick began doubting the literal and historical understanding
of many accounts of Jesus in the four Gospels from the early stage of his teaching career.
For example, he showed his doubt of the doctrine of the virgin birth of Jesus while
affirming his incarnation, which he called “the central doctrine” 152 during his stay at
Princeton Theological Seminary. His view on Jesus’ accounts became more liberal in his
later article, “The Reconstruction of Christian Belief for Today and Tomorrow” (1970).
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Here Hick included three major Christological issues that seemed to him quite doubtful:
atonement, virgin birth, and resurrection. These were put in the list because their literal
interpretation is in serious conflict with modern science and does not pass the test of
reason. Hick’s agnosticism on these issues was only a beginning step to opposing the
central doctrine of incarnation. Hick went on further because as long as the doctrine of
incarnation is retained, his pluralistic hypothesis would not be able to stand. For if Jesus
was literally God, and Christianity was founded by this Jesus, it is necessary that
everyone must be Christian in order to be saved. The doctrine of incarnation must have
been one of the major obstacles that must be disregarded or at least must be reinterpreted
in his then-developing pluralistic hypothesis.
Thus, finally in Hick’s edited volume The Myth of God Incarnate (1977) he had
to conclude that Jesus was “a metaphorical son of God” rather than “a metaphysical God
the Son” as Christians claimed. 153 His conclusion was drawn from his liberal
hermeneutics with respect to the four Gospels. According to the “consensus,” Hick insists,
that is common to at least the most of university scholars, “none of them was in fact
written by an eye witness.” 154 The Synoptic Gospels, Hick argues, must have been
written as late as A.D. 70 and A.D. 80, while the Gospel of John was written in the 90s or
even later. He also claims that “Jesus himself did not teach that he was God incarnate, or
God the Son” 155 on the basis of the scholarly consensus. The Synoptic Gospels, he insists,
never taught that Jesus taught his divinity, while John’s Jesus claims that he is God
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incarnate. On the basis of this information, Hick seems to make the distinction between
“the Jesus of history,” and “the Christ of faith” to solve the dilemma of being
contradictory to each other. He argues that “the Jesus of history” mainly depicted in the
Synoptic Gospels, in which Jesus never taught that he was God, was changed by the
church’s theologizing Jesus’ life, which happened in the Gospel of John and in the
history of the Christian church, making him God incarnate.
Therefore all the hard-to-believe events of the Gospels, Hick argues, required
reinterpretation through the glasses of modern science. If accounts concerning Jesus in
the four Gospels do not pass the tests of reason, Hick reinterprets them as myth. As a
result, insists Hick, in the course of church history the Jesus of history was transformed
into the Christ of faith; the metaphorical son of God became the metaphysical God the
Son. Though it is not my main goal here to criticize his biblical hermeneutics, it must be
addressed that his hermeneutics are very much biased. His selection of biblical scholars
was not balanced, but one-sided. Most of them, if not all, were from the liberal circle who
shared the same hermeneutical principle of testing the Bible by human reason alone.
Mythological Understanding of the Bible
Traditional Christians believe that the Bible is the special and supernatural
revelation of God. To them the stories of the Bible such as creation, fall, virgin birth,
resurrection, and numerous miracles, must be understood literally, thus historically. This
literal and historical interpretation of the Bible was one of the traditional ways of looking
at biblical texts, seeking “to discover the author’s intent by focusing on the author’s
words in their plain, most obvious sense.” 156 The Reformers of the sixteenth century,
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rejecting the fourfold meaning 157 of Medieval theologians, argued for the single sense.
Luther insisted that this is “the very simplest, . . . the literal, ordinary, natural sense.” 158
Hick’s mythological interpretation of the Bible, though not on every text, may have been
similar to the allegorical interpretation. Though myth 159 to Hick is not exactly the same
as allegory, they share one thing in common: They are neither literal nor historical.
What does he mean by myth then? He describes myth as follows:
I mean by a myth a story that is not literally true but that has the power to evoke
in its hearers a practical response to the myth’s referent—a true myth being of
course one that evokes an appropriate response. The truthfulness of a myth is thus
a practical truthfulness, consisting in its capacity to orient us rightly in our lives.
In so far as the heavenly Parent is an authentic manifestation of the Real, to think
of the Real as an ideal parent is to think in a way that can orient us rightly to the
Real, evoking in us a trust which can pervade our lives and free us to love our
neighbor. 160
We cannot claim that all elements in the Bible must be interpreted literally,
because, for instance, as Hick illustrates, God the father cannot be our father in a literal
sense, but in an analogy. God is described by Scripture in many ways such as Creator,
Father, King, Lord, Shepherd, Rock, Commander, and so on. These obviously must be
seen figuratively rather than literally. However, Hick’s mythological interpretation sees
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almost all events as well as teachings in the Bible are not literal 161 and therefore as not
true. For example, Hick considered “the stories of the creation of the world in seven days,
and of the fall of Adam and Eve and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden” as “wellknown religious myths,” 162 thus they must not be literally true. His distinction between
literal truths and mythological truths 163 of the Bible are his way of getting rid of being in
conflict with science in his theological interpretation.
Furthermore, the story of Jesus being the Son of God (incarnation) and coming
down from heaven to save sinners as a human baby is “not literally true,” Hick argues,
“because it cannot be given an acceptable literal meaning, but is on the other hand
mythologically true in that it tends to evoke in us an appropriate attitude to the Divine,
the Real, as the ultimate source of all salvific transformation.” 164 The mythological
understanding of incarnation is not only one of many rejections of biblical teaching, but it
is a rejection of everything in Christian theology because Christianity itself is founded on
Jesus’ being God, or God the Son, or the Second Person of a divine Trinity. As it is the
main thesis of Hick’s edited book Myth of God Incarnate, if the incarnation of Jesus is
not literally true, Christianity will lose the foundation on which it is built.
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Summary and Conclusion
John Hick’s life journey as a theologian and philosopher of religions is a lifelong
pilgrimage from an exclusivist to an inclusivist, and eventually to a pluralist who not only
approves other religions as true and genuine responses to the Real, but as a result, denies
the essence of Christianity by rejecting its fundamental doctrine of incarnation. Hick’s
theology of religions, as discussed above, was a result of his lifelong experience of
multidimensional aspects throughout his life: religious, academic, and social.165 Though
the biographical sketch of Hick is not exhaustive, the background of his theological
pluralism has been adequately addressed in the present chapter.
In concluding, it is worth reiterating some aspects presented earlier in this
chapter: that Hick’s personal experiences as a Christian, professor, and social activist led
him to doubt some Christian doctrines and to open the door for pluralistic ideas; that his
mythological interpretation of the Bible was his solution for conflicts with science; that
this mythological interpretation of biblical accounts led him to reinterpret and then
ultimately to reject the Christian doctrine of incarnation; that this whole process led him
to the eventual rejection of the Bible and eventually changed his life direction to become
“the leading spokesperson for an extremely pluralistic theology of religions.” 166
Life Experience
The leading spokesperson of religious pluralism, John Hick, was born out of
multidimensional aspects—religious experience as Christian, academic experience as a
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professor of many universities, and social relations in different cities and universities—of
a lifelong pilgrimage. There were, in his lifelong pilgrimage, two main factors that
shaped his theological framework. First, being the foundation of the latter, was the
scientific knowledge that had a big impact on his theological thinking, because his
starting point in theology was the presupposition of liberal theology that there was no
inherent contradiction between theology and science. All theological truths must pass the
tests of reason. Second, it was his exposure to the religions of world that shaped his
theological system. Hick was not merely a theoretician who did research in a study, but
an activist who continuously had interactions with other thinkers and religious groups.
Throughout his lifetime, he has been involved in numerous conferences, seminars, and
committees for religious, academic, and social matters. Through these, he began to reach
the realization that there are many pious religions seeking the common goal of liberation
or salvation. Thus, he insists, Christianity is only one of many different yet equally valid
religions or one of many “different perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly
different responses to, the real or the ultimate.” 167
Mythological Interpretation of the Bible
Since the doctrines of Christianity must pass the tests of human reason, and must
have no conflict with science, Hick inevitably had to reinterpret biblical texts. When the
teachings of the Bible are in conflict with scientific knowledge of today, Hick must treat
them as myth.
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For example, the story of the sun standing still for twenty-four hours recorded in
Josh 10:12–14 is regarded as untrue by the modern mind of science, so he could not see it
as a literal and historical event. When this same principle of mythological interpretation
is applied to the great teachings of Jesus’ incarnation, it eventually leads people to the
denial of Jesus’ divinity. According to Hick’s mythological interpretation, Jesus is not
God the Son but merely a human like us. As discussed earlier, the Christ of the church is
a result of the Church’s confession of faith. The Christ figure of Christianity, argues Hick,
possibly is “a creation of the human religious imagination.” 168 Thus, to Hick, Jesus boils
down to “someone whom we try to follow as our model.” 169 The human Jesus of
Nazareth was just as sinful, frail, and imperfect as other humans are. This rejection of
Jesus’ incarnation and thus divinity must lead Hick to the denial of biblical authority as
well as Christianity itself, because Jesus Christ being our Savior God is the foundation of
Christianity. Thus the way for religious pluralism is wide open.
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CHAPTER III
AN ANALYSIS OF HICK’S PLURALISTIC HYPOTHESIS
Introduction
The biographical sketch of John Hick shows that Hick’s theology of world
religions was not a result of his theological studies or reflections alone, but of his lifelong
struggle with his own religious, academic, and social life experiences. While chapter 2
shows how Hick developed his theology of world religion throughout his lifetime,
chapter 3 will investigate Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis per se at a deeper level. It is
necessary to examine Hick’s pluralism before entering into the discussion of his
eschatological model of world religion. In other words, Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis,
particularly the theocentric model of world religion, is the basis of other parts of his
system. Thus, it is necessary to discuss Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis in depth as a
prerequisite in order to understand his eschatological model of world religion.
While the main purpose of this chapter is to focus on the overall picture of Hick’s
religious pluralism, the major elements of his religious pluralism will be included in this
study. Apart from the introduction and the conclusion, there will be four sections
describing some key concepts of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis in this chapter. First,
Hick’s self-described “Copernican Revolution” will be discussed as a general picture of
his theocentrism, which became the foundation of his theoretical framework. Second,
Hick’s concept of “the Real,” which is the basis of his pluralistic hypothesis, will be
included in discussion. Hick’s interpretation of the real plays a key role in the further
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discussion of his pluralism. Third, Christology, Hick’s biggest obstacle for his pluralistic
hypothesis, will be discussed. It is included because it shows how he views Christ, who is
the foundation of Christianity and, according to the historic Christian faith, is the only
way of salvation. Finally, soteriology, which is the common denominator of all religions
and closely related with eschatology, will be discussed as an opening door for the
eschatology in the following chapter.
Hick’s “Copernican Revolution” and Subsequent Kantian Shift
The theological foundation of Hick’s religious pluralism is based upon his
theocentric model of world religion. This theocentrism is Hick’s answer to the problem of
plurality of religions and their conflicting truth claims and salvation claims. 1 It is clearly
seen in his self-described “Copernican revolution.” Hick adopted the term “Copernican
revolution” from astronomy, in which it “involved a shift from the dogma that the earth is
the centre of the revolving universe to the realization that it is the sun that is at the centre,
with all the planets, including our own earth, moving around it.” 2 Thus, the essence of
Hick’s Copernican revolution in Christian theology “must involve an equally radical
transformation of our conception of the universe of faiths and the place of our own
religion within it,” 3 and must involve “a shift from the dogma that Christianity is at the
1

The background of the Copernican revolution in theology is that orthodox
Christianity claims that there is no salvation outside the church, or outside Christianity. If
this is true, Hick argues, those who are not Christian are not saved but damned or lost.
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centre to the realization that it is God who is at the centre, and that all the religions of
mankind, including our own, serve and revolve around him.” 4 As a result, the concept of
God takes the place of church or Christ in Christianity as the central doctrine upon which
all other doctrines are built. This involves “a parallel abandonment of the Christianitycentred assumption through recognition that Christianity is one of several religious
traditions.” 5 As D’Costa says, “the Copernican revolution marked a shift from
ecclesiocentrism and Christocentrism to one of theocentrism.” 6
Therefore, as Philip Almond notes, “the revolutionary aspect” of Hick’s view sees
that “other religions are not assessed in the light of a theology constructed independently
of them (so-called Ptolemaic epi-cycle theologies), but rather are a part, and crucially so,
of the act of doing theology in a global context.” 7 Hick, unlike Hans Küng who argued
for a “theocentric view” and whose God is the God of the Bible, seems to view all
specific ideas of God as “culturally determined” 8 and thus as appearing in different
cultures differently as Jahweh, Allah, Vishnu, Shiva, Brahman, Nirvana, Sunyata, Tao,
4
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and so on. 9 Hick’s Copernican revolution leads to the idea that all religions have access
and are in contact with the Real, but that the differences between religions are the result
of their historical, cultural, and geographical differences. The theocentric model of
religion is the fundamental basis for Hick’s religious pluralism, which has some direct
implications. First, it has crucial implications for Christology, because Hick’s
theocentrism inevitably clashes with the foundational doctrine of Christianity, the
doctrine of incarnation. Second, Hick’s concept of the Real is very close to the God of the
Bible. Theism is assumed in his system no matter what terminology he uses for the
Ultimate Reality. Finally, there are apparently conflicting truth claims of different
religious traditions in his pluralistic hypothesis.
Hick’s Early Theocentric Model of Religions
The theocentric model 10 of world religions is Hick’s early pre-Kantian way of
solving the inevitable problem and dilemma that he faced in truth claims 11 and salvation
9

Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent,
271, 278. Hick argues that the Real is perceived differently, depending on various
cultures, as personal beings or impersonal absolutes.
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As will be noted in the following subsection, there is a Kantian shift in Hick’s
model of religions. This shift is a further development, which D’Costa calls
“Realocentrism” in Hick’s thought after his transition from Christocentrism to
theocentrism, which Hick calls his Copernican revolution. However, Hick’s
Realocentrism replacing theocentrism does not mark as radical a shift as happened in his
Copernican revolution. Rather it marks a change of terminologies or broadening of the
theistically colored Christian name of God to “the idea of an ultimate Reality” (John Hick,
“Straightening the Record: Some Response to Critics,” Modern Theology 6, no. 2 [Jan.
1991], 189). Therefore, in my dissertation, I consider Hick’s Realocentrism as a
broadening or further development of theocentrism.
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claims among different religions. The biggest obstacle that Hick encountered in his
thinking toward a pluralistic hypothesis from the Christian perspective was “a central
Christian position that salvation is through Christ alone,” 12 that is, “outside the church, or
outside Christianity, there is no salvation.” 13 Hick’s proposal of theocentrism was his
reconciling answer to the exclusive attitude of Christianity toward other religions, and at
the same time was a sign of the denial of the fundamental Christian doctrine of
incarnation. Hick’s theological argument that the concept of God or the divine is a
common denominator of world religion is foundational to his religious pluralism.
There are two factors that led Hick the theocentric view of world religion: (1) the
theological and moral argument—the concept of God’s “universal love”; 14 (2) the
phenomenological argument—the cultural relativity of religions. 15 The first factor that
led Hick to his theocentric model of world religion is his idea of God who is “the God of
universal love.” 16 Hick’s idea of God must have been borrowed from the Christian
concept of God whose dominant attribute is love. The concept of God’s universal love,
Hick argues, is not compatible with the real world where there are numerous people,
Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, ed. Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker
[New York: Oxford University Press, 2000], 162).
12
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maybe the majority of human beings, who are “outside the historical influence of Jesus of
Nazareth” 17 and are damned or lost. He adds, “Thus the doctrine that there is no salvation
outside historic Christianity would in effect deny the universal love and redeeming
activity of God.” 18 This concept of God’s universal love was a dominant attribute of God
which led Hick to the initial development toward pluralistic thinking. As expressed in his
book, Evil and God of Love (1966), God’s universal love was presupposed in Hick’s
theological framework. Hick argues, if “God is the God of universal love” who wants to
save all, he must save at least the large majority of the human race if not all rather than
“only a small minority” as Christians claim. 19 It is this moral contradiction, in part, that
led Hick to theocentrism.
The second factor that led Hick to theocentrism was phenomenological in nature:
the cultural relativity of religions. 20 This view, as Eddy observed it, is founded in the
phenomenon that “one’s membership within one of the world’s religions is generally a
factor of parentage and birth place.” 21 For instance, Hick argues, “when someone, anyone,
is born to Muslim parents in Egypt or Pakistan or Indonesia, that person is very likely to
become a Muslim; when to Buddhist parents in Tibet or Sri Lanka or Japan, to become a
Buddhist; when to Hindu parents in India, to become a Hindu; when to Christian parents
17
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in Mexico or Poland or Italy to become a Catholic Christian; and so on.” 22 The idea that
religion is an accident of birth led Hick to theocentrism, because it poses a problem in the
traditional Christian exclusivism that there is no salvation outside the church or
Christianity. In other words, if one’s religion is based on one’s ethnic, cultural, or
geographic background, it is not fair to say that anybody’s religion is better than
somebody else’s because they are all relative. The only fair answer is, Hick would argue,
that everybody has slightly different views of the same God from his or her different
backgrounds. 23
Hick’s Later Shift to a Kantian Model of Religions
Under the influence of Kantian philosophy, Hick proposed his “own
contribution . . . to the epistemology of religion,” 24 which became the main solution to
the conflicting truth claims particularly in regard to the different views of the Ultimate
22

Hick, A Christian Theology of Religions: The Rainbow of Faiths, 8. He even
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born” (Hick, God Has Many Names, 61).
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of human culture, and within each main cultural region the response to the divine has
taken its own characteristic forms” (Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, 138). Hick
uses the parable of the blind men and the elephant, believed to be told by Buddha. The
fact that all had different views of the same elephant, by having limited and different
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Reality. With an appeal to Kant’s distinction between “phenomena” and “noumena,” 25 or
between a “Ding an sich and that thing as it appears to human consciousness,” 26 Hick,
applying this insight to the awareness of the Real, distinguishes “between the noumenal
Real, the Real an sich, and the Real as humanly perceived in different ways as range of
divine phenomena.” 27 Thus, as Eddy rightly observes, “Hick began to experiment with a
variety of terms” 28 for “God” 29 such as “the Eternal One,” 30 “the Divine, the
Transcendent, the Ultimate, the Real”31 in search of a more religiously neutral term,
before he finally settled on his favorite one, “the Real.”
25
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This whole process of changing terminologies for this Ultimate Reality occurred
over a period of time, 32 from the 70s to the late 80s and onward, and particularly in his
An Interpretation of Religion (1989). This, however, does not mean that Hick has
changed his idea concerning “an ultimate Reality,” but rather shows his change in
terminology to have “the more tradition-neutral term ‘the Real,’” 33 which may include
theistic and nontheistic, personal and impersonal Ultimate Reality. Thus, Hick’s use of
the pre-Kantian term God up to the 70s is replaced by his new Kantian terminology “the
Real.” In so doing, Hick seems not to have relinquished the basic theistic structure of the
Ultimate Reality, but he wants to remove the theistic color in his use of it, broadening his
previous views on that Reality. 34
Hick claims that the great world religions are “different human responses to the
one divine Reality, embodying different perceptions which have been formed in different
historical and cultural circumstances.” 35 In other words, what the religions of the world
perceive in regard to the Real are different only phenomenologically, but they are their
different yet authentic responses to the noumenal Real, which is beyond human cognition.
All human perceptions of the Real are in a sense approximations of the Real as it is in
itself.
32
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Implications for Christology
When Hick began to apply his Kantian distinction between noumenon and
phenomenon to the doctrine of God, as McCready observes, “he could relativize the
person and work of Christ as he sought for a way to reject the salvific claims of
Christianity without giving up his claim to be a Christian.” 36 The paradigm shift from a
Christ-centered model to a God-centered model of the universe of faiths, as Hick argues,
must involve “a reopening of the Christological question.” 37 Hick insists, if Jesus was not
literally God incarnate as the paradigm shift implies, “the idea of divine incarnation is to
be understood metaphorically rather than literally, as an essentially poetic expression of
the Christian’s devotion to his Lord.” 38 In other words, as Paul Knitter observes, Hick’s
main thrust to “a theocentric, non-normative Christology is his insistence that Christian
belief in the incarnation and in the divinity of Jesus is mythic and therefore not only
allows but demands reinterpretation.” 39 If this doctrine of incarnation is to be treated as a
myth 40 rather than a literal truth, Jesus is not literally God the Son and the Second Person
of the Trinity. This means that Christianity is without its foundation, the person Jesus
Christ, on whom the entire Christianity is founded. This approach has further
36
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implications on the view of Scripture, whether it is God’s special revelation for human
beings, and on Christian soteriology, that salvation is through Christ alone.
Theism Assumed
As noted above, Hick’s pre-Kantian theocentric model of world religion was
formulated from the Christian idea of God 41 whose primary attribute is agape love.
Hick’s pre-Kantian God as loving creator is “formed and informed by Christian scripture
and tradition,” said Chester Gillis, because “other traditions (for example, Buddhism,
Hinduism) do not conceive of the divine (the Real) as a loving creator.” 42 The concept of
God as the ultimate reality that is universal in every religion, as Hick assumes, is the
basis of Hick’s religious pluralism. This means that Hick’s system of thought must
presuppose the existence of the divine reality who is perceived differently in various
cultures, times, and geographical places. As Eddy observes, “absolutely nothing can be
said or known about the divine in and of itself.” 43 Hick is sure of the presence of the
divine Reality, who can be experienced phenomenologically. Affirming the divine
Reality, Hick argues, “the noumenal Real is experienced and thought by different human
mentalities, forming and formed by different religious traditions, as the range of gods and
absolutes which the phenomenology of religion reports. And these divine personae and
metaphysical impersonae, as I shall call them, are not illusory but are empirically, that is
41
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experientially, real as authentic manifestations of the Real.” 44 In this sense Hick is a
critical realist who assumes the actual existence of the divine Reality in his interpretation
of religion, no matter how he tries to describe that Reality either as personal being or
impersonal reality.
Truth Claims
According to Hick, one of the major difficulties that religious pluralism faces in
the world religions and their theologies is the problem of truth claims. That Hick
recognizes “the ‘conflicting truth-claims’ of the different religious traditions” 45 is
obvious in his pluralistic hypothesis. Within all religious traditions, there are unique
theologies that deal with some fundamental theological issues 46 such as God (the Real),
humans, salvation or life after death, and so on. Among many different types of truthclaims, 47 at the center are the truth-claims about God or the Real. One of the most
obvious examples is God or the Real as personal in Judeo-Christian traditions and
44
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impersonal in Buddhism, particularly Theravada Buddhism. 48 It is hard to see not only
different but conflicting claims as the result of looking at the same Real, because they are
not only disagreeing with each other but stand in contradiction to each other. This is one
of the main dilemmas that Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis of world religion deals with.
Though admitting them as “the apparently rival conceptions of the Real,” Hick
shows the genius of his pluralistic hypothesis by adopting the Kantian distinction
between noumenon and phenomenon and further appealing to “the principle of
complementarity: those whose religious practice is as prescribed by the theistic traditions
experience it[the Real] as a personal reality, whilst those who act in relation to it in the
ways prescribed by the non-theistic traditions experience it as a non-personal reality.” 49
Therefore, Hick applies his pluralistic hypothesis—“the great world traditions constitute
different conceptions and perceptions of, and responses to, the Real from within the
different cultural ways of being human” 50 —to truth-claims in order to solve the problem
of apparently conflicting truth-claims. As will be discussed in more detail later, all the
descriptions of world religions’ Ultimate Reality are on the phenomenal level, that is, not
literally true. As Brian Hebblethwaite observes, if “they refer beyond the phenomenal to
48
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the noumenal Real, they function mythologically.” 51 The mythological understanding of
the truth-claims in turn makes Hick’s hypothesis “less optimistic about cognitive
complementarity.” 52 In other words, the descriptions of the Real become more and more
vague as Hick’s system develops.
Moreover, Hick’s claim that “the broad differences between . . . [religions’]
different images of the Eternal One arise from the broad differences between human
cultures” 53 does not give any satisfactory answer to their mutually exclusive claims of the
same Reality. If they are their own perceptions or responses of the same Reality, why are
they so different from one another? How do we know that their own conceptions
originated from the Real? More fundamentally, how do we know whether the Real exists
at all? A more detailed account of the language of the Real will be discussed in the
following section.
Theology (Doctrine of the Real)
As clearly noted above, Hick’s model of world religion is centered upon the
concept of the Real or the divine Being. Whatever it is called, this divine Reality is the
central focus of Hick’s theology of world religion. Though taking a lot of time to explore
the meaning of this Reality, Hick has difficulties doing so due to its inaccessibility in
direct ways. If this Ultimate Reality 54 is a key to the understanding of Hick’s model of
51
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world religion, it is necessary to clarify first of all what Hick means by the Real. Then I
will discuss other related issues such as the distinction between noumenal and
phenomenal, the possibility of the knowledge of God, and finally, the linkage between
the noumenal Real and the phenomenal Real.
The Concept of the Real
The concept of the Real which is at the center of the universe of faiths in Hick’s
religious pluralism is a very difficult concept to define. Hick’s central figure in the
universe of faiths was acquired from conceptions related to the Christian Deity whose
generic name is known as God to English-speaking people. As a matter of fact, up to the
point when Hick proposed the Copernican revolution in the early 1980s he exclusively
limited his use of the title God to describe the Being. For instance, in his book God and
the Universe of Faiths (1973), as the title suggests, Hick used the title God throughout the
book. Hick’s use of the title God is natural because he, though proposing the pluralistic
theology of religion, still did so from a Christian perspective.55
Struggling to find the best title for that reality, Hick showed a wide range of the
use of titles in his writings throughout time as he was developing his theory. He said,
“We therefore have such options as the Transcendent, the Ultimate, Ultimate Reality, the
Supreme Principle, the Divine, the One, the Eternal, the Eternal One, the Real.” 56 The
reason why he was struggling to find the right word is that once he chose one title, the
concept of the reality would be limited and confined in the terminology itself, which
Real.” Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, 10;
idem, A Christian Theology of Religions: The Rainbow of Faiths, ix.
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hardly contains that Reality. As can be observed in his writings, Hick did not want to
limit himself to any one tradition by choosing the title of the Reality in favor of it. He
must choose a title as neutral as possible that can satisfy all major world religions. In his
struggle to find the most appropriate word, he chose some such as “the Transcendent, the
Divine, and the Eternal One,” among which he thinks the latter two would be “too
theistically coloured.” 57 Finally, he was between two choices—“the Transcendent” and
“the Real”—and chose the latter. This does not mean that Hick exclusively uses this term
(the Real) to describe Ultimate Reality. 58 Hick lists his reasons why he chose this title
instead of others to describe Ultimate Reality as follows:
This term has the advantage that without being the exclusive property of any one
tradition it is nevertheless familiar within all of them. In Christian terms it gives
rise to no difficulty to identify God, the sole self-existent reality, as the Real.
Within Islam the Real, al Haqq, is one of the names of Allah. Within the Hindu
family of faiths it is natural to think of the ultimate reality, Brahman, as sat or
satya, the Real. Within Mahayana Buddhism the Dharmakaya or sunyata is also
spoken of as tattva, the Real. In Chinese religious thought the ultimate is zhen, the
Real. ‘The Real’ is then, I suggest, as good a generic name as we have for that
which is affirmed in the varying forms of transcendent religious belief. For it is
used within the major theistic and non-theistic traditions and yet is neutral as
between their very different ways of conceiving, experiencing and responding to
that which they affirm in these diverse ways. 59
Though Hick proposes using the words “the Real” to describe Ultimate Reality,
he does not use this term because he considers it adequate. According to him, “there is no
adequate term” to describe Ultimate Reality. However, probably coming from a Christian
57
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background, Hick argues, “it is customary in Christian language to think of God as that
which is alone finally real,” 60 and this term does not offend other religious traditions.
Thus, I now have reached Hick’s favorite term “the Real,” which is central to
Hick’s universe of faiths yet cannot be defined because the Real is beyond human
cognitive ability. Hick’s description of the Real is still confusing. As mentioned above,
following Kantian insight Hick made a distinction between the Real as it is in itself and
the Real as it is experienced in different religions. In his own words,
This distinction between the Real as it is in itself and as it is thought and
experienced through our human religious concepts entails that we cannot apply to
the Real an sich the characteristics encountered in its personae and impersonae.
Thus it cannot be said to be one or many, person or thing, conscious or
unconscious, purposive or non-purposive, substance or process, good or evil,
loving or hating. None of the descriptive terms that apply within the realm of
human experience can apply literally to the unexperienceable reality that underlies
that realm. 61
If nothing can be described about the Real itself, how can we know anything
about it? Hick, however, does say something about the Real. He says, “All that we can
say is that we postulate the Real an sich as the ultimate ground of the intentional objects
of the different forms of religious thought-and-experience.” 62 Hick appeals to a
“necessary postulate” 63 argument, which is based on his epistemological rule that “the
60
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phenomenal world is that same noumenal world as it appears to our human
consciousness.” 64 Though we have no direct access, Hick argues, we must postulate
“such an unknown and unknowable Ding an sich,” because without it “we should be left
with a plurality of personae and impersonae each of which is claimed to be the Ultimate,
but no one of which alone can be.” 65 Thus, Hick’s conception of the noumenal Real is the
product of his postulate, based upon various phenomenal religious experiences. Hick’s
conception of the Real is not a direct knowledge of the Real itself, but a mere conjecture
that is based on various religious experiences. We still have a question unanswered: Is
real knowledge of the Real possible? Before inquiring about this question, I will discuss
Hick’s distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, the epistemological insights he
adopted from Kant to deal with the dilemma of knowing the Real that is beyond our
cognitive ability.
The Distinction between Noumenon and Phenomenon
As John C. Lyden observes, “Hick is not suggesting that all religions say the
‘same thing,’ or that there are no real differences among their concepts of the Real and
the salvation it offers.” 66 Rather, what he is proposing is that every religion perceives the
64
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Real differently in their own cultural, historical, and geographical backgrounds. 67 Thus,
“at the center of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis” 68 is the distinction between noumenon and
phenomenon, with which Hick tries to make ineffable noumenal Real available to human
conceptuality phenomenologically. This distinction between noumenon and phenomenon
is originally acquired from Kant’s epistemological model in order to solve the apparent
problem of contradictory notions of the Real. Unlike the realist who claims that
knowledge is knowledge of the things, and the idealist who says that knowledge is
knowledge of my own idea, Kant claims that “knowledge is transcendental.” 69 It only
knows the phenomenon (thing in me), not the noumenon (thing-in-itself). The noumenon
(the thing-in-itself) is inaccessible, because it is not in me, “affected by my
subjectivity.” 70 However, it must be noted that though Hick adopts basic Kantian
epistemological insights, he is not strictly Kantian because he extends the noumenalphenomenal insight beyond sense experience to religious experience. 71 Hick’s adoption
67
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of the Kantian distinction between noumenon and phenomenon not only made his
pluralistic hypothesis work in the face of the dilemma of problems of conflicting
conceptions, but also became his major tool for his perennial support for the pluralistic
hypothesis.
Hick starts with one of Kant’s most fundamental “epistemological insights,
namely that the mind actively interprets sensory information in terms of concepts.”72
Hick uses Kant’s basic insight that “everything I know is made up of two elements: that
which is given 73 and that which I posit.” 74 The basic principle that Hick adopts from
Kant’s epistemology had been already stated before by Thomas Aquinas: “Things known
are in the knower according to the mode of the knower.” 75 This means the way we know
things depends on our perception of them, which allows a major role of human
subjectivity in epistemology. Hick applies this same principle “to argue that in relation to
the divine the ‘mode of the knower’ differs within different religio-cultural systems so
that the Real is thought-and-experienced in a wide variety of ways.” 76 If the world we
experience is partly our own construction, Hick argues, we must differentiate “between
the world an sich, unperceived by anyone, and the world as it appears to, that is as it is
extending Kant’s analysis of the one, in an appropriately adapted form, to the other”
(ibid.).
72
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perceived by, us.” 77 This dichotomy between noumenon and phenomenon plays a major
role in Hick’s thought. By taking this basic insight of Kant’s epistemology and applying
it to our religious experience as Kant never did,78 Hick arrives at his own “Kantian
revolution” 79 as D’Costa calls it—“a synthesis that forms the foundation for his response
to the problem of conflicting conceptions.” 80 Thus, according to Hick’s system, as Eddy
notes, “conflicting images of the divine are not merely understandable, but are even to be
expected.” 81 This line of argument could solve the central problem of Hick’s pluralistic
hypothesis, namely the problem of conflicting views of the Real. In other words, by
applying his own “Kantian revolution” (dichotomy between noumenon and phenomenon)
77

Ibid. Though the world an sich is not knowable to human mind because it does
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Hick is able to catch two rabbits at a time: he can affirm the existence of the single
noumenal Real while maintaining the radically different conceptions of it in various
world religions.
Responding to what Alston calls the “level distinction” between “the one ultimate
reality” and its “pictures,” “images,” or “representations” 82 — between the ultimate
divine Reality and the different human conceptions and perceptions of that Reality—Hick
presents his pluralistic hypothesis through the Kantian system of thought as follows:
Instead of giving rival accounts of a common intended referent, the religious
belief-systems each give an account of a different referent, namely their own
culturally influenced communal perception of the ultimately Real. On this view,
we postulate the transcendent divine Reality which lies (as each of the great
traditions at some point asserts) beyond our networks of human concepts; which
is the ground of all existence and the source of all salvific power; which is
conceptualized in a variety of ways in terms of the two basic religious categories
of personal deity and non-personal absolute, and under each category in a variety
of concrete forms as Adonai, the heavenly Father, Allah, Vishnu, etc., and as
Brahman, the Dharmakaya, the Tao, etc. 83
In this manner the Real is conceived differently in each tradition “through the
complex lens of a human tradition, consisting of modes of thought, spiritual practices,
sacred writings, theological and philosophical systems, great exemplars, and a web of
historical contingencies of various kinds.” 84 Thus the conception of the Real in each
82

William P. Alston, “Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,” in
The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, ed. Philip L. Quinn and Kevin
Meeker (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 194.
83

John Hick, “Religious Pluralism and the Rationality of Religious Belief,” Faith
and Philosophy 10, no. 2 (1993): 248.
84

Ibid.

87

religion can be different, because “every human concept of God . . . is a finite image, or
mental picture, of the infinite divine reality that exceeds all human thought.” 85
Though what produced Hick’s system to deal with plurality of religious
phenomena is Kant’s epistemological insight, which is mainly for the realm of sensory
epistemology, Hick made a shift in that he applied the Kantian insight to “the realm of
religious epistemology,” as Eddy noted. 86 Another divergence from Kant, Eddy insists,
“involves the nature of Hick’s category-analogues.” 87 Whereas Kantian forms and
categories are a priori, universal, necessary, and invariable, Hick’s “categories of
religious experience are not universal and invariable but are on the contrary culturerelative.” 88 Being aware of the problems associated with Kantian epistemological
interpretation, Hick does not want to enter into a Kantian dilemma of potential solipsism
in the realm of religious matter. 89 Like Kant who used the term “noumenon” in the
negative sense—“we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous
intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode of intuiting it” 90 —Hick uses it in a
negative way, as Eddy noted. Eddy writes, “he does not mean to make any positive
85

Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, 178. Thus, as Hick argues, “indeed all
our concepts of God are ‘images’ of the infinite divine reality: Christ is the Christian’s
image of God” (ibid.).
86

Eddy, “John Hick’s Pluralist Philosophy of World Religions,” 180.

87

Ibid., 181.

88

Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent,
243–244; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 26–27.
89

Tony Bellotti, Does Kant’s Theory of Knowledge Lead to Solipsism?
http://www.philosophypathways.com/essays/bellotti3.html, 2006 (accessed March 21,
2008).
90

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 186.
88

claims regarding the unknowable divine noumenon. . . . Rather, he wants to refer to it
only as a necessary postulate.” 91 None of the concrete descriptions about the Real in itself
is proposed or affirmed by Hick because it is not within the realm of our conceptual
frameworks. 92 As D’Costa observes, “Hick is led into agnosticism” 93 by his dichotomy
between noumenon and phenomenon that he originally adopted to deal with the
conflicting truth claims of world religions. Hick insists, “It cannot be said to be one or
many, person or thing, substance or process, good or evil, purposive or non-purposive.” 94
Nevertheless, Hick affirms that “the phenomenal world is that same noumenal world as it
appears to our human consciousness” 95 while the unknowable noumenon exists
regardless of our perceptions of it. Thus, though Hick admits that there is no access to the
noumenal world, and claims that human religious experience is “not purely imaginary
projection,” 96 he must posit “an element of human projection,” 97 as Clarke and Byrne
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observe. Hick does not want to fall into the trap of either agnosticism that we know
nothing about the noumenal world, or the conclusion that religions are the product of
human delusion or imagination.
The Possibility of Knowledge of the Real
As John K. Roth notes, “Central to Hick’s analysis is the idea that no religious
tradition describes ‘the Ultimate as it is in itself.’” 98 As noted above the basic thesis of
Hick in regard to the Real is that the Real is ineffable 99 because it is “lying beyond the
range of our human conceptual systems.” 100 As observed by Kenneth T. Rose, this
ineffability of the Real is “the central flaw of the hypothesis.” 101 Rose summed the
essential problem succinctly as follows: “The central flaw of the hypothesis—the claim
that the noumenal Real utterly transcends all human experience and knowledge—can
never be overcome by any conceptual machinery. . . . If the Real an sich is, as Hick
contends, beyond speech, knowledge, and experience, then one has no choice but to
remain silent about it.” 102 If Hick is consistent in his system, he must admit that his
attempt to explore the Real is useless because the Ultimate or Real is “utterly beyond our
97
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comprehension.” 103 Thus, according to Hick’s system, the Real remains utterly
incomprehensible, as he responded to Joseph Prabhu: “Strictly speaking we do not know
anything (in the strong sense of ‘know’) about the Real.” 104 Stephen T. Davis’s
suggestion is well taken: “All the religions are mistaken in what they say about the
Ultimate. Hick simply rejects the way most religions understand themselves (to the extent
that they make truth claims about the Ultimate).” 105
However, Hick does not stop there with the ineffability of the Real itself by
emphasizing “the utter transcendence of the Divine nature to any human thought” 106 and
developing his own epistemological principle based on Kantian epistemological insights.
He lists several great church fathers to show “a strong tradition in Christianity of the
ineffability of God.” 107 Thus, Ward claims that “Hick’s use of the noumenal/phenomenal
distinction simply restates the classical Christian doctrine of the Divine ineffability.” 108
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Adopting Kant’s distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, Hick made a
distinction between the Real an sich and the Real as phenomenally expressed in the
different cultures and religions, which is the most basic thesis of Hick’s pluralistic
hypothesis.
The knowledge that is available to human beings is not the firsthand knowledge
of the Real as it is in itself, but the secondhand one, if it is anything about the Real at all.
Some questions are raised regarding the knowledge of the Real as it is in itself: If the
Real as it is itself is known through the Real as thought and experienced, that is, only
phenomenally, what is the kind of the knowledge of the Real as thought and experienced?
How do we know that it is any knowledge of the Real itself?
Hick is positive on the question of the possibility of the knowledge of the Real.
Hick argues that the only condition is, “we always perceive the transcendent through the
lens of a particular religious culture.” 109 This means people have the knowledge of the
Real within their own religion. However, Hick’s claims, that the infinite Real which is
beyond human cognitive ability is known through human thought and experience, are
contrary to his fundamental thesis that the Real is utterly ineffable. Based on the
distinction between “the Real in itself and the Real as humanly thought and experienced,”
Hick proposes “the hypothesis that the infinite Real, in itself beyond the scope of other
than purely formal concepts, is differently conceived, experienced and responded to from
embodied in Hick’s model” (Eddy, “Religious Pluralism and the Divine: Another Look at
John Hick’s Neo-Kantian Proposal,” 470).
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There is contradiction in Hick’s thought about the noumenal Real, as Heim notes, “The
epistemic validity of religious belief within varying traditions was taken by Hick to imply
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within the different cultural ways of being human.” 110 Thus, as S. Mark Heim notes,
“Hick’s hypothesis implies there are some conditions in which it would be verified by an
experience of the noumenal Real, i.e. experience of what cannot be experienced.” 111
According to Hick’s arguments, though the knowledge of the Real in itself, the
noumenal Real, is not within the range of human consciousness, which exists
independently of our perception of it, the knowledge of the Real as perceived, the
phenomenal Real, is the same Real as it appears to us. Thus, Hick insists that the Real as
it appears is “entirely real.” 112 This leads Hick to affirm that “the noumenal Real is
experienced and thought by different human mentalities . . . and . . . by different religious
traditions.” 113 The distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal produces Hick’s
conviction that the noumenal Real can be known through the phenomenal Real, because
while the former remains beyond our human conceptuality, the latter reveals phenomenal
representations of the former. The great religious traditions are “different ways of
conceiving and experiencing the one ultimate divine Reality, and correspondingly
110
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different ways of responding to that Reality.” 114 Even though the religions are responses
to the same divine Reality, their conceptions of that same Reality are different to Hick.
Understanding this “mixture of commonality and difference,” Hick adds, “in Christian
terms it is the distinction between God in himself, in his eternal self-existent being,
independently of creation, and God-for-us or God as revealed to us. In more universal
language it is the distinction between the Real an sich and the Real as humanly
experienced and thought.” 115 This brings us to the basic dilemma of Hick’s pluralistic
philosophy of religion, the cognitivity of the Real an sich. Unwilling to deny the
cognitivity of religious language, Hick argues, “the core religious statements are true or
false in a sense that is ultimately factual.” 116
Assuming that everybody is exposed to the same Real as Hick suggestes, though
it is natural to expect some variations due to the different historical, cultural, and
geographical backgrounds, it is unnatural to expect them to be utterly contradictory to
each other. As Eddy observes, the main dilemma of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis is as
follows: “Given Hick’s pluralistic model, one would prima facie expect human
perceptions of the single divine Reality to be relatively similar, or at least not mutually
exclusive, in nature. Phenomenologically, of course, this is anything but the case.” 117 One
of the most obvious and problematic dilemmas is the problem of evidently contradictory
notions of the divine between a personal Being and a non-personal reality. These two
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responses are too different from each other to be from the single divine Reality. We are
not sure whether they are responses to the same divine Reality. Accordingly, as Firestone
observes, “Hick would not want to say . . . that we must think that God as-He-appears is
the same God as-He-is-in-himself.” 118 Therefore, we can assume that the Real an sich
represented in the work of Hick is knowable, but only in a phenomenological way at most,
as he argues, “we speak mythologically about the noumenal Real by speaking literally or
analogically about its phenomenal manifestations.” 119 This brings us to a question of the
circular relationship between the Real as it is in itself and the Real as experienced and
thought.
The Linkage between the Noumenal Real and the Phenomenal Real
Though it is beyond the limit of human conceptuality, Hick wants to make certain
formal statements about the noumenal Real without giving any concrete characteristics.
For example, Hick, without giving any positive statement, offers “Anselm’s definition of
God as that than which no greater can be conceived.” 120 If Hick cannot make any
affirmative statement about the Real an sich, Hick’s religious pluralism which is based
upon his dichotomy between noumenon and phenomenon will not work. Thus, adopting
Anselm’s definition of God, by “the Ultimate” or “the Real” Hick proposes to mean that
“putative reality which transcends everything other than itself but is not transcended by
118
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anything other than itself.” 121 The Real an sich in Hick’s thought is not the reality that
human beings can directly experience, but some kind of putative reality that Hick
proposed as “a necessary postulate of the pluralistic religious life of humanity.” 122
Regarding this necessary postulate, Hick says;
For within each tradition we regard real the object of our worship or
contemplation. If, as I have already argued, it is also proper to regard as real the
objects of worship or contemplation within the other traditions, we are led to
postulate the Real an sich as the presupposition of the veridical character of this
range of forms of religious experience. Without this postulate we should be left
with a plurality of personae and impersonae each of which is claimed to be the
Ultimate, but no one of which alone can be. 123
This postulated noumenal Real, Hick insists, is the basis of “the encountered gods
and experienced absolutes witnessed to by the religious traditions.” 124 Hick’s arguments
regarding the dichotomy between the postulated noumenal Real and “the encountered
gods and experienced absolutes” still do not give a clear answer to the question whether
they have a direct connection between them. Unless the linkage between the noumenal
Real and the phenomenal Real in Hick’s argument is seen, he could not make certain
statements about the Real an sich because of its inaccessibility. It is hard to find the
necessary linkage between this postulated noumenal Real and the conceptions of the Real
in each world religion because we have no direct access to the noumenal Real in Hick’s
system. Without any knowledge of the Real an sich, there is no way for us to see the
connection between them.
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Even if there is connection between them, it is hard to understand why Hick’s
range of phenomenological manifestations, that is, the multiple phenomenal appearances
is so wide that we can hardly accept that they are manifestations of the same Real: They
are not only different but some of them are contradictory to each other. 125 Is there any
relationship between the noumenal Real and the phenomenal Real at all? If there is any,
what kind of relationship is there between them? Hick’s answer is that there is no direct
or literal relationship between them. As noted above, though Hick’s “noumenal world
exists independently of our perception of it and the phenomenal world is that same world
as it appears to our human consciousness,” 126 the relationship between them is not clearly
defined.
However, he insists, “this relationship between the ultimate noumenon and its
multiple phenomenal appearances, or between the limitless transcendent reality and our
many partial human images of it, makes possible mythological speech about the Real
[emphasis added].” 127 The best he could say about the relationship between them is that it
is mythological rather than literal. This means the multiple phenomenal appearances are
not literally true manifestations of the ultimate noumenon, but rather they are
mythological truth which “tends to evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude to its
subject matter.” 128 Therefore, Hick claims, “Analogously, I want to say that the noumenal
125
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Real is experienced and thought by different human mentalities, forming and formed by
different religious traditions [emphasis added].” 129 One thing is certain from his
descriptions of the noumenal Real: They are not literal. Though Hick tries to avoid the
problem of internal coherence between his claims about the Real as unknowable and
several conceptions of it by using such words as “mythological speech,” “analogously,”
and “phenomena” and so on, he has to make some positive statements about the Real
which are literal, as he does in order to make his system of thought work. For instance,
Hick says, the noumenal Real that is experienced and thought by different human minds
and its manifestations “are not illusory but are empirically, that is experientially, real as
authentic manifestations of the Real [emphasis added].” 130 It seems that the Real
manifests itself to us through something like a divine supernatural revelation of
Christianity within each religion. This self-manifestation of the Real is even clearer in
Hick’s description of Henry H. Price’s personal openness to the universal presence of the
Real that he heard from Henry himself. Hick describes it as follows:
One Sunday morning, after a late breakfast, Henry found himself in an unusually
tranquil and peaceful frame of mind. He felt moved to go into the drawing-room,
where there was a writing-chair in the middle of the room, facing the empty
fireplace. Then in a gentle and gradual way it began to dawn on him that there
was someone else in the room, located fairly precisely about two yards away to
his right front. There was no kind of sensory hallucination, either visual or
auditory, nothing seen or heard. He was not in the least alarmed, and the
experience itself was so absolving that he did not even feel any surprise at the
time. It was just as if he had received a visit from someone he had never met
129
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before. They proceeded to have a conversation, though one conducted entirely by
exchange of thoughts, about God’s love for human beings, including himself. 131
Hick claims that Henry went through a strong impression of the unknown visitor’s
presence at this moment. Hick says that Henry described this religious experience “as an
experience of the sense of presence.” 132 Hick considers it to be “a moment of unusual
openness to the universal presence of the Real, the Ultimate.” 133 Thus, it seems that Hick
admits the idea of divine manifestation to the individual who is ready for it, which is
exactly against his own understanding of the noumenal Real that is unknowable and
beyond human conceptuality.
Though Hick does claim that the human religious experience is a “response to
reality” as humans were originally structured, he cannot avoid people’s accusation that
his own suggestion is “imaginative projection” 134 due to the inaccessibility of the
noumenal Real. Hick’s concept of the Real an sich is not based on the direct knowledge
of the Real, but is the product of his own hypothesis on the basis of his own
understanding of the world religions. Therefore, it must be noted that the linkage between
the noumenal Real and the phenomenal Real is not clearly seen, as Hick assumes in his
claims of religious pluralism. The conceptions of the Real an sich that Hick presents on
the basis of his knowledge of the world religions seem to be at most mere postulate or
imagination rather than real responses to the Real. There is no way to prove any direct
connections between them. This failure to prove the necessary linkage between the
131
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noumenal Real and the phenomenal Real weakens Hick’s theocentric model of the world
religions.
Christology
Hick’s main thrust in his pluralistic hypothesis, namely theocentrism, opened the
way for not only a new but a radical interpretation of Christ the God incarnate. In his
theocentric model of world religions, which is not in agreement with the orthodox
doctrine of the divinity of Christ, “the incarnation continues to be the principal target of
Hick’s doctrinal reinterpretation project.” 135 In other words, as Keith E. Eitel notes, “The
net result of Hick’s model is a denial of the Incarnation.” 136 The reinterpretation and
denial of the incarnation, in turn, led him to reinterpret the Bible and understand its
teachings as myth rather than historical and literal truth.
This section will include the following aspects of Hick’s Christology. First,
though having briefly touched the issue earlier, I will look at how Hick’s Christology
developed throughout time. In a sense, Hick’s Christological transformations over
periods of time serve as one of the barometers to understanding his pluralism. Second, I
will look at Hick’s own suggestion on Christology, namely “An Inspiration Christology,”
which shows one of the obvious results of his theocentric model of world religions. Third,
I will deal with Hick’s mythological understanding of biblical teachings including the
doctrine of incarnation.
From Christocentrism to Theocentrism
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Hick’s own development of the theology of incarnation can well be summed up as
a transformation “from Christocentrism to Theocentrism.” A major shift in Hick’s
Christology occurred with his publication of “Christology at the Cross Roads” (1966).
Here Hick assumed the central issue of Christology to be “the uniqueness of Christ,”
which he thought to “stand today at the cross roads.” 137 The central concern of Hick’s
Christology in regard to his uniqueness rests on the issue whether it is “a uniqueness of
kind or of degree.” 138 Arguing for and against the Christology of the two writers—
Norman Pittenger in The Word Incarnate (1959), 139 and Nels Ferre in Christ and the
Christian (1958) 140 —Hick found himself in favor of the degree Christology, yet argued
against weaknesses of that model. 141 The basic thesis of these two writers was, as Hick
observed, that “God has been at work in essentially the same way in all men in all ages,
but incomparably more fully and effectively at work in Jesus Christ than in anyone
else.” 142 He claimed, “the Degree Christology holds that Jesus Christ is unique in fact but
not in principle.” 143 The main point of Hick here, though not accepting their basic thesis
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that Christ is unique among all others, is that the incarnation is taking place all the time in
different degrees everywhere.
Here Hick introduced his own Christological presentation, namely agape
Christology—a neo-Chalcedonian Christology—as follows:
The neo-Chalcedonian claim is that the eternal divine agape towards mankind
‘caused’ Jesus’ agape towards the men and women whom he met, in a sense
analogous to that in which the radiating energy of the sun ‘causes’ the falling of
its rays upon the earth’s surface. That is to say, the sun radiating forth its light,
and that light illuminating and warming the surface of the globe, form one
continuous complex event; and likewise the divine agape exerting itself in
relation to mankind, and operating on earth as the agape of Jesus, form one
continuous event in virtue of which we can say that Jesus was God’s attitude to
mankind incarnate. 144
Thus Hick made certain conclusions from this Christological hypothesis. First,
Jesus had only one nature, which is “wholly and unqualifiedly human.” 145 But this human
nature was directed by God’s agape. Second, Jesus had “one will, that of the man Jesus
of Nazareth,” motivated by God’s agape. Third, Jesus was conscious of God’s agape
“from the time of his baptism by John.” 146 However, Hick claims, “this does not mean
that he was conscious of being God, or the Son of God, or the eternal Logos made
flesh.” 147 This article, as Gillis observes, “does set the groundwork for more radical
proposals to follow,” 148 while not rejecting traditional Christology as a whole.
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In his “The Reconstruction of Christian Belief for Today and Tomorrow,” 149 Hick
shows his own starting point in his liberal and pluralistic understanding of Christianity by
rejecting some fundamental Christian teachings (e.g., virgin birth, atonement, and
resurrection). His concept of the Church and theology shows his radical approach in
Christology. Hick insists, “So long as the person of Jesus of Nazareth is remembered, and
gives rise to a continuing faith-response, the men and women in whom that faith-response
occurs will be the Church, and the ways in which they conceptualize their faith will be
Christian theologies.” 150 Thus theologies are human creations that are developed in
history and are able to be modified and changed throughout time. Thus, Hick suggests,
the development of world religions is to be viewed as “a dynamic continuum with major
disturbances or creative religious movements” 151 in the historical context of humanity.
Hick argues, “it is not appropriate to speak of a religion as being true or false any more
than it is to speak of a civilization as being true or false.” 152 This marked Hick’s
departure from traditional Christian theology, which reveals the fact that theology is not
based on God’s special revelation but based on human reason. 153
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In his God and the Universe of Faiths, Hick introduced his radical self-described
“Copernican revolution” in theology, and made a paradigm shift from Christocentrism to
theocentrism. As noted above, theocentrism inevitably clashes with the central Christian
doctrine of incarnation, because Christianity stands on the doctrine of exclusive salvation
through Christ. His article “Christ and Incarnation” is a reproduction of “Christology at
the Cross Roads” (1966), which emphasizes that Jesus was exclusively human rather than
divine. Thus, in his article “The Essence of Christianity,” he argues that “the essence of
Christianity is not in believing rightly but in acting rightly in relation to our fellows.” He
contends, it is “not in thinking correctly Christ’s two natures, as divine and human, but
living as disciples who in his name feed the hungry.” 154 Finally, this volume suggests that
the statement that Jesus is God incarnate is not a literal, but a poetic, symbolic, or
mythological statement. 155 Thus Hick’s thesis of incarnation as myth is introduced as an
inevitable result of his theocentric model of the world religions.
With the publication of The Myth of God Incarnate (1977), Hick made a
definitive statement that Jesus was “a metaphorical son of God” rather than “a
metaphysical God the Son” as traditional Christianity holds, 156 which is his reaffirmation
of his earlier position. Jesus, who is not literally God incarnate, is compared with Buddha
as another form of incarnation in Hick’s essay “Jesus and the World Religions.” Here
Hick argues, “The human Gautama came to be thought of as the incarnation of a
transcendent, pre-existent Buddha as the human Jesus came to be thought of as the
incarnation of the pre-existent Logos or divine Son. . . . Gautama was the Dharma
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(Truth) made flesh, as Jesus was the Word made flesh.” 157 According to Hick’s argument,
this same phenomenon can happen to any other prodigy of religion, even to any person
who is in the presence of God or the Real.
Thus, Hick made a definitive move to pluralism in that Jesus being the Son of
God, God the Son, is “a mythological idea” rather than a literal truth. He saw the
incarnation of Jesus “as a mythological idea whose function is to evoke an appropriate
response of faith in Jesus as Lord and Savior,” 158 as Cliford S. Hospital observed. This
mythological understanding of incarnation, which is also the main thesis of his volume
The Metaphor of God Incarnate, 159 led him to open the door widely for the religious
pluralism. As Eddy observes, though “Hick has substituted the term ‘metaphor’ for
‘myth’” in his later writings, his “incarnation as myth thesis” remains the same. 160 Now I
will focus on some aspects of Hick’s Christology that contributed to his development of
the pluralistic hypothesis, namely “An Inspiration Christology” and “Mythological
Understanding of Christ.”
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An Inspiration Christology
As implied in his reinterpretation of Christian doctrines earlier, Hick’s “primary
responsibility to contribute to the rethinking of absolutism” 161 involves the traditional
Christian doctrine of incarnation. “Since Christian ‘absolutism’ is chiefly fueled by the
orthodox doctrine of the deity of Christ,” says Eddy, “the incarnation continues to be the
principal target of Hick’s doctrinal reinterpretation project.” 162 Once the uniqueness of
Jesus Christ as God incarnate is recognized as the Christian tradition claims, Hick’s
whole project of religious pluralism is in jeopardy. Given this dogma that “Jesus Christ,
the founder and focus of the religion, was God in human form or, more precisely, the
Second Person of the divine Trinity living a human life,” Hick argues, Christians
naturally see their religion as “the one and only true religion, founded by God in person
and the locus of God’s unique saving act.” 163 In order to deal with this fundamental
dilemma of Christian uniqueness built into the doctrine of incarnation, Hick develops his
reinterpretation project based on some contemporary writers such as Donald M. Baillie
and Geoffrey Lampe.
Donald’s Baillie’s book God Was in Christ, 164 Hick argues, shows how he
remains orthodox while not retaining the traditional Christology. Hick sees him not
criticizing the idea of incarnation but trying to make it intelligible to the modern mind by
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introducing a new incarnation called “the paradox of grace.” 165 In Baillie’s words, Hick
observes, the essence of the paradox “lies in the conviction which a Christian man
possesses, that every good thing in him, every good thing he does, is somehow not
wrought by himself but by God. This is a highly paradoxical conviction, for in ascribing
all to God it does not abrogate human personality nor disclaim personal
responsibility.” 166 Thus, whatever man does is done through the grace of God dwelling in
him. Baillie applies this principle to the case of Jesus’ incarnated life on earth lived not
by his own will, but through God’s dwelling in him. Through his new paradox of grace
Christology, Hick observes, “Baillie discards the traditional Chalcedonian language of
Jesus’ having two natures” 167 —divine and human natures. Baillie’s new theory of
incarnation is taken by Hick as a good example of attempting to bring incarnation to the
modern mind in intelligible terms.
The other good example that Hick chose to illustrate the new approach in the
doctrine of Christology is called “a Christology of inspiration,” suggested by Geoffrey
Lampe in his book God as Spirit. 168 Lampe says that the Spirit of God “is to be
understood, not as referring to a divine hypostasis distinct from God the Father and God
the Son or Word, but as indicating God himself as active towards and in his human
165
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creation.” 169 By doing this, Hick understands that Lampe does not accept the traditional
incarnation doctrine that the Logos is God the Son. On this view, God’s Spirit has been
active in the human life, enabling individuals to fulfill the will of God by their free
responses. Therefore, it is not men or women who are doing the will of God, but the
Spirit of God who is always active in human spirit, inspiring them to do it. And Hick
adds, “This . . . activity of God as Spirit means that God has always been incarnate in his
human creatures, forming their spirits from within and revealing himself in and through
them.” 170 This is what happened in the life of Jesus on earth as he was inspired by the
Spirit of God, who enabled him to fully respond to the will of God. Hick, by adopting this
inspiration Christology, insists that he catches two rabbits at the same time: (1) a return to
the original Christology held by the early church; (2) an advance to the more intelligible
interpretation of incarnation that is acceptable to the modern mind. 171
Therefore, according to Baillie and Lampe, Hick insists, “to speak of God’s love
becoming incarnate is to speak of men and women in whose lives God’s inspiration, or
grace, is effectively at work.” 172 Divine incarnation can occur and is occurring anywhere
and anytime in any person or persons. Hick sees them still as holding “the centrality and
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superiority of Christianity within God’s providence” 173 because they assumed Christ’s
uniqueness, not in the sense that he was unique in kind but in the sense that he was
unique in his response to God. Thus, as Terrence Merrigan notes, “the appeal of Spirit
Christology for pluralist theologians . . . allows the ‘domestication’ of Jesus as one
inspired religious leader among others.” 174 The incarnation Christology identifies Jesus
as a mere man inspired by God among many others. Jesus should not be different in kind
but only in degree from other inspired religious leaders. 175 Thus Hick claims that
“incarnation then becomes a matter of degree: God is incarnate in all men in so far as
they are Spirit-filled, or Christ-like, or truly saintly.” 176 This model implies, as Hick
suggests, that there is possibility of “plural incarnations.” 177 Therefore, according to an
inspiration Christology, Jesus of Nazareth is not literally God incarnate, God the Son,
Son of God, Second Person of the Trinity living a human life, as traditional Christianity
claims. Hick argues, “This type of inspiration or paradox-of-grace Christology” falls
within the range of options open to the religious pluralists, and is also “compatible with
173
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the religious pluralism.” 178 This means that every person can be one like Christ so far as
he or she is filled with the Spirit.
Mythological Understanding of Christ
Hick’s pluralistic approach to religions in general and to Christology in particular
inevitably led him to reinterpret one of the core doctrines of Christianity, namely
incarnation. Hick does not want to reject the doctrine per se, but he presents it in a
different way from the traditional Christian doctrine. The main thesis of Hick’s
incarnation doctrine, that the incarnation is not literal but mythological was well,
introduced in his God and the Universe of Faiths (1973). 179 Hick says that the incarnation
of Jesus “cannot apply literally to Jesus. But as a poetic image—which is powerfully
evocative even though it conveys no literal meaning—it expresses the religious
significance of Jesus” 180 as traditional Christianity holds.
As Eddy observes, Hick offers three main lines of argument for his thesis of
incarnation as myth thesis or for his rejection of a literal incarnation. Eddy writes:
First, drawing upon contemporary New Testament and historical Jesus studies,
Hick argues that “almost certainly Jesus himself did not teach that he was God
incarnate. Second, Hick proposes that one can trace the genesis and development
of the notion of the incarnation in the early church up through the fourth century,
along with the purely human concerns that motivate it. Finally, Hick contends that
the mythological nature of incarnational language is betrayed in the fact that every
attempt to explain it on a philosophical level reveals it to be nothing short of
logically incoherent (i.e., “a self-contradiction,” on the same logical par as “the
idea of a square circle”) and thus literally meaningless. 181
178

Hick, “The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity,” 32.

179

Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, 165–179.

180

Ibid., 172.

181

Eddy, “John Hick and the Historical Jesus,” 306–307.
110

If myths are not literal and thus literally meaningless, what purpose do they serve
for the believers of religions? Hick claims that “myths are not literally true, but they may
nevertheless be mythologically true.” 182 In order to understand this, we need to look at
his definition of myth. He defines a myth as “a story which is told but which is not
literally true, or an idea or image which is applied to something or someone but which
does not literally apply, but which invites a particular attitude in its hearers.” 183 For
example, Hick, though not admitting the six-day creation story and the fall of Adam and
Eve in the Garden of Eden as literally true stories, claims that they may communicate
truth “that the world is a divine creation and that humans are very imperfect beings living
in a very imperfect world.” 184 Whatever he tries to say about it, Hick’s myth is neither
literal nor historical truth.
Hick’s mythological-incarnation thesis that he developed in the 1970s remains
unaltered in his later Christological treatise on the current issue, The Metaphor of God
Incarnate: Christology in a Pluralistic Age (1993). Hick states the primary purpose of the
book as follows: “The main conclusion of the book, embodied in its title, is that the idea
of divine incarnation in its standard Christian form, in which both genuine humanity and
genuine deity are insisted upon, has never been given a satisfactory literal sense; but that
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on the other hand it makes excellent metaphorical sense.” 185 Trying to define what he
means by “metaphor” in distinction from the literal meaning, Hick claims, “metaphor is a
form of non-literal or figurative speech. . . . Thus metaphorical speech is a use of
language in which speaker-meaning differs from dictionary-meaning.” 186 Hick’s thesis of
incarnation as myth (or metaphor in this book) is expressed in the title of the book
itself—The Metaphor of God Incarnate—implying that the incarnation of Jesus is
understood as metaphor or myth rather than as historical truth.
As Eddy notes, here Hick has four basic arguments for why he is against the
traditional Chalcedonian incarnational Christology. Eddy says:
First, neither the teaching nor the apparent experience of the historical Jesus
serves to authorize the claim of a literal incarnation. . . . Second, in retrospect, one
can trace the historical process by which Jesus came to be thought of as “God,”
and can fully explain it in terms of human motives, both religious and even
political (e.g., the Council of Nicaea). . . . Third, according to Hick no rendition of
the traditional model of “fully God and fully human,” taken literally, has ever
been shown to be meaningful. . . . Fourth and finally, Hick continues to
emphasize that “historically the traditional dogma has been used to justify great
human evils.” 187
As Eddy observes, though Hick prefers to use metaphor rather than myth in his
recent Christological writings, particularly in The Metaphor of God Incarnate, “this
terminological change does not seem to signal any substantive modification of Hick’s
185
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thesis.” 188 It seems that Hick, knowing that in ordinary language myth is something not
true, 189 prefers to use metaphor because it has a more positive connotation than myth. To
Hick, who sees myth as “expanded metaphors,” 190 myth and metaphor are not different
from each other; rather they have one thing in common: they both are neither literal nor
historical. Thus, the thesis of incarnation as myth or metaphor led Hick to deny the deity
of Jesus.
Soteriology
No matter how good it is, a religion without some kind of salvation is
meaningless. Ultimately “all religions are religions of salvation.” 191 As Hick notes,
though they use different terms and concepts of salvation, 192 all religious faiths,
particularly all “post-axial faiths are soteriologically oriented.” 193 S. Mark Heim is right
when he says, “If moral development is our guide to whether a salvific transformation is
188
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taking place, then it is taking place in all these traditions.” 194 All major world religions
share three common elements that are soteriological in a sense that they all recognize
human misery, human possibility, and the way for a limitlessly better quality of existence.
Though they cannot all be called “salvation” as in Christianity, they somewhat share a
common element of this limitlessly better existence from humanity’s present miserable
situation. Hick, knowing salvation as a confined connotation of Christianity, prefers to
use several terms interchangeably such as salvation, liberation, and transformation. 195
Hick’s soteriology must be understood in the light of his doctrine of the Real,
which is the starting point for his entire system. Knowing “the idea that each of the great
world religions is a response to the ultimately real, and that each is a context of human
salvation,” 196 Hick describes salvation as “the transformation of human existence from
self-centeredness to a new orientation centred in the divine Reality.” 197 In turn, Hick’s
soteriology is intimately connected with his eschatological model, what he calls
“pareschatology,” because as we will see later, a salvific transformation is not complete
for most people in this life. It is a continued process throughout several lives after death
for the majority of people. Thus Hick’s soteriology is a connecting bridge between his
theological model (the concept of God) and eschatological model, which is the focus of
my study.
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In this section, I will lay the groundwork for the further discussion about Hick’s
eschatological model in the following chapter. First, I will look at Hick’s definition of
salvation in the context of the historical development that he went through. Second, I will
discuss the aspect of salvation as human transformation, which he would like to call the
“soul making process.” This concept of “soul making” is crucial to Hick’s pareschatology
because it gives a rationale for his eschatological model. Third, I will discuss the concept
of universal salvation that Hick’s system inevitably presents. This idea of universalism
must be thought of as a puzzle piece with other elements of his soteriology. And, finally,
I will briefly discuss the salvation claims of other religions compared with Christianity.
Historical Sketch
Hick’s analysis of Christianity’s three approaches to other world religions—
exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism—is a historical development of Christianity’s
attitude toward others as well as its threefold approach toward them throughout history.
This is also reflected in his personal theological journey.
As noted earlier, Hick was not a religious pluralist from the beginning in his
theological journey, but rather he was an exclusivist in regard to salvation. In other words,
he used to believe “that salvation is through Christ alone, and therefore that those who do
not respond to God through Christ are not saved but . . . damned or lost.” 198 This
exclusivism in regard to salvation has been the position of traditional Christianity. For
example, Hick argues, the Bible teaching that “there is salvation in no one else” (Acts
4:12; John 14:6), and the “traditional Catholic teaching Extra ecclesiam nulla salus (no
198
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salvation outside the church)” 199 have been a very dominant position of Christianity. This
theological exclusivism also served as a theological reasoning behind the nineteenthcentury missionary expansion.
Second, this exclusive Christian approach in regard to salvation has been
“outflanked by the work of such influential Catholic theologians as Karl Rahner,” 200
which can be categorized as inclusivism. Rahner’s idea of “anonymous Christians—
within the invisible church even without knowing it, and thus within the sphere of
salvation” 201 —is one of his major theological achievements regarding soteriololgy. The
basic idea is that no matter what religious group you are in, as long as you are devout,
you are saved within your religious faith. However, Hick notes, this kind of inclusivism
“recognizes the spiritual values of other religions, and the occurrence of salvation within
them, and yet at the same time implicitly affirms the final superiority of their own
religion over all others.” 202 Thus, inclusivism claims that salvation is basically Christian
salvation. All are saved, inclusivism would argue, by Christ and his atonement regardless
of their acknowledgment of it or not.
Finally, Hick along with other pluralists, not being satisfied with the level of the
openness of inclusivism, argues for religious pluralism. Based upon his pluralistic
hypothesis that all religions are responses to the same ultimate Real, Hick insists that they
all “seek to be contexts of human transformation from natural self-centredness to a new
centring in the Real, the Ultimate, as differently conceived and experienced within
199
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them.” 203 Hick’s theology of God is the foundation of his soteriology. Again Hick says,
“if salvation is taking place, and taking place to much the same extent, within the
religious systems presided over by . . . various deities and absolutes, this suggests that
they are different manifestations to humanity of a yet more ultimate ground of all salvific
transformation.” 204 In short, Hick’s pluralism suggests that all religions are only different
paths to humans’ ultimate salvation. This implies that there will still be different forms of
worship, ethics, and theologies which will distinguish the world religions.
Salvation as Human Transformation
There remain some questions such as when and how salvation is realized in
human life. Hick disagrees with traditional Christian claims that the judgment awaits a
person in the future at personal death or on an eschatological day of judgment, and argues
for salvation as human transformation to a perfection which usually does not take place
within this short human lifetime. Hick suggests a process of coming to perfection as a
“vale of soul making,” 205 which will require many lives for the majority of people. This
means that the time and the manner of salvation are various depending on people’s
circumstances. Some who are closer to the Real may have only this life before they are
saved, while others may need more lives to be saved. Since all religions are different
perceptions of the same Real, this transformation can occur in any religion. The manner
of salvation that constitutes human transformation from self-centeredness to Realitycenteredness could be various.
203
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As Gillis notes, “Hick’s theory of a vale of soul making is a logical outgrowth of
his Irenaean view of the creation of human kind.” 206 In his book Evil and the God of Love
Hick presents two major approaches to theodicy which involves the issue of human
transformation. The first is the Augustinian tradition which flourished in the West, and
has been dominant in Christianity. According to this traditional view, human beings are
created as perfect beings with God’s own image in them. Through the fall, however, they
lost the image of God and fell into the sinful state which is inherited by all their
descendants.
The second is the Irenean theodicy, prominent in the East, which Hick adopts.
According to this position, human beings are not created as perfect beings as the
Augustinian view claims. Hick adopts Ireneaus’s distinction between “the image and
likeness” of God in Gen 1:26. Though human beings, Hick argues, are endowed with “the
image of God” at creation, they do not yet have “the likeness of God” which would be
acquired in time. In Hick’s own words, “he was created as an immature and imperfect
creature who was to grow in grace through time from the imago dei, which is the capacity
for God, to the finite similitudo or ‘likeness’ to God, which is the perfection of our nature
in relation to him.” 207 This means, it is the actual human transformation that constitutes
salvation. Adopting this Irenaean two-stage creation of the human being, 208 Hick
suggests that salvation takes place in human beings as “transformation from natural selfcentredness to a new centring in the Real, the Ultimate, as differently conceived and
206
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experienced.” 209 This means, human openness to the Real has a key role in the process of
salvific transformation along with God’s original framing of us in a way that we are
“inwardly structured towards him.” 210
There are many theological implications in the Irenaean view of creation, as Gillis
notes. To begin with, “this Irenaean conception of the creation/development of
humankind admits of no historical fall.” 211 This implication of a nonliteral understanding
of the fall in Gen 3, which is assumed in his acceptance of Irenaean theodicy, must have
led Hick to the foundation of future mythological understanding of the Bible and its
teachings. Second, “Irenaeus’s thought suggests an account of evil that sees it as having a
place within the creative process of the universe.” 212 This means, evil is something
necessary for the perfection of human beings, not something that should not have existed
at all from the beginning. 213 As a result, the reality of evil is underestimated and even
misunderstood. Third, since the Irenaean view claims that the creature is as immature as a
baby at the time of creation, “the creature is . . . on the road to perfection.” 214 This road
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toward perfection is a slow process which usually is not finished by the time of death.
Thus, for the majority of people it will require many lives to reach perfection.
Universal Salvation
The next questions that may come to mind are “Who then will be saved?” “Are
some or all going to be saved?” This is another major theological issue that Hick
addresses in his presentation of soteriology. Hick has moved in the direction of the
concept that everyone will be saved eventually, namely “universalism,” or “universal
salvation.” 215 His idea of universal salvation is clearly implied in his two books, Evil and
the God of Love and Death and Eternal Life.
As Gillis observes, “The concept of universal salvation is important to our study
because it impacts directly upon soteriological claims.” 216 Hick argues for “universal
salvation” as an antithesis of the doctrine of eternal torment in hell, which he claims to be
contradictory to the idea of God as love. He lists why he rejects the doctrine of eternal
torment as follows:
The objections to the doctrine of eternal torment which once seemed so weak and
now seem so strong are well known: for a conscious creature to undergo physical
and mental torture through unending time (if this is indeed conceivable) is
horrible and disturbing beyond words; and the thought of such torment being
deliberately inflicted by divine decree is totally incompatible with the idea of God
as infinite love; the absolute contrast of heaven and hell, entered immediately
after death, does not correspond to the innumerable gradations of human good and
evil; justice could never demand for finite human sins the infinite penalty of
eternal pain; such unending torment could never serve any positive or reformative
purpose precisely because it never ends; and it renders any coherent Christian
215
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theodicy impossible by giving the evils of sin and suffering an eternal lodgment
within God’s creation. 217
Hick’s concept of universal salvation is based upon his idea of God who is infinite
love. Universalism is derived from a reaction against his own Calvinistic doctrine of
predestination which claims that there is a hell where eternal torment is going on for
those who are lost. 218 To him, it must not be acceptable that there is a God who is
infinitely good and powerful, yet will bear with eternal torment in hell for the lost. 219
Hick’s idea of universal salvation is also a very crucial concept that has a direct
connection with Hick’s pareschatology, which not only covers the Christian concept of
eschatology but includes ideas much more than that, that is, there will be not only one
eschaton but many eschatons before the final destiny of a human being. Thus it is
important to understand Hick’s concept of universal salvation in relationship with his
eschatological model.
Acknowledging the antinomy between “the omnipotent divine love intending
man’s salvation” and “human freedom,” Hick tries not to exclude either of these but to
retain them both by showing some evidences from the New Testament and his own
argument in regard to human freedom. First, Hick argues, though there are times of Jesus
warning people that “if they did not repent they would reap eternal damnation,” and other
New Testament writers telling about eternal punishment, “this threat is not incompatible
217
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with universalism.” 220 However, Hick adds, “it did not follow from the fact of this danger
that you or I or anyone else is in fact never going to repent and be saved.” 221 Thus,
according to Hick’s understanding, in the New Testament universalism is not ruled out.
Second, Hick goes on to discuss the problem of human freedom in relationship
with universalism. He argues, if we are free creatures, “God cannot coerce us into saving
faith.” 222 The only possible answer to universalism so far is that the omnipotent God
must overrule the will of man, which can be interpreted as coercion. However, Hick
introduces the Augustinian thought that “God has so made us that the inherent gravitation
of our being is towards him.” 223 This means that the human being’s nature is “inwardly
structured towards him.” 224 Hick argues that God does not have to coerce us to save us,
for he has already created us in such a way that our nature brings us to him. Therefore, he
does not have to set aside either of these two antinomies (loving God and human
freedom) to argue for universal salvation.
Soteriology and Ethics
Assuming from his pluralistic hypothesis that “salvation is in fact taking place not
only within the Christian but also within the other great traditions,” 225 Hick argues that
all are being saved within and through their own religions. Accordingly Hick’s pluralism
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involves not only theology (who God is) but also its soteriology (what theology does in
regard to the human predicament). In this sense, theology’s major concern rests on
soteriology, whether it provides salvation to its seeker, because theology without
soteriology is meaningless.
Hick’s definition of salvation as “the transformation of human existence from
self-centredness to Reality-centredness” is the “neutral, universal essence of religion,” 226
argues Grant. This definition of salvation by Hick is too general and not clear enough to
allow one to grasp its meaning. This leads us to raise another question in regard to
soteriology: What are the criteria for judging religions if not all are valid ways to
salvation such as the cults, led by Jim Jones and David Koresh? Hick’s answer to this
question of criteria is summed up as follows:
Any judgment about them has to be based on a close examination of each
particular movement, and all that one can say in general is that the same criterion
must apply as in the case of the great world faiths: are they effective contexts of
the salvific transformation of human beings from self-centredness to a new
orientation centred in the Real as authentically known in a particular human way?
And the criterion of authenticity here can only be their observable moral and
spiritual fruits in human life. 227
Thus the apparent danger of pluralism in regard to salvation is that if all religious
traditions are made relative, we could have a hard time distinguishing good from bad, the
spiritually wholesome and profound from the spiritually poor and moribund religion. For
instance, no one supposes that all religious leaders, all religious teachings, are equally
valid or equally in touch with the Real. There is a substantial difference between a Jim
Jones and an apostle Paul. Thus, Hick’s basic criteria for genuine religion are
226
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soteriological—more particularly, whether they “promote or hinder the salvific
transformation.” 228
The greater dilemma arises when it comes to the issue of truth claims on salvation,
because all religions have different views of salvation. Some view salvation as a celestial
place while others view it as nothingness; some view it as blissfulness in this life (no
after-life) while others view it as blissfulness in the afterlife. This also requires some
identifiable criteria. Hick suggests that the criteria for making that judgment lie in the
“spiritual and moral fruits” 229 found in the lives of believers. But it is difficult to decide
whether these fruits reveal a genuine or counterfeit sign of transformation, which can be
purely subjective. We have no objective criteria of how good is good enough, how high is
high enough. Accordingly, it is almost impossible to distinguish between good and bad
religions in Hick’s religious pluralism.
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I have surveyed the major elements of Hick’s religious pluralism
as a basis of my discussion of his eschatological model. Some may wonder why one
whole chapter is allotted to the discussion of Hick’s religious pluralism in general. On the
one hand, as they may argue, it is right that this dissertation’s main focus is Hick’s
eschatological model rather than his whole system of pluralistic hypothesis. On the other
hand, however, though this dissertation is mainly about Hick’s eschatological model and
whether it is consistent with its own system, its main purpose is the proper evaluation of
228

Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent,

300.
229

Ibid., 301. The moral values are not only different but sometimes contradictory
to one another.
124

his religious pluralism as a whole. Thus, I have discussed some crucial elements of
Hick’s pluralism to see whether his eschatology fits into his whole picture as a puzzle
piece, which in turn would show the adequacy of his overall model of religious pluralism.
I have discussed Hick’s pluralism in four major areas in this chapter as follows:
(1) Hick’s self-described “Copernican Revolution; (2) Theology (Doctrine of God); (3)
Christology; and (4) Soteriology. This chapter tries to show what Hick attempted to do
with his system of pluralism, which makes it descriptive in nature with some critiques. As
noted above, Hick’s pluralism is centered upon his doctrine of the Real or God, which
frames other elements of his system. Hick’s Copernican revolution in Christian theology
involves a radical shift from the traditional teaching that Christianity (Church) or Christ
is at the center, to the interpretation that it is God who is at the center, and that all
religions revolve around him. Therefore, it views all religions as having responded to the
same Real, but with different perceptions of it due to their historical, cultural, and
geographical diversities.
In the second section, I dealt with Hick’s doctrine of God or the Real. Since
Hick’s model of the world religions is centered upon the concept of the Real, it is
necessary to see what this Reality is. Hick’s Real, however, cannot be grasped or defined
fully because it is beyond human cognitive ability. Then some may wonder how we know
that there is the Real at all. If we have no access to the Real as it is in itself, we must be
silent about it. But Hick appeals to the idea that “we postulate the Real an sich as the
ultimate ground of the different forms of religious thought-and-experience.” 230 His
appeal to a necessary postulate is based on his thought that “the phenomenal world is that
230
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same noumenal world as it appears to our human consciousness.” 231 Knowing that there
are many concepts of God that are even contradictory to each other at times, Hick adopts
the Kantian distinction between noumenon and phenomenon to deal with the problem of
phenomenal multiplicity of the Real. Though the Real itself, Hick argues, is outside the
realm of human comprehension, the Real as experienced is available. Thus, Hick insists
that “we always perceive the transcendent through the lens of a particular religious
culture.” 232 To him, the knowledge of the phenomenal Real is the same Real as it appears
to us. Hick’s identification of the phenomenal Real with the noumenal Real, however, is
done not in a literal sense but in a mythological sense.
No doubt Hick’s theocentric model of world religion made him reinterpret it and
finally led him to the denial of the central Christian doctrine of incarnation. The
traditional Christian claim that Christ is the only way for salvation is incompatible with
Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis. Hick’s agenda for the incarnation doctrine was a
reinterpretation at first, which eventually led him to say that it is not the incarnation of
kind but of degree, and thus is a metaphorical or mythological truth rather than a literal
and historical truth. In short, this whole process led him to reject the traditional
foundation of Christian theology that Christ is God incarnate, through whom we are all
saved.
Theocentrism led Hick to accept that God is the center of all religions and thus all
religions are salvific. Though world religions use different terms and concepts of
salvation, they share a common element of limitlessly better existence than man’s present
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state of predicament. Hick claims that all religions are “soteriologically oriented,” 233 that
is, all religions are religions of salvation and thus there are transformations from selfcenteredness to reality-centeredness observed in them. To Hick, because each of the great
world religions is a response to the divine Real, “each is a context of human
salvation.” 234 Hick’s soteriology does not stop here, but goes on further. He argues for
the universal-salvation concept that all will be saved eventually. This idea of universal
salvation has a direct connection with Hick’s pareschatology because the salvific
transformation of all does not take place in this world for all. For the majority of people it
takes many lives for this transformation to be completed. Knowing the possibility of
overruling human freedom with God’s great love, Hick argues that the God of love has
created human beings in a way that they are “inwardly structured” towards him.
As D’Costa notes, throughout his life, Hick’s theological pilgrimage moved “from
Christocentrism to theocentrism to a Realocentrism.” 235 These three words summarize
Hick’s personal as well as theological journey. Having started as an orthodox Christian
who strongly held traditional Christocentric Christianity, Hick made a major shift by
advocating a “Copernican revolution” which led him to reconsider the traditional
understanding of Christ as God incarnate, replacing Jesus first with God or later the Real.
Having launched the journey to theocentrism through his Copernican revolution, Hick
began to show his radical approach to Christian theology. Thus, he had to deny the very
foundation of Christian theology—the doctrine of incarnation. At this stage, Hick, not
wanting to accept the doctrine anymore nor wanting to reject it at the same time,
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suggested a radical reinterpretation—a mythological interpretation of incarnation. Finally,
even his theocentrism was replaced by a Realocentrism through his “Kantian revolution”
in order to deal with multiple and conflicting phenomenal appearances of the Real. 236
The pluralistic hypothesis was now well formulated with its basic components fitting into
the whole picture. Hick’s fullfledged pluralism was now redirected by his soteriological
concern, which opened the way for his eschatological model, to be discussed in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
HICK’S ESCHATOLOGICAL MODEL—PARESCHATOLOGY
Introduction
In the previous chapter I have dealt with the overall picture of Hick’s religious
pluralism as a foundation for the discussion of his pareschatology. On the basis of my
previous discussion regarding religious pluralism, particularly theocentrism and
soteriology, Hick’s eschatological model may be summarized briefly as follows: Hick’s
God or what he calls the Real is a loving one and thus will not let people suffer eternal
torment in hell because of their shortcomings and mistakes of one short life. 1 The
traditional Christian “doctrine of hell is morally intolerable.” 2 Hick’s appeal to this
morally based argument is due to his understanding of the existence of evil in the
presence of an all-good and all-powerful Ultimate Reality, which is the central problem
of theodicy. 3 Though salvific transformation is seldom accomplished in this life, 4 by
being made in the image of God in the beginning and later in the likeness of God as
Irenaeus advocated through human openness to the Real, people gradually come to
achieve a greater degree of human perfection. Finally all will experience the ultimate
1
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salvation through a continued soul-making process 5 of being, which shows that Hick’s
theology of death is ultimately eschatological and teleological in a sense that everyone is
moving towards the final perfection. In this whole process, Hick has applied the basic
principle of evolutionism that human “species evolve” 6 from a lower being to a higher
one and to the final perfection. More particularly, Hick’s pareschatology is founded upon
the evolutionary principle that concerns biological, psychological, and spiritual evolution
of human beings. 7 As LeRoy Moore notes, Hick believes that “earthly life and
otherworldly reincarnation are preparations for the ultimate state beyond.” 8 Thus, there
will be not only one eschaton but many eschatons before the ultimate salvation of a
human being, depending on how close he or she is to the Real. 9
5
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Assuming the evolutionary principle, Hick says, “In this world man has emerged
within the evolution of the forms of life as an unique complex being who is an animal,
with instincts and drives geared to the struggle to survive; but at the same time a social
and therefore ethical being, conscious of the other-regarding demands of his existence;
and at the same time again a religious being, with innate tendency to interpret his
experience in terms of the supernatural, and thus capable of responding to divine
revelation” (John Hick, “Coherence and the God of Love Again,” Journal of Theological
Studies 24, no. 2 [Oct. 1973]: 523). See also John Hick, Biology and the Soul
(Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1972), 26.
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This eschatological model of Hick’s represented as “pareschatology”—“the
doctrine of the para-eschata, or next-to-last things” 10 —is a unique conception, which
“refers to the intermediate period between death and the ultimate state of being.” 11 As
noted above, based upon the idea of universal salvation and Irenaean soteriology, Hick
develops his own pareschatology, which is a combination of various eschatologies from
East and West. 12 As Hick notes, however, “it differs from the western tradition in
postulating many lives instead of only one, and from the eastern tradition in postulating
many spheres of incarnate existence instead of only one.” 13 In other words, Hick
postulates that there will be many lives in many different worlds other than this universe.
In order to discuss and evaluate Hick’s hypothesis of “many lives in many
worlds,” 14 what he calls pareschatology, we need to understand his anthropology, and his
ideas of death and afterlife. As a result of Hick’s discussion of eschatologies or
pareschatologies from East and West, Hick presents pareschatology as a product of his
religious pluralism which he thinks presents a possible solution for conflicting claims
between them. Death and Eternal Life will be the main source of my discussion of Hick’s
pareschatology along with only a few authors. Since Hick’s pareschatology is largely
10
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ignored by the majority of scholars, there is only a small amount of secondary sources
available.
Anthropology
Hick’s eschatological model focuses on “individual eschatology,” which concerns
the immortality of the soul, rather than “general” or “collective eschatology” of the
biblical tradition, which concerns a general resurrection of the saved at the end of
history. 15 There are questions that need to be answered in this section regarding Hick’s
thought on anthropology before going into the main discussion on his pareschatology:
What is man? Is a human being composed of two separable entities, physical and nonphysical parts? What is the concept of soul?
What Is Humanity?
How Hick views a human being—where he comes from in terms of his origin,
how he is composed between mind and body, where he is going in the future—will be the
basis of his understanding of a human’s destinies after this life and more if there are any.
Thus it is helpful to look at Hick’s anthropology because his anthropology, I think, is the
key to the understanding of his pareschatology.
As one assuming modern scientific method and its findings, Hick claims that from
a purely human point of view a human being is a product of the shuffling of the
enormous number of possible genetic codes with its “continuous interaction with its
environment.” 16 He claims, “Behind each of us there lies an astronomical number of
15
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other possible arrangements of the same genetic material.”17 Nevertheless, his view of
the emergence of human beings is not purely naturalistic because he attributes this
process of random selection of genetic codes to the result of “the creative will of God.” 18
Thus Hick insists, “Our emergence out of the bewildering complexity of the genetic
process is not in tension with the basic theological conception of man’s utter contingency
as a created being.” 19 While accepting modern scientific knowledge of biology or
chemistry regarding human life, Hick wants to keep his religious conviction that there is
a God who is creator of everything including human beings. Hick accepts that man was
“created out of dust of the earth” as the Bible teaches. However, Hick’s creator is not like
the God of the Bible who created man and woman on the sixth day of the creation week,
because he doesn’t want to clash with “natural sciences of the origin of man.” 20 Thus, he
says, “The details of the creative process, from dust to the immensely complex religious
and valuing human animal, are for the relevant sciences to trace.” 21 This position forced
him to accept “the long, slow evolution of the forms of life, a process which has
eventually produced man.” 22 Hick’s acceptance of modern scientific knowledge led him
to reinterpret or even reject some traditional biblical truths in the first few chapters of
17
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Genesis. Particularly, the story of the fall in the Garden of Eden could not be a historical
truth. According to Hick, the fall “did not take place at any point in time, from a paradisal
condition which did not exist at any place.” 23 The evolutionary process is done through
the principle of the survival of fittest, which assumes that “death has always characterized
life on this planet as have other evils such as earthquakes, storms, floods, droughts, and
pests.” 24 This idea is against the traditional understanding of the stories in Gen 3. In order
to get rid of his dilemma of being contradictory to the biblical truth, he adapted the
Irenaean teaching regarding human origin, which distinguishes “between what he called
the image of God and the likeness of God.” 25 He suggested a two-stage creation of man
as follows:
The imago dei is man’s nature as a rational, personal and moral animal. Thus man
in society, man the ethical being, man the creator of culture, exists in the image of
God. It has taken many hundreds of millions of years of biological evolution to
produce him, and yet even so he is only the raw material for the second stage of
the creative process, which is the bringing of man, thus fashioned as person in the
divine image, into the finite likeness of God. This latter state represents the
fulfillment of the potentialities of our human nature, the completed humanization
of man in a society of mutual love. Whereas the first stage of creation is an
exercise of divine power, the second stage is of a different kind; for the creatures
who have been brought into existence in God’s image are endowed with a real
though limited freedom, and their further growth into the finite divine ‘likeness’
has to take place through their own free responses within the world in which they
find themselves. 26
Thus according to Hick the creation of man is not completed but still going on.
The process of creation is hardly to be completed in each person’s life on this earth
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within seventy to eighty years. It is hard to think of the second stage of creation—the
likeness of God—as finished in this life.
Hick’s religious interpretation of human existence is teleological and
eschatological. The meaning of the human being’s life is to be understood in the
perspective of what he is going to be in the future rather than the life on earth concluded
at the time of death. That is why he said, “It is not what man has come from but what he
is going to that is important.” 27 Thus Hick’s man is in the process of making himself in
the likeness of God in this life, or even life or lives after for most people. Hick suggests
this final state of human being is to be something like “the central Hindu notion of the
atman, the universal self which all the separate human consciousnesses unitedly are in the
depth of their being.” 28 He claims that “the goal is a return to unity at a higher level, a
movement from pre-individualized unity through separate egoity to a supra-individual
unity.” 29 Hick insists that this state of atman is “the ideal state of human consciousness
which waits to be realized through the negating of individual egoity.” 30 Though the
conception of atman is identical to that of Brahman, Hick hesitates to equate this
“eschatological humanity” (atman) with Brahman itself. 31 If Hick’s final state of the
human being is this egoless existence that can hardly be identified as someone from earth
in heaven or paradise as Christian and other religious believers imagine, it is hard to think
that this someone is said to be saved at all. If no self-identity is going to be recognized
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there and if one is in the state of “the fully realized collective consciousness of the
atman,” 32 it is hard to say that this state is ideal for all religious adherents to pursue.
Dichotomous View of Mind and Body
As Schmitt noted, Hick assumes that man is “composed of physical and nonphysical parts or realms,” 33 that is, body and mind. Unlike the concept of the physical
aspect that can be seen and felt, weighed and measured, as Hick notes, the nonphysical
aspect of human nature, which cannot be seen or felt, is conceived in a variety of terms
such as “mind, soul, self, I, person, spirit, ego, consciousness, psyche, the subconscious,
the unconscious, the id, the superego, mentality, transcendental unity of apperception, . . .
jiva (or jivatman) and atman.” 34 Though Hick admits that it is impossible to put all these
“terms into a single system,” he prefers to call this nonphysical part “a self,” more
particularly “an embodied self,” 35 which is understood by Hick as something
“identical” 36 with or “included” in the Christian concept of soul. 37
It is crucial to see how Hick views the human being, whether he has two or more
aspects or parts, mind and body, in order better to understand his eschatological model.
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Hick discusses this issue in the sixth chapter of Death and Eternal Life entitled “Mind
and Body,” 38 which I will use as the main source. Presenting four basic options in regard
to various views of the relation between body and mind, he starts his discussion with an
assumption that these two are two separate parts. This aspect of a two-parts-theory of
body and mind will be even clearer in Hick’s presentation of four main options of how
body and mind are related.
The first option is monistic in nature, while all others are dualistic. It is known as
the “mind/brain identity theory” which claims that “the two concepts refer to the same
reality.” 39 Mind/brain identity consists in “the electro-chemical function of the brain.” 40
He insists that “while the names ‘mind’ and ‘brain’ have different meanings, they
nevertheless in fact refer to the same object.” 41 According to this view, as Hick notes,
“thoughts are not effects or by-products or epiphenomena of cerebral events, but thoughts
and brain processes are the same things.” 42 Hick felt that this position went too far,
because even though there is “ample evidence of mind/brain correlation” it is hard to say
that mind and body are identical. 43 Hick argues that though we can locate “a brain
process in space, namely in a part of the cerebrum,” it is impossible to “locate a mental
38
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event in space.” 44 Thus, the mind/brain identity theory is dismissed in Hick’s idea of the
relationship between body and mind.
The second option is called epiphenomenalism, which claims that “the mind is
unilaterally dependent upon the body and has no independent efficacy.” 45
Epiphenomenalism is “the view that whilst consciousness is different from the physical
activity of the brain it is nevertheless generated by that activity and has no independent
existence or causality.” 46 In an analogy, Hick contends that “while electricity is flowing
through a light bulb it produces light, but stop the current and there’s no light. Likewise,
electricity flowing through the brain produces consciousness, but stop the current and
there is no consciousness.” 47 Unlike the mind/brain identity theory, it is a dualism that
sees two different elements, the brain doing things with the mind reflecting what the
brain does. The weakness of this position is that, as Hick notes, “the states of the brain
determine the states of the mind, and never vice versa,” 48 which entails determinism. In
other words, if the mind is a mere epiphenomenon, it is completely determined by the
brain.
The third option is another dualistic view which claims that “although mind and
body are entities of different kinds, and the mind influences the body as much as the body
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influences the mind, yet the latter cannot function apart from the body.” 49 Through
observations of mental work and various mental illnesses that are treated by drugs to the
brain, Hick argues that the “mind and brain are independent but interacting realities, each
of which can causally affect the other.” 50 In other words, mind and brain have mysterious
reciprocal causality to each other. The interaction of body and mind “is unique and
utterly mysterious.” 51 Hick also observes the plasticity of the brain among the people
born blind and those facing some physical traumas such as stroke. He says:
Using modern brain imaging techniques, it was discovered that people who had
been born blind and used Braille throughout their lives had taken up the cortical
areas that you or I would use for vision for processing touch. . . . [So] the brain
had been modified so that parts people normally use for vision are now used for
touch. Again, when stroke victims are able gradually to recover some of their lost
abilities, this is done by constant effort, guided by physiotherapists, which forms
new pathways in the brain to compensate for the damaged ones. 52
Building upon the basic ideas of the third option, Hick proposes his own view on
this issue as follows: “body and mind are entities of different kinds, mysteriously locked
together in our present existence, but . . . the mind may nevertheless be able to survive the
death of the body” 53 (emphasis added). One supporting example of a special function of
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the mind and its possibility of survival after the death of the body is telepathy, 54 which
Hick believes to be a form of extrasensory perception. The existence of telepathy, Hick
argues, which is mentally or psychologically rather than physically based and involves
some kind of connection between minds, is a strong evidence of “the possibility of the
mind’s surviving the death of the body.” 55 In this sense, Hick’s dichotomous view of
mind and body is clearly seen, 56 though he develops it further in another context.57 Thus,
the possibility of survival of the mind or nonphysical part after death is suggested by
Hick’s argument. Hick is now preparing a way to argue for what he calls “the traditional
religious conception of the human being as an immortal soul,” 58 which is in conflict with
the teachings of Scripture. This leads us to the discussion of the concept of the soul.
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Concept of Soul
Being aware of the difficulty of defining the concept of soul, the nonphysical part
of the human being, Hick says, “The term ‘soul’ has of course been used to refer to any
of a whole family of notions, named by such terms as ‘self,’ ‘higher self,’ ‘elusive self,’
‘psyche,’ ‘mind,’ ‘ego,’ ‘I,’ ‘transcendental unity of apperception,’ ‘metaphysical
subject,’ etc.” 59 Hick notes, “The Christian concept of soul undoubtedly includes [the]
conscious self, which earns rewards and deserves penalties . . . and which is to enjoy
hereafter the blissful life of heaven or to suffer eternal loss of heaven.” 60 In his discussion
about the soul, Hick presents three traditional theories in regard to the origin of the soul.
The first one is the doctrine of preexistence of the soul claimed by Origen. Roughly, as
Hick says, it claims that “the soul existed in the heavenly realms before descending into
this world, and that its present imprisonment in a material body is the result of a primeval
fall from grace.” 61 This thought is not derived from biblical teachings but from Greek
philosophy.
The second one is traducianism, which claims that “the soul-substance which God
breathed into Adam has been passed down through generation after generation of his
descendants by continual division,” 62 as Hick notes. This view sees that the souls of
people are all from the soul of the first man with slight modifications. This, Hick says,
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“can be seen as a mythological version of what actually happens as described by the
science of genetics.” 63
The third theory is creationism, as Hick says, which understands that “each soul is
a new divine creation which God attaches to the growing foetus at some point between
conception and birth.” 64 Accordingly, God is said to create “a new soul and infuses it into
each man.” 65 Creationism is supported and advocated by the Catholic Church. Hick is not
satisfied with this theory. As he notes, if the soul is something that is created and infused
into man, it is natural to assume that there are characteristics of the soul which are neither
from inheritance nor from the environment. Unless the soul contributes to the personal
essence of a human being in terms of human individuation besides heredity and
environment, the soul would be a useless postulate. If there are characteristics derived
from the soul, they must not purely “arise from the inherited genetic code,” 66 notes Hick.
This means that if there is the divinely inserted soul in each person’s life, we must
assume that “there are innate personal qualities which have not been inherited from one’s
parents but which have been implanted by the Creator.” 67
However, Hick claims that some aspects of innate aptitudes, such as intelligence,
musical and artistic abilities, temperamental type and character structure, etc., are
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inherited through the body that already contains genetic information. 68 On top of this
genetic basis of personality, Hick recognizes the presence of “the formation of moral
character through the individual’s interaction with environments.” 69 Yet he does suggest
some third element—“the basic moral and spiritual dispositions” 70 that he claims to
inhere in the soul—that enables human beings to be free moral beings. That means if
man’s life is predetermined by both heredity and environment, he cannot be said to be
totally free, as Hick’s idea of man as a free being who is “placed at an epistemic distance
from God” 71 suggests. Thus Hick says: “The soul is the locus of our personal and moral
freedom. . . . We should then identify the soul with certain fundamental dispositional
characteristics—presumably our basic moral and religious attitudes.” 72 Hick claims that
insofar as one is different from another in morality and spirituality, “it will be impossible
to disprove the claim that this difference is due to basic dispositions which were either
implanted by God at conception or formed in previous lives.” 73 This however does not
mean that Hick considers the soul as a created and infused substance, nor that “the term
68
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soul can no longer have any proper use, but only that it should not be used as the name of
a spiritual substance or entity.” 74
This line of argument led him to consider it from a totally different perspective
that Hick understands the word soul “as an indicator of value.” 75 For instance, Hick
suggests the use of “soul language or even to speaking of human beings as souls, or as
having souls, in distinction perhaps from the lower animals.” 76 That means soul-language
expresses the sacredness of human personality and inherent human rights. He proposes to
see the word soul as a person and not some sort of mysterious divine entity hidden within
him. This way of looking at the soul is somewhat parallel to that of the Scriptures, which
view the soul not as some kind of substance that can be separated from the body and
survive after death but as human consciousness or the human person as a holistic being. 77
In this line of argument the soul is to be seen as an expression “equivalent to ‘man,’ or
‘person,’ or ‘self,’” 78 with which Hick would not agree, because he considers the
74
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understanding of human being as soul to be mythological. 79 Hick sees an individual as
neither “a non-physical soul incomprehensibly interacting with a physical body,” nor “as
an eternal soul temporarily attached to a mortal body,” but views him as a “psychophysical life.” 80 Though knowing that human beings have two parts, mind and body, and
one may survive while the other is extinct, Hick perceives the human being as “an
indissoluble psycho-physical unity” 81 as we encounter it every day, which is in
contradiction with his own suggestion of the possibility of the soul’s survival after bodily
death. Thus, Hick is leaning more towards the idea of man as a psycho-physical unity
rather than the notion of soul or mind that can survive bodily death.
Death
Being fully aware of the inevitability and universality of death, Hick says, “Death
comes impartially to everyone; there are no privileged or underprivileged in this matter;
we are all in the end in the same boat.” 82 As the title of the book Death and Eternal life
suggests, he presents an eschatological issue, a theology of death, as one of the agendas
for his religious pluralism. It must have been crucial for Hick to deal with the issue of
death, which is “a central concern of all the religions of the world,” 83 to have a complete
system of religious pluralism. For him “the question [is] whether the belief in an afterlife
is or is not an essential part of the Christian faith,” because he believes “upon this issue
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every other aspect of our theology of death necessarily hinges.” 84 Hick seems to believe
that a global theology (of death) is made possible by his pluralistic hypothesis.
Death and Eternal Life
It is worthy to discuss something about his work Death and Eternal Life that is
the main source of this chapter. As Schmitt notes, Hick has “two basic and
complementary goals” 85 in his work Death and Eternal Life. The first goal is apologetic
in nature. As Schmitt notes, “Hick argues that belief in life after death does not contradict
and is not contradicted by the investigations of nontheological realms,” 86 claiming that
this belief is universal in all religions. Hick did his own investigation not only in the
realm of religions but also in the realm of other scientific disciplines. This open attitude
of Hick is seen in his preface: “It seems to me that the claim of the religions that this life
is part of a much larger existence that transcends our lifespan as animal organisms,
whether through the continuation of individual consciousness or through participation in
a greater transpersonal life, is very likely to be true. I shall argue that this is not ruled out
by established scientific findings or by any agreed philosophical arguments.” 87 Hick’s
openness to all data from every area of knowledge covers such disciplines as religious
traditions, philosophies, psychology, anthropology, sociology, genetics, etc. His
apologetic nature is clearly observed in every page of the volume.
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The second goal is to see whether a global approach, a global theology of death, is
possible. Hick does not want to present “the possibility of a global religion,” 88 which
would require a uniformity in religious consciousness, but to seek a global theology (of
death), which provides an interpretation that reconciles different beliefs, data, modes of
religious experience. Hick distinguishes between two aspects of religion: First, its central
affirmations concerning the nature of reality which are true or false; and second, the
mythology which comes with the central affirmations but is ultimately not true or false.
Regarding this Hick notes:
It is because affirmations about the nature of reality are true or false or, more
probably, partly true and partly false, that the theologies of the different religions
can be compared with one another, that agreements and disagreements can be
registered, and that the possibility of syntheses and even of a comprehensive
global theology cannot be excluded in advance. On the other hand, it is because
religious myth and the practice of piety are phenomena of human culture that a
global religion will never come about so long as there is—as let us hope there will
always be—a wide variety of different styles of human existence. 89
According to this approach, differences between religious traditions regarding
death are not religiously significant because for Hick what is important is not theological
understanding but the fact that “salvation/liberation takes place as well on one side or the
other.” 90 As Heather Meacock notes, Hick claims that “faiths themselves . . . may be
salvific, despite the truth or falsity of their eschatological predictions.” 91 For Hick, thus,
theology is of little importance, because as long as “both correct and incorrect trans88

Ibid., 30.

89

Ibid., 29.

90

Heim, “The Pluralistic Hypothesis, Realism, and Post-Eschatology,” 211.

91

Heather Meacock, An Anthropological Approach to Theology (New York:
University Press of America, 2000), 183.

147

historical beliefs . . . can form part of a religious totality” 92 that provides contact with the
Real and salvific transformation, they are all valid. This line of argument is what Hick
wants to achieve in his religious pluralism as well as in his global theology of death.
A New Look on Death
Hick’s agenda inevitably led him to have a new look on death. Unlike the
traditional Western view of death, which understands it as a consequence of sin, Hick
presents a new approach, “what he calls a non-traditional view of death,” 93 as Jay D.
Robison notes. Hick argues that, according to traditional Christian theology, death is the
result of the fall of humanity, “a punishment,” “a disastrous consequence of man’s
turning away from his maker.” 94 This Augustinian view sees death not as “an aspect of
the divinely intended human situation, but is an evil, a state that ought never to have
come about.” 95 According to this picture, as Hick notes, man, a finitely perfect creature,
sinned against his Creator God, which brought death into the world. Death is seen as “a
divinely inflicted punishment for sin.” 96 Thus, man at the time of bodily death faces
God’s eternal judgment of either heaven or hell. As Hick notes, “God’s purpose for the
individual will be fulfilled in this life.” 97
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Not being satisfied with this traditional view, Hick presents an alternative view of
death, which is based on the theology of Hellenistic Fathers, particularly Irenaeus’s
anthropology. 98 According to this view “human beings were not created perfect but as
immature creatures at the beginning of a long process of growth toward maturity,” 99
which Hick accepts as his position on death. According to this line of reasoning, man did
not fall from a perfect condition without sin into a disastrous condition of sin and guilt as
Gen 3 describes. 100 Rather, humanity as an immature creature is still in the process of
being created in the likeness of God, as Irenaeus’s idea of a two-stage creation implies.
This view contends that humanity is understood as taking a pilgrimage toward death,
because “life is a soul- or person-making process” 101 while alive. The moment of death is,
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thus, not seen as “the moment when the individual’s eternal destiny is irrevocably
decided,” 102 as the traditional Christian theology understands.
From this new perspective, Hick argues that death has never been a disastrous or
unnatural experience. In the process of soul-making, death is understood as “a necessary
part” 103 of man’s experience of being made in the likeness of God. Thus, being aware of
existentialist philosophers’ understanding of death, which stresses how death sheds light
on our lives, Hick suggests two meanings that man’s death gives to his life. First, a
person’s death shows its meaning to others, how his life is seen in its totality. He says,
“For only when a life has been rounded off by death are we able to see it in its totality
and so to characterize it as a whole.” 104 Second, the manner of a person’s “dying may
throw a flood of retrospective light upon his character throughout life.” 105 Hick argues
that the act of dying at the very last moment of life may form a unique climax for him, as
Jesus’ life on earth illustrates “the significance of his life and work as a whole.” 106
As Schmitt notes, therefore, Hick’s interpretation of death is positive and
naturalistic. 107 This view sees death in the context of the will of God, which enables the
person to move from one world to another and helps personal growth and development in
the likeness of God. Hick, comparing two alternatives on the view of death, suggests that
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“the Augustinian type of theology in which death is held to be the wages of sin should be
replaced by an Irenaean type of theology which sees our mortality in relation to a positive
divine purpose of love.” 108 Thus, according to Hick, death must not be seen as a moment
of eternal judgment but as a moment of transition to the higher level of existence, which
leads to the following issue of what happens after the moment of death.
Afterlife
One of the major concerns of the world religions centers upon the notion of
human survival of physical death, whether there is an afterlife. As Hick notes, a
straightforward question that everyone asks is, “Do we live on after bodily death?” 109
Knowing that the question of afterlife is not easy to answer, Hick discusses the origins for
belief in afterlife and immortality, not only from a religious point of view, but also from
empirical as well as rational points of view.
There is much empirical, particularly parapsychological, evidence “in the form of
spirit communications through mediums,” 110 Hick argues, which seems to support the
assumption that there is some kind of “human survival after death.” 111 Nevertheless, not
being sure of whether it is a case of deceased persons trying to use a medium’s
108
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personation of them, or the medium receiving telepathic impressions, or a person
deceased having a psychic factor (character traits and memories) for a while, Hick does
not give a definitive answer on the survival of bodily death. Hick, quoting Robert H.
Thouless in answering the question “Do we survive bodily death?,” writes: “There seem
to be many converging lines of evidence which suggest that [death] is the passage to
another life, but we cannot yet be certain that this is the case. It is a future task of
parapsychology to reduce to a minimum this uncertainty and to find out all we can about
the nature of this future life.” 112 Hick insists, as Kai Nielsen notes, that the empirical
evidence for “the survival of the death of our ‘present’ bodies in either a disembodied
state or with a new resurrected body is ambiguous and uncertain.” 113 This does not mean
that there is no afterlife, according to Hick. Though clearly being aware of the uncertain
nature of empirical evidence of life after death, Hick argues, “The fact that we cannot as
of now establish life after death by empirical evidence does not mean that there is no life
after death. We must not mistake absence of knowledge for knowledge of absence!” 114
Another line of argument from empirical evidence is observed in his discussion of
burial practices of ancient people. Hick argues that the study of earliest evidences from
all over the world shows that man “did not think of death as the cessation of
existence.” 115 The burial practices of ancient people show that “our prehistoric ancestors
assumed that in some sense and in some form humans continue to exist after their
112
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deaths.” 116 In other words, Hick claims there has always been a universal belief in
“continued existence beyond death.” 117 This wishful thinking, however, cannot be an
evidence for life after death.
Hick also argues from the rational and moral perspectives that a brief earthly life
followed by a divine judgment of either eternal heaven or hell is not morally realistic. 118
As La Due argues, “How could divine justice ever demand as a punishment for finite
human sins an infinite penalty of eternal torture?” 119 The recognition of the inequality of
human existence leads Hick to develop a new eschatological model called pareschatology,
which tries to solve the paradox. 120 Thus, discussing the basic argument that after this
limited earthly life comes an eternal judgment of God, Hick lists three reasons that this
picture is unrealistic. First, a large proportion of human babies in the past “have died at
birth or in infancy, so that for them it would seem that the purpose of life has remained
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unfulfilled.” 121 Second, “the circumstances into which people are born . . . vary so greatly
in their propitiousness for moral and spiritual growth that it is hard to see how we could
be fairly assessed” 122 in this short life. Third, in this short earthly life, only a “few people
can be said to be morally fitted” 123 for eternal salvation. The only acceptable explanation
for the unfairness of human existence, Hick argues, “can be found in a life beyond death
in which many or most of those injustices are remedied.” 124 This is a way of saying that
salvation, as achieving certain moral norms, is not consonant with the traditional
Christian theology of salvation, which put its emphasis on salvation by faith through
grace. Though acknowledging this emphasis of faith, claiming that “the saved are those
who believe in Jesus Christ as their Lord and Saviour and who put their trust in the
efficacy of his atoning death,” Hick argues it is “arbitrary and implausible” in this
pluralistic age. 125 Thus, Hick made a move to consider other options from Hindu,
Buddhist, Jain and Sikh traditions. Hick argues, “The basic thought here is that one lifespan is not enough for the transformation of human beings from the self-centredness of
our natural state to the unity or community with the divine reality which is the ultimate
aim of human existence.” 126 The fact that there are only a few people fitted for eternal
salvation led Hick to think that “one such natural span is not sufficient for our growth to a
121
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total unitive or communitive centredness in the divine reality.” 127 In this way, Hick had
to speculate that our present life would be followed by further lives in order to fulfill the
ultimate purpose of human existence. Thus, Hick suggests we should consider seriously
the basic Eastern option of a series of several afterlives, the doctrine of reincarnation
taught by Buddhism and Hinduism. As Nielsen observes, “The eastern option . . . seems,
on balance, if we view the matter purely morally, the more attractive option.” 128 This led
Hick to the main issue of this dissertation, pareschatology, which will be discussed in the
following section.
Before discussing Hick’s pareschatology, it is helpful to mention some options of
afterlife that he dealt with. He lists three major options in regard to the understanding of
death and afterlife. First, the materialist, humanist view is that there is not any form of
survival after death. Second, the Western and Christian version believes that there will be
life after death in heaven. Third, the Eastern religions believe that there will be multiple
lives after death in another form of existence. The first option Hick simply ignores,
because he thinks it does not provide any idea of existence after death and is not included
in his discussion. If Hick, as a pluralist philosopher who considers all forms of belief
systems, does not consider this as an option, it is not consonant with his pluralistic
hypothesis of world religion, which must include all systems as available options.
Though being aware of the fact that the Western and Christian belief and the Eastern
belief in regard to life after death are mutually exclusive, the first believing in the
continuation of the individual personality after death either in heaven or hell and the
second believing in the continual rebirth of person until it gains ultimate realization or
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nirvana, Hick suggests that “they point beyond themselves.” 129 Hick, after he has
discussed both the Eastern and the Western beliefs, as Nielsen notes, has “something of
the advantages of both while escaping their disadvantages.” 130 More will be discussed in
the following section, but for now it needs to be noted that here Hick argues for what he
calls “a third possibility, other than eternal-heaven-or-hell or repeated earthly
reincarnations.” 131 The third possibility that he suggests is neither the Eastern nor the
Western belief, but rather a combination of both. While the third possibility postulates
“many spheres of incarnate existence” rather than only one, which is not in agreement
with the Eastern belief, it also postulates “many lives” rather than only one, which is not
in agreement with the Western belief. 132
Pareschatology as a Product of Pluralism
Hick’s eschatological model is a unique system and thus is not something that has
a parallel system to be compared with. It is not based on any single system but rather has
roots in major world religions’ views on the subject. Thus it should be noted that Hick’s
pareschatology, what he generally calls a global theology of death, is a combination of
major eschatologies of East and West. Knowing the profoundly obscure nature of the
subject, Hick does not want to present theories in alleged certainties, but rather to “spell
out possibilities.” 133 For this reason, Hick suggests that we “look seriously at all the main
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theories and speculations and consider, so far as we can, their respective strengths and
weaknesses—even, in a very broad sense of the term, their relative probabilities.” 134 This
attitude shows Hick’s apologetic way of doing theology. Trying not to start from any
single religious vantage point, particularly Christianity, Hick argues, “I have tried not to
be blinded by my own particular starting-point to insights and suggestions coming from
beyond the Christian and western traditions.” 135 Furthermore, he invites Christians to
make this same effort with him, and invites them to set aside certain prejudices against
Eastern thoughts such as karma and rebirth. This pluralistic attitude led him to explore
the new possibility of an eschatological model.
Definition of the Term
Before entering into the main discussion of pareschatology, it is worth noting how
Hick defines the term. A somewhat odd and foreign term, “pareschatology” is adopted by
Hick to express his own model of eschatology. It should be also noted that Hick
distinguishes between eschatology and pareschatology. Comparing these two, Hick
argues that while eschatology is the doctrine of the eschata or last things or the ultimate
state of humanity, “pareschatology is the doctrine of the para-eschata, or next-to-last
things.” 136 Thus, as “the doctrine of man’s existence between bodily death and the
ultimate state,” 137 Hick argues, pareschatology concerns not the ultimate state of
134
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humanity but “the human future between the present life and man’s ultimate state.” 138
That means its major concern is not centered upon the ultimate state of humanity as other
eschatologies are, but rather on the human state between the moment of death and the
ultimate salvation. Admitting the uncertainty of theories and speculations concerning the
future destiny of man after death, Hick argues, “For if there is continued human existence
after bodily death it is possible that its more immediate phases may bear sufficient
analogy to our present state for some of our speculations about it to be not wholly
misleading.” 139 But the fact that pareschatology deals with events less remote, thus more
immediate, does not guarantee that it is more easily known to us. It is equally uncertain
what looks to be the destiny of man between eschatology and pareschatology. The
nearness or remoteness of time really does not matter in the question of its certainty,
because they both are beyond the access of human knowability. Hick’s attitude toward
the pareschatology, how vague it is and how uncertain it is, is well expressed in the
following. He says:
The best that could be hoped is that in some of its more ultimate speculations the
human mind is looking in what is in the most general sense a right direction, or at
any rate that it is not looking in a totally wrong direction. But if we use this
directional image it must be in terms of astronomical distances. To be looking in
the direction of some unimaginably remote constellation, altogether beyond the
range of our vision, may merely mean that I am, say, facing north rather than
south! 140
The analogy of looking at “some unimaginably remote constellation” to illustrate
his model shows the very uncertainty and vagueness of the subject. If Hick is only
interested in suggesting some kind of direction that leads to the destiny of humanity in
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the future after death because of its uncertainty, I wonder how can we be sure that we are
oriented in the right direction at all. The only possible direction that Hick’s reasoning will
lead could be his own conviction that there will be life after death, no more, no less.
Nevertheless, Hick presents the basic method to explicate possible human destiny
beyond death. His agenda for the discussion, which I will also follow for my analysis of
his model, is as follows: “What might it be to survive as a disembodied mind? What
might the resurrection of the body, or of the flesh, mean? What might a spiritual body be?
How can the idea of reincarnation be understood?” 141 Hick’s basic agenda can be as
simple as saying that he will look for the evidences of afterlife, and two major options
from Western and Easternstrands will be considered.
The Survival of the Disembodied Mind
As noted above, Hick’s main goal in Death and Eternal Life is development of a
universal or global theology of death and eternal life. In his steps to this objective, as
Schmitt notes, Hick discusses Western and Eastern eschatological models, namely
“pareschatologies, i.e. images and descriptions of what happens between death and the
ultimate state.” 142 The first issue Hick introduces in this section is “the survival of the
disembodied mind,” 143 an issue that is rarely discussed.
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Though the belief that “after bodily death the mind continues to live goes back in
western thought at least to Plato,” 144 little has been discussed systematically about “the
notion of the survival of the disembodied mind” 145 until Henry H. Price presented a paper
titled “Personal Survival and the Idea of Another World.” 146 Hick states Price’s theory in
three stages as follows. First, perceptions of life after death will be as similar as
“perceptions in dreams.” 147 As Hick notes, these perceptions will be “minddependent” 148 and will come from mental images of one’s life. That means our survival
in the postmortem world will be a psychological one rather than physical. Second, while
dreams are private matters in which there is no communication and interaction with other
minds, in the world of the afterlife there may be “real communication and interaction
with other minds” through what we call “extrasensory perception.” 149 Thus there will be,
as Hick notes, “continual telepathic activity, producing visual and auditory images, so
that the resulting experience is just like that of seeing other people and hearing them
talk.” 150 Third, this postmortem world will “be dependent on the memories and the
144
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desires of the persons who experienced it,” 151 because their memories and desires will
determine the images they have.
However, as Hick notes, “Price cautions us against assuming that such a realm of
wish-fulfillment would necessarily be unqualifiedly pleasant.” 152 The spectrum of this
psychological survival, as Hick notes, can range from solipsism—“a private-mentalworlds picture” 153 —at one extreme to another extreme notion of bodily resurrection, with
Price’s own conception standing in the middle. Hick contends that “there is . . . a tension
between the idea of the formation of a post-mortem world by the power of desire and the
idea that such a world is common to many minds in virtue of telepathic links between
them.” 154 The wish-fulfillment principle is consonant with the solipsistic picture while it
is in conflict with the other extreme end of spectrum. Hick notes that one encounters
difficulty if there are two or more individuals having identical or conflicting desires at the
same time. Hick says:
It is not easy to combine the two suggestions that the post-mortem world is
created by human wishes and that it is common to a great number of people. For
desires inhere in individuals, and at the level of ordinary everyday wishes at any
rate it may be presumed that no two individuals’ and certainly no large
community of persons’ desires coincide sufficiently to be capable of being
fulfilled in identically the same state of affairs. I do not believe that we can in fact
imagine a coherent world created by the desires of a multitude of different people
out of the material of their several sets of earthly memories. 155
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I wonder what would happen when wishes or desires of all the human beings
conflict with one another in the postmortem world. If it is not likely that the desires of
close friends are harmoniously related to each other, it is almost impossible to expect that
all human beings’ wishes are in perfect harmony.
According to Price’s psychological survival hypothesis, 156 as Hick notes, it is
hard to imagine how one can make any moral choices if our dreams are understood as
“psychologically determined events.” 157 But it seems that Price’s hypothesis does not
want to claim our dreams are fully determined, and thus it is coherent to argue that “in a
prolonged dream one might have to make ethical decisions” 158 and thus experience moral
development. This in turn requires that there must be inhabitants with whom postmortem
minds interact in order to develop their moral characters. Hick argues that this kind of
social environment would be “unreal and his commerce with other people delusory” 159 in
the postmortem world, because it is impossible to “imagine one continuing to develop to
fulfillment isolated from other individuals.” 160 However, this solipsistic picture is, as
Hick notes, “transcended by the sharing by many minds in the imaging of a common
156
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desires as a “science-fiction” theory (Louis Dupré, review of Death and Eternal Life, by
John Hick, The Journal of Religion 58, no. 2 [Apr. 1978]: 218).
157

Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 268.

158

Ibid., 269.

159

Ibid.

160

Schmitt, Death and After-Life in the Theologies of Karl Barth and John Hick,

132.

162

world” 161 or “a common environment,” 162 in which the memories and desires of
numerous minds (thousands or millions) are pooled together.
Price suggests, as Hick notes, “a number of separate worlds created by groups of
people with sufficiently similar memories or desires or both.” 163 Contending that though
the Old Testament presents the notion of a single world after death, and the New
Testament views it as “the notion of a hierarchy of heavens existing at different spiritual
levels,” 164 Hick argues for the direction that there is a series of worlds beyond death. This
notion of many worlds is consonant with Hick’s Irenaean type of theodicy that requires
the person-making process to be continued in the lives beyond death, because “it is
seldom completed by the time of bodily death.” 165 In other words, as Hick notes, “if the
person-making process is ever to be carried through it seems that it must necessarily
continue beyond bodily death. And this appears to require a real continuation of human
life as a formative process.” 166 However, Price’s hypothesis that “the understanding of
reality developed by idealist metaphysicians might be true of the next world although not
of the present one” 167 makes the postmortem worlds created by man’s desires hardly able
to aid man in the person-making process. Disagreeing with Price, who understands the
next world as different from the present one, Hick contends that “the next world would be
161
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similar in nature to this world,” 168 where the real person-making process is taking place
because they are not two completely different worlds but have the same basic nature.
In concluding this section regarding the disembodied mind, Hick makes the
following statements: “As soon as we try to conceive of the post-mortem existence of the
disembodied mind we find that this is not after all truly disembodied. If there is no
physical body inhabiting a physical world, then the mind must supply its own ‘dream’
body inhabiting a ‘dream’ world, the latter being as real to those who experience it as the
former.” 169 The next world either will be in a world with spatial dimensions or our mind
will provide a world through dreams or imagination. Thus, Hick contends that the notion
of the survival of the disembodied mind is not something radically odd but a special form
of embodied postmortem existence. Though Hick is not clear about what this special
form is, he argues that the next world has the same basic nature as ours, unlike Price’s
conception of a dream-like world of mental images. Accordingly, Hick does not expect
that our life will continue beyond death in terms of immortality of soul, which led him to
consider resurrection of the person. 170
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The Resurrection of the Person
Admitting that the predominant view of humanity in contemporary science is that
of an “indissoluble psycho-physical unity,” 171 in which only the empirical self is known
and there is no room for soul in distinction from body, Hick wonders why Christian and
Jewish belief in bodily resurrection is not getting enough attention in contrast to the
Greek idea of the survival of a disembodied mind. Hick now draws our attention to a
somewhat ignored conception of what he calls “the re-creation of the psycho-physical
person” 172 to have a clearer idea of life after death.
Before presenting his own “replica” theory, Hick briefly mentions the resurrection
of the dead, presented by the apostle Paul. 173 What he means by the resurrection of the
dead is not “the resuscitation of corpses in a cemetery.” 174 When a person died he is
extinct, as Hick rightly notes. By nature a human being is mortal, but God in his grace by
the act of sovereign power either resurrects or recreates him. However, the manner of
resurrection Hick advocates is “not . . . as the identical physical organism that he was
before death, but as a soma pneumatikon (‘spiritual body’) embodying the dispositional
171
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characteristics and memory traces of the deceased physical organism.” 175 Though he is
discussing the conception of resurrection, a core Christian doctrine, Hick is not concerned
with how the Scriptures deal with it, but attempts to present the subject in an intelligible
way to today’s mind.
One of the major problems that Hick acknowledges is how we are able to connect
the earthly life and the resurrection life in terms of personal identity, which is an issue the
Bible does not present, maybe because it is taken for granted. To present resurrection in
an intelligible way Hick employs an idea that he calls the “replica” theory. 176 Hick
suggests three conjectural examples of a person disappearing from one place only to
appear at the same time as a “replica” at another place. Hick assumes that this “replica” is
believed to be the person who disappeared from one place. Hick uses the term “replica”
in his attempt to explain the doctrine of resurrection in an intelligible way in distinction
from replica, the word used to identify two simultaneously identical entities. He says: “If
a putative ‘replica’ did exist simultaneously with its original it would not be a ‘replica’
but a replica; and if there were more than one they would not be ‘replicas’ but replicas.
For ‘replica’ is the name that I am proposing for the second entity in the following case.
A living person ceases to exist at a certain location, and a being exactly similar to him in
all respects subsequently comes into existence at another location.” 177 Thus, as Schmitt
notes, Hick’s “replica” is “a second, identical entity [that] exists subsequent to an
175
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original.” 178 Hick develops his theory of “replica” in a series of three cases, which he
claims to be the only logical possibilities.
First, Hick begins with the idea that someone living in this world suddenly
disappears and the next moment comes into existence at another place. The person who
appears in another place is exactly identical in both physical and mental characteristics.
Hick argues, “There is continuity of memory, complete similarity of bodily features,
including fingerprints, hair and eye coloration and stomach contents, and also of beliefs,
habits, and mental propensities.” 179 Furthermore this “replica” person thinks of himself as
being the same person who disappeared.
Second, Hick presents another imaginary case, which appears to be a step closer
to the idea of resurrection. A person, instead of disappearing, dies and at the moment of
death appears at another place with the same characteristics. Hick notes this would be
even odder than the previous one because of the presence of a dead body in one place
while a new “replica” is in another place at the same time. 180 The one who died and the
one who appeared must be the same person, argues Hick.
Hick presents still a third case, which contends that on a person’s death the
“replica” of him appears not at another place in this world, but “in a different world
altogether, a resurrection world inhabited only by resurrected persons.” 181 Hick’s
speculation on this third possibility runs as follows:
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It is, I think, manifestly an intelligible hypothesis that after my death I shall
continue to exist as a consciousness and shall remember both having died and
some at least of my states of consciousness both before and after death. Suppose
then that I exist, not as a disembodied consciousness but as a psycho-physical
being, a psycho-physical being exactly like the being that I was before death,
though existing now in a different space. I have the experience of waking up from
unconsciousness, as I have on other occasions woken up from sleep; and I am no
more inclined in the one case than in the others to doubt my own identity as an
individual persisting through time. 182
This third example is very close to the conception of resurrection in the Bible,
which teaches death figuratively as sleeping and resurrection as waking up. This
assumption is a model that Hick explores, in order to “conceive of the divine re-creation
of the embodied human personality.” 183 Thus, Hick argues there is no question of
affirming self-identity; that resurrected person would no more doubt his own identity than
we do now. 184 Hick also claims that that resurrected person would know that his
existence is “post-mortem,” because it is conceivable that “the space of the resurrection
world should have properties which are manifestly incompatible with its being a region
of physical space as we know it.” 185 Hick’s main reason for arguing that the person is
sure that he is postmortem is that the laws of space in which he was before death are not
compatible with the first and the second cases. The third example is closest to the view
that Hick is proposing concerning the conception of resurrection, yet it is not completely
identical with it. Admitting that a resurrected person comes into existence in a different
world with the same personal identity as before his death, Hick still tries to show that the
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idea of life in a resurrection world is spatially and physically unrelated to this world. Hick
argues, “This world occupies its own space distinct from that with which we are now
familiar.” 186 Therefore, an object in this world is “not situated at any distance or in any
direction from the objects in our present world, although each object in either world is
spatially related to every other object in the same world.” 187 The resurrection world is not
somewhere that we can locate in this universe, but it is in another world to which we
cannot travel, because there is no space between them. 188
The next question that comes to mind is the time relationship between the two
worlds. Arguing against Alan Olding’s contention that “no time elapses between the
death of the physical body and the appearance of the resurrection body . . . because they
are not temporally related,” and thus “the death-bed scene is not a past event,” 189 Hick
contends that the resurrected person remembers his moment of death and therefore his
death-bed must have been a past event. 190 In other words the “replica” of Mr. X
remembers his dying, because his death-bed is an event he experienced in the past. Hick
contends that there is “a single time sequence in which events can occur simultaneously
186
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in different spaces.” 191 He speculated on the possibility of a singular time in plural spaces
as follows: “Presumably the divine mind, conscious of all spaces and of the elapse of
singular time, would be aware of the temporal relationship between events in different
spaces. But the inhabitants of a given space could only be aware of the continuity of time
through spaces as an inference from their own memories of life in another space.” 192
Therefore, the “replica” or resurrected person in space two comes into existence after his
death in space one. There is no direct evidence of his having reappeared in space two
available besides his own memory. Thus, as I mentioned earlier, this contention of
memory has a key role in the identification of Mr. X in space one and his “replica” or
what Hick calls Mr. X1 in space two. In other words, this memory of the previous life
confirms the self-identity of Mr. X1—that he still is Mr. X. 193
Granted that the ‘replica’ of Mr. X appears in another space at the same time as
Mr. X’s physical body dies, does he appear as he was at the last moment of life before his
death in this world? Acknowledging the problem of losing all the memories that he had
acquired since that age when supposing that the resurrection body is a “replica” of his
earlier life with full health and vigor, Hick argues the resurrection body is created in the
condition of the earthly body “perhaps at the last moment of conscious personal life.” 194
Furthermore, he claims that old people will go through “a process of growing physically
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younger to an optimum age,” 195 which makes him self-contradictory because he
mentioned that he was against the idea of a “replica” of earlier life rather than at the
moment of death. The biggest issue Hick deals with here is whether the resurrected
person in another world preserves a full personal identity. 196 Though the resurrected
person may go through some changes which are not seen in this world, argues Hick, as
“an indissoluble psycho-physical unity . . . he must begin his resurrection life as
identically the person who has just died.” 197 However, as John C. Yates notes, regarding
my own “replica” though others may treat it as me, I wonder “how I may reasonably treat
my own identity.” 198 Hick’s “replica” lacks a certain continuity with the pre-mortem
person with which it is supposed to be the same individual.
Hick’s goal in this section is to argue that the discussion has accomplished “the
conceivability of resurrection as the divine re-creation of the individual after his earthly
death as a total psycho-physical ‘replica’ in another space.” 199 However, Hick admits that
this “replica” theory is only “the most accessible of a range of possibilities,” 200 and it is a
speculation of divine reconstitution in another world. He also argues that in the
resurrection world we still have bodies as our outward reflection of our inner nature, not
195
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in the same way as we do in this world, but in ways quite different from this world. 201 He
does not go further with a more detailed description of these bodies in the resurrection
world, as Schmitt notes, beyond which “only imagination could carry man.” 202
Reincarnation
The doctrine of reincarnation originated from religions in India such as Hinduism
and Buddhism and is becoming popular in the Western world in different forms. The
reason for Hick’s preference for reincarnation as one of the serious eschatological options
is that it may be able to answer the annoying problem of inequalities that are experienced
in society. Hick’s basic reasoning behind the preference of survival after death in terms
of, particularly, reincarnation is based upon his dealing with the problem of evil in Evil
and the God of Love, namely, theodicy. The problem of evil in human existence is a hardto-deny fact that is in appears to be in contradiction with a Christian notion of allpowerful agape God. 203 The way Hick finds the solution to this paradox is by adopting
the Irenaean anthropological insight of double creation of human being, evil is not only
201
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The classical problem of theodicy that deals with the issue of evil in view of an
omnipotent and all-loving God is one of the basic foundations of Hick’s new
eschatological approach called ‘pareschatology.’ The basic reasoning of theodicy, as
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permitted or helpful but also is inevitable and even necessary for the “soul-making”
process. 204 Thus, the backbone of Hick’s search for a new eschatological model through a
global theology is his understanding of theodicy that a good and almighty God is not in
contradiction with the existence of evil because evil is a part of human creation.
Accordingly, as Schmitt notes, Hick’s theory of afterlife, particularly
reincarnation, “attempts to solve one basic problem—how it is possible to account for the
physical and social inequalities which invariably accompany birth into this world.” 205
While Western people have a hard time answering human inequalities such as being born
in poverty, or with birth defects, or as a slave and so on. Indian religions offer an
alternative answer that “we all lived before and that the conditions of our present life are
a direct consequence of our previous lives.” 206 Rather than appealing to the arbitrary,
random, and unjust will of God in the inequalities of human existences, the reincarnation
doctrine teaches that we are reaping now what we have sown in the past. In other words,
the doctrine of reincarnation relieves God of a traditional theodicy problem that if God is
all-powerful and all-good, why there is evil in the world and, instead, “make[s] our
karma responsible.” 207 According to this conception one has lived before and will
continue to live in another life, which naturally presupposes physical resemblance. One
also must be able to remember his experiences of the past lives, as Hick notes, “even
204
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though in fact the traumas of death and birth generally erase such memories, repressing
them to a deep and normally inaccessible level of the unconscious.” 208
Basic Conception of Reincarnation
One who is supposed to be reborn after his death must have the same identity in
order for him to be conceived as the same person. Hick has discussed three strands of
continuity—memory, bodily continuity, and psychological continuity 209 —which
constitute the identity of a certain person through time. Hick dismisses the first two,
namely memory and bodily continuity—because they do not assure anyone of
reincarnation. He claims that 99.9% of people never recall their experiences of the
previous lives, which confirms that the memories of previous life cannot be the evidence
of the connecting thread for reincarnation. The fact that one may change sex, race, and
turn into other species 210 in the following existences, as Hick notes, confirms that there
can hardly be said to be physical connection or continuity between these existences.
The third suggestion offered by Hick in favor of continuity is “the psychological
continuity of a pattern of mental dispositions,” 211 which claims that if the reincarnated
person Mr. X1 has the same personality traits as Mr. X, Mr. X1 is the reincarnation of Mr.
X. Though psychological continuity may be able to solve the problem of sexual,
racial ,and special changes between existences, as Schmitt notes, “to accommodate such a
diversity of possibilities the pattern of mental dispositions would necessarily be so
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general as to be applicable to thousands of persons.” 212 In other words, general
similarities of character would never lead us to identify the two persons as the same
person. In regard to this view Hick says: “Many people are kind and thoughtful, or have
artistic temperaments, or are proud and intolerant; but so long as they are distinct bodily
beings with different streams of consciousness and memory the fact that two individuals
exhibit a common character trait, or even a number of such traits, does not lead us to
identify them as the same person.” 213 Therefore, Hick admits that psychological
continuity is far too vague and broad to accept as evidence for the reincarnation doctrine.
Failing to provide evidences for reincarnation with these three strands of
continuity between two existences, Hick appeals back to the credibility of memory in a
slightly different way. Hick contends that “there is an unconscious thread of memory
linking” 214 the various lives which will “remain latent until a final moment of total recall
as the reincarnating soul at last attains to enlightenment,” 215 because memories, whether
conscious or unconscious, link with a particular life or lives rather than connecting lives
with similar character traits. Thus, as Schmitt notes, Hick “rescues the idea of
reincarnation before it sinks.” 216
212

Schmitt, Death and After-Life in the Theologies of Karl Barth and John Hick,

213

Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 307.

214

Ibid., 308.

134.

215

Ibid. Agreeing with both contemporary scientists and Western philosophers
that man is “an indissoluble psycho-physical unity,” Hick sees the soul as not something
that can be separated from body, but something inseparable from body. In this way, Hick
understands the concept of soul as something identical to mind (ibid., 278).
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Before closing the discussion, Hick revisits his early formulation that the idea of
reincarnation solves the inequality problem of human birth and life. According to the
basic idea of reincarnation that our present life is the consequence of previous ones, “the
inequalities of our present life are endlessly postponed and never achieved.” 217 Thus,
Hick admits that the doctrine of reincarnation does not solve the dilemma of the
inequalities of human circumstances, because the solution is only postponed to infinity.
Reincarnation either requires explanation if there is a first birth, or postpones the solution
to infinity if there is infinite regression of births. 218
Rebirth in Buddhism
Another Indian-originated religion which teaches a doctrine of reincarnation is
Buddhism. Though discussing the similar doctrine in Hinduism, Hick notes that Buddhist
scholars “prefer the term ‘rebirth’ to ‘reincarnation.’” 219 At death the nama-rupa
(literally “name-form” but best translated as “embodied existence”), 220 the composite of
the physical body and the mental element, disintegrates. Hick notes that at death man as a
psycho-physical being disintegrates and ceases to exist. The nama-rupa does not survive
death, and is not born again. Yet an aspect of him does continue to exist, not eternally but
until it has expended itself “at the end of many lives.” 221 The question is: What is it that
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survives if it is not the psycho-physical individual? Hick notes that it “consists of a
system of character dispositions, the karmic deposit of former lives, animated and
propelled onwards by the power of craving.” 222 Thus that which continues is not a
conscious being but “a formation of non-conscious psychic elements,” which is a “lifecraving system of dispositions” 223 equivalent to the linga sharira 224 of Vedantic theory.
The linga sharira—which Hick equates with “psychic factor” 225 or translates as “spiritual
body” 226 —will survive physical death and enter the womb and give its basic character to
a new embryo. Thus, in Buddhism the last moment of thought in the dying person is very
important, as Schmitt notes, because “the first moment of thought in the new stream of
life stands in direct causal sequence to” it.227 In other words, the thought of the last
moment of death determines the character of the new birth. The first thought of the new
life stream which Hick calls “relinking consciousness” 228 need not necessarily be a
conscious thought but rather “a complex dispositional impulse, carrying a set of basic
character traits and a store of unconscious memories.” 229
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Thus, reversing the previous arguments in favor of rebirth in human life, Hick
contends that the rebirth or reincarnation may not necessarily occur in our earthly life,
which in turn suggests the possibility of the reincarnation into other worlds. Hick notes
that rebirth or what he calls “rebecoming” 230 can occur in any of the following worlds
such as “the kama-worlds (sense worlds), which include our earth, purgatory, and the
nearer deva (angel)-worlds; the rupa-worlds (worlds of visible form though not sense)
which are the further Brahma and supra-Brahma spheres; and the arupa-worlds
(incorporeal worlds of thought).” 231
In order to argue for his thesis of an other-worlds hypothesis, Hick uses two
arguments. First of all he claims that the assumption of other worlds makes it intelligible
that reincarnation in this world does not always follow right after death. 232 Second, it also
makes it intelligible that the human population of the earth has always increased perhaps
because there are beings from other worlds being brought into our world. 233 The
hypothesis that a person may not be reincarnated again into this world becomes an
interesting possibility within Hick’s pareschatology. What then happens to the persons
who will not be reincarnated? This question will be answered in his own suggestion on
the possible pareschatology in the following section. According to his previous
discussion, as Schmitt notes, “somebody will of necessity be required to bear the
consequences of the decisions and actions” done on earth because of “the idea of a
collective karma, i.e. the collective, qualitative sum of volitional activity” in the previous
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life. 234 Hick argues that this way of interpreting reincarnation in ethical and social terms
is in the Western mind a demythologization. 235 It also should be noted that there is a
major weakness in the theory of reincarnation because it has difficulty explaining why
“babies are not born with adult egos” 236 who had died at an old age.
Christianity and Reincarnation
Though Hick knows that the doctrine of reincarnation has never been a Christian
doctrine because it is not compatible with Christian truth, he argues that this does not
automatically discredit it as one of the options. Hick lists four reasons why Christians
view the doctrine of reincarnation or rebirth as not consonant with Christian truth, with
his own arguments against them. First, Hick argues that “reincarnation is not taught in the
New Testament,” 237 and thus early church fathers did not accept it as orthodox Christian
doctrine. However, Hick adds that they were against “the popular conception of
reincarnation but very little against the more sophisticated versions” 238 in Hinduism and
Buddhism. In other words, according to Hick, they would have responded differently if
they had known the more sophisticated version of reincarnation. Second, Hick notes that
“Christianity attributes an absolute importance to this present life as the period of grace in
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which our eternal salvation or damnation is to be determined,” 239 so there is no room for
the idea of reincarnation. He, however, sees the possibility of pareschatology in the
theology of Ireanaeus, who viewed human beings in the process of being made in the
“likeness” of God. Third, Hick notes that the idea of “metempsychosis is fundamentally
at variance with the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body.” 240 Hick argues
that these two doctrines conflict superficially, yet they agree in their view of the human
being as “a psycho-physical unity,” thus able to live again as an “embodied being.” 241
Thus, he insists that reincarnation and resurrection are “superficially different but more
fundamentally in agreement.” 242 Fourth, Hick argues that there is a radical opposition
between Christian belief and the doctrine of reincarnation because reincarnation damages
the uniqueness of Christ’s death on the Cross. 243 Hick argues against this and says, “For
there is no logical connection between the idea that Christ died once only for the sins of
the world and the idea that men have only one life in which to accept the benefits of that
atoning death.” 244 As he implies, if we take Ireanaean thought that there is not necessarily
one life that gives only a lifetime chance for salvation, Christ’s unique atoning act could
239
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be compatible with the idea of reincarnation. Though Hick never argues that
reincarnation is a Christian doctrine, all he wants to say is that this idea of reincarnation
is not completely incompatible with Christian gospel. In other words he would like this
theory to be a possible option for further development of pareschatology.
Memories and Reincarnation
In Hick’s argument on the issue of identity of persons between this world and life
after death, as he notes, actual or latent memories of previous lives are essential to
credibility of the reincarnation doctrine. Though admitting the limit of the task due to its
unverifiability based on Ian Stevenson’s research, 245 Hick draws “attention to two
particularly puzzling features” that are suggestive of reincarnation. 246 The first puzzling
feature is related to children. Hick notes that children who spontaneously remember their
previous lives tend to forget them as they grow and are “more fully absorbed in their
present life.” 247 Thus Hick contends the memories of children concerning previous lives
tend to support the reincarnation hypothesis. The second puzzling feature is that the
majority of these cases suggestive of previous-life memories come from cultures where
“reincarnation is an accepted belief.” 248 As Schmitt notes, “cases of putative
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reincarnation generally occur in cultural contexts” 249 where the doctrine of rebirth or
reincarnation is taken for granted. On the basis of all these ambiguities and uncertainties,
Hick at this stage hesitates to draw a clear conclusion on the issue, but rather he makes
“an interim verdict of Not Proven.” 250 Hick argues that the evidences available at present
do not force us to accept the reincarnation hypothesis. At the same time it does not mean
that the evidences are so weak that we can ignore them. Additionally, Hick also insists
that memories of past lives claimed by yogis, arahats, and other liberated persons who
claim to have power to remember their past lives are not able to be proven. For instance,
Hick notes, according to the Fatakas of the pali canon, Buddha remembers his own past
550 lives. 251 But there is no way to test the claims made by these people. After a lengthy
discussion on the issue of continuity of memory in reincarnation, Hick concludes, “It
is . . . the claim that successive lives are linked together by an actual or latent continuity
of memory that makes reincarnation a factual hypothesis, open in principle to
confirmation or disconfirmation.” 252
Furthermore, Hick also investigates the issue whether there is any relationship
between the reincarnation hypothesis and the process of genetic codes. The fact that the
same basic character dispositions reappear again and again in different individuals could
be understood as “a mythological way of referring to the continuity of the genetic
249
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material through the ages,” 253 notes Hick. It is true that basic character traits are repeated
and observed in many different individuals over time. However, Hick argues that the
incompatibility of the doctrine of reincarnation with genetic science is seen, for instance,
in the fact that “whereas heredity always goes directly from parents to their offspring, the
process of reincarnation never does—children cannot be reincarnations of their own
parents.” 254 After investigating any relationship between genetics and reincarnation, Hick
draws a conclusion that genetic codes offer no positive support to the reincarnation
hypothesis. 255 On the other hand, genetic theory also is too incomplete to disprove
reincarnation.
In his conclusion on reincarnation, Hick hesitates to make a clear statement
whether the doctrine is true or not. However, with vagueness and uncertainty he draws a
preliminary conclusion concerning the doctrine of reincarnation as follows.
There are forms of reincarnation doctrine which may be broadly true pictures of
what actually happens. It may be true . . . that an eternal ‘soul’ or ‘higher self’ lies
behind a long series of incarnations, and that in the consciousness of that ‘real
self’ all these incarnations are linked together in a way which is not evident to any
of the temporary persons who form the series—one of whom I now am. Or it may
be true . . . that units or ‘packages’ of karma (as distinguished from ‘higher
selves’) produce a series of persons, one of whom is me. . . . But on the other
hand, whilst this may be a true account of what is happening, such a theory lacks
the moral and practical significance of the more popular pictures of reincarnation,
according to which I—the conscious self now writing these sentences—have lived
before and shall live again and am in the course of my present life reaping what I
have sown in the past and sowing what I shall reap in the future. . . . This popular
conception is what is believed, or vaguely assumed, under the name of
reincarnation or rebirth in Hindu and Buddhist cultures. Such a popular
conception has a limited support from the alleged memories of former lives
discussed [earlier], but tends to be unconvincing to those outside these cultures,
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and indeed seems to be slowly losing its hold even within them [emphasis
added]. 256
The Third Possibility
In the concluding part of the book Death and Eternal Life, Hick tries to wrap up
what he has discussed earlier and to reach “a possible human destiny.” 257 Unlike the
conventional approach to human destiny, Hick’s discussion of the issue includes not only
eschatology but also pareschatology. Hick notes that two things must be assumed in order
for his argument to work. First, there must be “the persisting self-conscious ego” 258
which will survive bodily death. Second, there must be a possible state for
pareschatology or “intermediate state or states between this life and the end of our
temporal existence” for the majority of people because they hardly attain perfection in
this world. 259 Thus Hick’s question to ask is, What is going to happen in the next stage of
a life journey?
Before presenting his own picture of what will happen after death before final
salvation, Hick discusses briefly “what is offered in the Tibetan Book of the Dead and in
western mediumistic communication.” 260 Hick tries to include as many options as
possible from East and West, yet not all are included in fact.
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The Bardo World
Hick’s first discussion is taken from the Bardo Thödol, in English Tibetan Book of
the Dead. The bardo is a combination of two words, bar meaning “between,” and do
meaning “two,” which represents “the state between death and rebirth.” 261 As Hick notes,
there are three bardo states, which show the soul or conscious mind going between death
and its return to a new body. In the first bardo state the soul detaches itself and is
surrounded by blinding light, “Radiance of the Clear Light of Pure Reality.” 262 The soul
will have an opportunity for immediate entry into nirvana at this moment, but “only those
who have come close to the complete purification of the self” have this chance. 263 In the
second bardo stage, the soul is exposed to good and evil powers. The self will encounter
good power and have a chance to go into “Buddha-worlds,” but the impure self will face
evil power and experience judgment in various hells. 264 After this experience, at the third
bardo state, as Schmitt notes, the unsaved soul “will be joined to another body and world
corresponding to its karma.” 265 Thus the soul will go back to the cycle of birth and death
again. It must be noted that in this process, as Hick notes, “the mind creates its own post261

Ibid. Comparing bardo state with Western Spiritualism, Hick says, “there is no
new sensory input and the environment of which we are aware is a mind-dependent
projection of our own memories, desires, fears and beliefs. Such a dream-like phase
would seem to correspond with what in Western Spiritualist literature has been called
illusion- and/or Summer-land” (Hick, Disputed Questions in Theology and the
Philosophy of Religion, 195).
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mortem world in accordance with its beliefs,” 266 which implies that it still is in the soulmaking process.
The “Next World” in Western Spiritualism
The basic idea of Western spiritualism, as Hick notes, is that there are some
cummunications emanating from persons who have died, which they believe to be
describing “the life to come.” 267 According to Western spiritualist literature “there is a
psychic double of the body, an astral or etheric body, which detaches itself at death from
the physical corpse until the connecting links between them are broken.” 268 This astral
body either sleeps or is in a half-conscious state, understood as a confused borderland
between this world and the next one, called “hades” in Western spiritualism. Hick notes
that the overall structure of Western spiritualism centers upon the idea of seven planes of
existence as follows:
There are said to be seven planes, the lowest being that of physical matter; the
next, the plane of ‘hades,’ described as a confused borderland between earthly life
and the next world; then the plane of illusion, in which most souls spend a
considerable time; and then beyond this a plane of ‘colour’, a plane of ‘flame’,
and plane of ‘light’, and finally a plane beyond time in which souls become one
with God. 269
These seven planes of existence represent one’s journey after death till the final
encounter with God. It should be noted that the third plane, the plane of illusion, is often
called “Summer-land, or the Memory-world,” 270 in which some have a delightful
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experience (no more illnesses, no bodily deformities experienced) while others have a
purgatorial experience (only darkness experienced). This stage of plane of illusion,
argues Hick, “represents only a phase in what is intended to be the upward movement of
the soul.” 271 In other words, this idea of the planes of existence shows the transition or
the movement from one level of existence to the higher one, that is, “a movement
towards a goal.” 272 This idea of movement towards a goal implies that there is a purpose
in life. For this reason, Hick points out that the basic thought concerning death and afterlife is teleological, showing our existence heading towards “human perfection, man’s full
humanization, the total realization of the potentialities of finite personal life or . . . man’s
divinization.” 273 Accordingly, preparing a way for his idea of pareschatology to be
considered as an intelligible hypothesis, Hick contends that human life is a soul-making
process, which lies far beyond our present existence in this world.
Critique of the Idea of the Immortal Ego
If life has a goal to reach, a full humanization or human perfection, argues Hick,
as we perceive it, “such a completion is very seldom (if ever) achieved in the course of
this present life.” 274 In this present life, as Hick notes, only a few people advance enough
for human perfection, while most advance a little, which is not enough for them to reach
human perfection. And there are still others failing to advance at all, or even becoming
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worse who will need more time for a full humanization. I wonder what state this
perfected humanity is and doubt that we can easily find some cases in the real world.
Hick adds, “Accordingly, it seems clear that if we do indeed exist under the aegis of a
cosmic person-making purpose, that purpose must hold us in being beyond this present
earthly life.” 275
Then Hick raises the question: Can personal identity be conceived as holding over
unlimited time? He argues that theoretically “the endlessly prolonged life of finite egos”
seems to be possible, while “it is debatable whether this would be a prolonged human life
and whether therefore it could serve the purpose of the gradual creation of perfect
humanity.” 276 The issue of personal identity again seems to involve personal memory,
which could not stretch out to infinity. Hick notes, according to Duncan-Jones, that if we
understand personal identity in terms of our memory, it could not be prolonged in
eternity. 277 Hick quotes Duncan-Jones’s statement concerning the relationship between
personal identity and human memory:
In ordinary life as we know it, only a limited number of acts of memory, with a
limited content, can take place in a limited time. As time passes, the number of
happenings available to be remembered increases. It follows that if all that is
memorable gets remembered equally often, any given memorable event must be
remembered more and more rarely as time passes. . . . It seems to follow that
every event must be remembered more and more readily as time passes. We have
then a gradual fading of connections between one part of a person’s life and
another. In that case it would seem to follow that every person would
progressively become more and more unlike a person as we know persons now.
Connections would become looser and looser. If we imagine someone in his
millionth year, or whatever high number we choose to take, his connections with
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the earlier parts of his life will be unimaginably scattered and thin compared with
what we are used to. 278
As Duncan-Jones notes, if we live endlessly, our memory capacity is too full to
remember an increasingly long past. Thus I, who am writing these sentences now, will
hardly be the same a million years later with completely different remembered
experiences.
Hick also presents the idea of personal identity in two different ways: objective
and subjective identity. Objective identity, which is also called physical or metaphysical
identity, is a view that conceives of a person living forever as one who has “the same
body, or the same bodily form, or even the same spiritual substance, throughout
eternity.” 279 Subjective identity is an identity that is viewed from one’s own point of view.
This is an identity about how we think who we are, and Hick argues against “the notion
of the immortal ego as compared with that of a series of lives.” 280 Hick argues that a
person who was alive a million years ago is hardly considered as the same person
anymore due to the “increasing attenuation of memory combined with the increasing
inner distance, produced by continuous personal change.” 281 Humanity, according to
Hick, in the process of soul-making, as sociocultural beings, thus “the ways of becoming
and being human are as numerous as man’s cultures.” 282 He also contends that the idea
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that man is in a soul-making process seems to be more compatible with the idea of
multilives in many worlds than with the idea of immortal ego.
At the end of the section, Hick concludes as follows:
These considerations suggest the likelihood that if the human ego is immortal, or
if it persists for a period which multiplies very many times the length of an earthly
life, its post-mortem existence occurs in successive sections rather than as one
continuous unit. Thus it may be that periodic death (like periodic sleep) divides up
an existence which, as finite creatures, we can only live in limited phases. Its
recognition of this is, as we have seen, a virtue of the Indian conception of
reincarnation. The basic idea does not however have to take the form of repeated
rebirths in this world. There is also the possibility of repeated ‘rebecomings’ in
other spheres beyond this world. 283
Hick finally arrives at his own agenda for pareschatology, which suggests the
notion of periodic death and life, a series of different egos, rather than an immortal ego
living endlessly throughout eternity, while not ruling it out as a logical impossibility. His
suggestion of postmortem existence is in a successive series of existences rather than in
one continuous unit.
Hick’s Pareschatology Model: Many Lives
in Many Worlds
According to Hick’s model, at physical death the ego ceases to exist in this world,
facing the final moment either of entering the ultimate state or, as in the great majority of
cases, being unable to face Ultimate Reality. Those who are not able to reach human
perfection in this life must “regain consciousness in a post-mortem state.” 284 As Bardo
Thödol suggests, the immediate postmortem state is “subjective and dream-like.” 285
Hick’s speculation on the existence right after death even runs like this: “In the first
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phase of existence after death, as the ego is freed from the constraints of the physical
world, this karma 286 (a gradually formed psychic structure) makes itself known to us in
experiences both of wish-fulfillment and of self-judgment.” 287 Accordingly man is able
to get echoes from the next world through some extrasensory perceptions, as Price
suggests. Hick considers this state as the bardo world of illusion, which is supposed to
last symbolically forty-nine days for judgment. What then is the next state?
Postulating a transition from the bardo world to another embodiment in the next
world, Hick is raising a question whether this rebecoming is “a birth as an immature
creature which has to grow into its new existence, or an arrival as an already fully formed
individual within the new environment.” 288 Two issues are related with this question:
whether this life is first or not and what the place of sex is. In regard to the first issue,
Hick is inclined to say it is the first life rather than saying that we have lived many lives
before. This in turn involves the issue that the next life will be beginning as a matured life
rather than starting as a child. He contends that “there need be no presumption that
subsequent re-becomings in other worlds will repeat the same pattern.” 289 Concerning the
issue of sex in another world, Hick, after a long discussion between Hindu-Buddhist
argument and Christian argument, hesitates to conclude what is going to happen for sure
286
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because it could be only speculation. He says, “these are questions which must remain
unanswered in our present life,” 290 because we can scarcely even speculate on it in this
world. Accordingly, Hick argues as follows:
We cannot say anything about the next word beyond bardo state except that it will
be a real spatio-temporal environment, functioning in accordance with its own
laws, within which there will be real personal life—a world with its own concrete
character, its own history, its own absorbing and urgent concerns, its own crises,
perils, achievements, sacrifices, and its own terminus giving shape and meaning
to existence within it. For moral and spiritual growth, as we know it, depends
upon interaction with other people within a common environment. 291
Here Hick’s thought is in tension, because he is uncertain about sex 292 in the next
world while he has his own ideas of the next world or worlds. For instance, even though
he has argued for a bardo world, it is only a speculation. The question is how he knows
of this bardo state at all, if he does not have access to the world beyond this one.
Furthermore, his descriptions concerning the next world—such as a real spatio-temporal
environment, law-governed world, and personal life—are able to be described as no more
than another speculation or his own mythology.
This series of lives will repeat and the self will undergo another transition, argues
Hick, “via another bardo-type experience, into yet another life in yet another world.” 293
Being unsure of the number of those worlds, Hick suggests that an individual’s number
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of “embodiments will presumably depend upon what is needed for him to reach . . . the
ultimate state, or nirvana.” 294 Gaining insights from the Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian
pictures, Hick suggests that the number of embodiments will be either almost infinite for
those who are worst or only one more for those who are best. Thus, Hick says, “some will
require a smaller and others a greater number of embodiments.” 295 The number of
embodiments would all depend on how good or bad they are in this world. And the
criteria of goodness and badness that Hick discusses are very vague. It seems that Hick’s
idea of good depends on how much a soul “transcends ego-hood and attains the ultimate
unitive state.” 296 But this idea of transcending ego-hood is still too vague to define. We
are not sure whether it is internal or external transformation. There are no objective
criteria for judging the good or the level of the good.
Appealing to the memory argument that the human being has a limited span of
self-apprehension and effective memory, Hick argues that our amount and clearness of
memories retained will depend upon whether our lives are many or few. We would
remember almost everything if our lives are few, while we should not expect to
remember them if they are numerous. And he also claims that “there would be some
memory of the immediately past life,” which will fade as one is absorbed in the new
successive existence. 297 This does not exclude the possibility of having some memories
of many previous lives, which Hick identifies as “memory by some general characteristic
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of each embodiment,” 298 similar to an old man who has lived in many houses since
childhood but recalls very little detail of them. He also acknowledges that a future self,
say, in fifteen hundred years, who does not seem capable of remembering me now in the
present, may still be identified as me because of a continuous chain of consciousness that
shares “the same personal history.” 299 Regarding the connection of consciousness Hick
says, “Each link in the chain will be consciously connected with the one next before it,
although it may well be that none of them will be directly conscious, in either perception
or memory, of the chain as a whole.” 300 It seems that he argues for a direct consciousness
of the immediately previous life, while having a less direct consciousness of remote
previous lives. Here Hick may be mistaken in understanding the capacity of memory in
the other worlds as similar to this world. In other words, to Hick it seems that everything
in the next world is the same as in this world. Developing his hypothesis on the basis of
his other hypotheses, as Hick himself notes and admits, he is “building speculations upon
speculations” 301 rather than evidence-based theories.
In the conclusion of the discussion of “A possible pareschatology,” Hick invites
us to get “the broad picture of the human person progressing through ever higher spheres
of existence towards a final state.” 302 This picture of a human being progressing toward
higher states entails Hick’s Irenaean two-phased creation of the human being, which is a
theological basis of his pluralistic hypothesis. Furthermore, Hick argues that the idea of
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higher spheres of existence towards human perfection “is consonant with one suggested
interpretation of the ‘many mansions’ of which the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel spoke.” 303
Quoting William Temple concerning the many mansions, Hick claims that “the monai
(‘mansions’ or, better, ‘resting-places’) are . . . ‘wayside caravanserais—shelters at stages
along the road where travelers may rest on their journey.” 304 Here again Hick uses a
Bible text yet not in its basic and literal sense but in a mythological and nonliteral sense,
using an interpretation of a theologian in an idiosyncratic way to support his own view.
A Possible Eschatology
In his dealings with pareschatology Hick has offered a survey of eschatological
views presented both by Eastern and Western religious traditions, mainly Hindu/Buddhist
traditions and Christian traditions. Against the general understanding that East and West
have conflicting views concerning eschatology, Hick argues that they are “essentially
open-ended . . . and offer convergent indications, each pointing beyond our present
human experience and yet each pointing in the same direction.” 305 For instance, different
views of postmortem existence such as resurrection, reincarnation, and disembodied mind
are all pointing to the general idea of “the next stage of human existence.” 306 Thus Hick
points out that the eschatologies of East and West are not in conflict but at least in a
direction of general agreement.
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In his own investigation of the idea of reincarnation, Hick suggests that our
existence is not complete in this life but many other lives will be needed for the majority
of people. In fact, as Hick notes, if there are many lives to live in the future, we must also
assume that we may have lived many times in the past. According to traditional Hindu
thought, the incarnated jiva (soul) is eternal and thus has no beginning and end. 307
According to the basic conception of reincarnation, though this picture has no conflict
with the immortality of the soul, it may present, as Hick notes, the “problem of
meaninglessness,” 308 that life has no purpose and no ultimate meaning but merely the
endless process of becoming. On the contrary, if we believe that the human being is
God’s creation, thus he has a beginning, argues Hick; “the present life is in fact—as it
appears to be—his first life.” 309 In this case, the issue of immortality becomes
problematic. If we assume that life has beginning with birth, we also naturally think that
it should end at death. Though acknowledging that the birth itself presupposes the death
and termination of self, Hick insists that this earthly life is a person’s first life on the basis
of two facts, one positive and the other negative, neither of which he thinks decisive. The
positive fact is that “the individual does seem to be formed ab initio in the womb from
which he is born to this present life.” 310 The negative fact is that people “do not normally
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remember any previous existence.” 311 Hick, in a sense combining these two, presents
“the more solid conception of reincarnation” that suggests the idea of “future lives in
other worlds.” 312
According to Christian tradition, Hick notes, a person has only one chance in this
earthly life in which he can come to the “saved relationship with God” 313 either through
his own will or divine grace, and then can have eternal existence in heaven or in hell.
Unsatisfied with this traditional view of a heaven and hell scheme, Hick argues that this
is unlikely on the basis of two events before and after death. He says:
If salvation in its fullness involves the actual transformation of human character,
it is an observable fact that this does not usually take place in the course of our
present life. There must, then, be further time beyond death in which the process
of perfecting can continue. The traditional scheme is equally unsatisfactory on its
post-mortem side. I have argued that the doctrine of hell is morally intolerable;
and that in any case the notion of the immortal ego, the finite person continuing
endlessly through time, involves profound conceptual difficulties. 314
Many issues are involved in this statement of Hick’s argument against the
traditional idea of a heaven-and-hell scheme. First of all, the definition of salvation is
mentioned here as “the actual transformation of human character,” which is not always
observable in this life. If salvation implies human perfection, only a few, if any, religious
prodigies will be able to enjoy it. The issue of salvation by faith through grace is almost
ignored in Hick’s conception of salvation. Second, it should be noted that Hick’s
argument is based on the traditional understanding of the immortality of soul, which will
suffer in eternity if it is damned. As noted earlier, Hick is aware of the fact that the Bible
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does not teach the immortality of the soul. Rather it shows that death implies the
extinction of life (soul). The issues related with these will be discussed more in the
following chapter.
However, Hick points out that there is “an important insight behind the traditional
Christian insistence that the time of grace, in which we may respond to God, is limited by
the boundary of death.” 315 He insists that this limitedness of time gives urgency and
meaning to our existence in this world, which at the same time does not make the idea of
one short life followed by an eternal one necessary. Hick also argues that the same is true
with the doctrine of reincarnation, with many lives followed by other lives with many
deaths, in which each life and death give a crucial meaning to the entire journey to human
perfection. This idea suggests, as Hick notes, that “it is only in incarnate lives on this
earth, and not in the many heavens and hells beyond it, that karma can be worked out and
progress made towards final liberation.” 316
Comparing and critiquing these two basic models of eschatology from East and
West, Hick presents his own model which he calls “a third possibility,” 317 meaning
neither Eastern nor Western. Concerning his own model of eschatology, he says:
I have argued for yet a third possibility, other than eternal-heaven-or-hell or
repeated earthly reincarnations, namely that of a series of lives, each bounded by
something analogous to birth and death, lived in other worlds in spaces other than
that in which we now are. This hypothesis accepts both the insistence upon the
need for life to be lived within temporal limits and the conviction that the soul can
only make progress in the incarnate state towards its final goal. But it differs from
the Western tradition in postulating many lives instead of only one, and from the
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eastern tradition in postulating many spheres of incarnate existence instead of
only one. 318
This third possibility that Hick is presenting here is, in a sense, a hybrid version of
Eastern and Western ideas of life after death. In short, Hick’s pareschatology is a
combination of Hindu/Buddhism and Christianity, yet different from both. As pointed out
above, Hick argues that they both agree that human beings are in the process of making
progress towards their perfection, while they differ either in the number of existences or
in the spheres of existence. By combining these two doctrines, Hick argues that people
will live a series of lives in other worlds or spheres until they reach final perfection.
This idea of many lives in many other worlds allows for people to grow spiritually
and morally in this world and after. It gives an idea of the same self through many lives
growing “towards its final self-transcending perfection.” 319 How does Hick solve the
dilemma of inequalities of human birth or life? Evidently the idea of tracing back to past
lives does not solve the problem of unfairness of life. Rather, Hick argues that in order to
find the solution for the problem of evil, we must look to the future where the real destiny
of humanity lies rather than the past. In other words, we need to look at “the final
creation of infinite good out of the ambiguities and contradictions of life as we know
it” 320 rather than looking back to the previous lives and what has happened in them.
The last question that is raised is “What then is the final state of humanity?” In
other words, “What happens when the development of human character towards its self318
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transcending perfection is completed?” In answering these questions, Hick suggests that
when one achieves perfection, embodiment and time are no longer necessary.321 He adds,
“The ultimate state . . . is beyond both matter and time, or at least time as we know it.” 322
In the process of getting closer to higher worlds, people would experience the
harmonious mutual love that is a universal life principle, while egoism diminishes. 323 In
this way the individual’s series of lives reaches its culmination “in a last life beyond
which there is no further embodiment but instead entry into the common Vision of God,
or nirvana, or the eternal consciousness of the atman in its relation to Ultimate
Reality.” 324 Hick’s principle of speculation-upon-speculation on eschatology finally ends
in his suggestion of “the unity of mankind in a state in which the ego-aspect of individual
consciousness has been left behind and the relational aspect has developed into a total
community which is one-in-many and many-in-one.” 325 In order to explain this perfectly
harmonious state of humanity, Hick uses the Christian Trinitarian conception of one-inthree and three-in-one. 326 He applies God’s corporate unity to the person’s communal life
in a perfect harmony with the community of perfected human persons as expressed in the
teachings of Jesus and the New Testament. Then Hick concludes: “What Christians call
321

Ibid., 463.

322

Ibid. Hick notes that since “objective or clock time is an aspect or dimension
of the physical universe,” when human consciousness does not relate with one it does not
relate with the other (ibid.).
323

Ibid.

324

Ibid., 464.

325

Ibid.

326

Here Hick shows his own way of using biblical teaching and Christian doctrine
to support his own views whenever needed.
200

the Mystical Body of Christ within the life of God, and Hindus the universal Atman
which we all are, and Mahayana Buddhists the self-transcending unity in the Dharma
Body of the Buddha, consists of the wholeness of ultimately perfected humanity beyond
the existence of separate egos.” 327
Summary and Conclusions
In the present chapter I have dealt with the main ideas of Hick’s eschatological as
well as soteriological model, namely pareschatology. 328 Pareschatology itself is not posed
as a separate issue but rather is dealt with along with other related issues such as
anthropology, death, afterlife, etc., within Hick’s entire system of pluralism. Therefore, I
have started my discussion with how Hick views humanity. Hick’s anthropology is the
basis of his further discussion of pareschatology. Though in the course of discussion Hick
leaves open the possibility of the mind or nonphysical part of man surviving physical
death, as he has developed further in anthropology, he tends to argue that the human
being, composed of mind (or soul) and body, is understood as a psycho-physical unity.
This line of thinking begins to pave the way to his eschatological model.
In the following section, I have discussed the problem of death in relationship
with his agenda of life after death. Hick’s main goal of writing Death and Eternal Life is
to do a global theology (of death), which could be one of his case studies in doing
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religious pluralism. Death, unlike the traditional Christian view which sees it as the
moment of eternal destiny, is seen as a moment to look for the further chance in the
journey of soul-making process. Thus death is not a disastrous or unnatural experience,
but it is understood as “a necessary part” 329 of man’s journey towards the likeness of God,
as Ireanaean theology suggests. According to Hick, death is to be understood not as a
moment of eternal destiny but as a moment of transition to a higher form of existence.
Hick’s understanding of death naturally leads us to the discussion of afterlife,
which is dealt with in the following section. The bottom line is, as Hick admits, that the
afterlife is beyond our knowledge because of its inaccessibility, at least in an empirical
point of view. However, he presents the rational and moral argument that it is not morally
realistic to have a brief earthly life followed by a divine judgment of either eternal heaven
or hell. 330 He argues that it would be only fair if there is afterlife or afterlives in which
many injustices or unfairnesses are remedied, which entails a classical problem of
theodicy. This line of thinking led Hick to postulate the possibility of many lives after
death, which is one of the main theses of pareschatology.
Here, I have arrived at the main issue of this dissertation. It must be noted that, as
the title of the section suggests, pareschatology is a natural product of Hick’s pluralistic
hypothesis. Hick’s eschatological model not only deals with eschatology but also with
329
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pareschatology which, as Hick claims, deals with the human state between death and the
final salvation. This can be seen as eschatology from a Christian perspective, yet he
prefers to call it pareschatology, maybe because he wants to be inclusive towards other
models such as Hindu/Buddhist alternatives.
The reasoning behind Hick’s preference of doing pareschatology rather than
eschatology is that it has more immediate phases which may bear “sufficient analogy to
our present state or some of our speculations about it.” 331 The idea that pareschatology
deals with events less remote and at the same time more immediate does not guarantee
that we may be able to know them more easily. Furthermore, Hick’s claim that we have
easier access in pareschatology than eschatology is in conflict with his own statement
made earlier. Since we have no knowledge beyond death, Hick’s content of what he calls
pareschatology is still beyond our present cognition.
After defining the term “pareschatology,” I have dealt with three major issues that
Hick includes in his discussion of pareschatology: the survival of the disembodied mind,
the resurrection of the person, and the reincarnation. Hick uses Price’s psychological
survival hypothesis to show some kind of survival of death. Unlike the idea of Price who
sees the next world as something different from the present one, which is almost a
solipsistic world where souls are living in a dream-like world of mental images, Hick
contends that “the next world would be similar in nature to this world.” 332 Hick
concludes that as “we try to conceive of the post-mortem existence of the disembodied
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mind we find that this is not after all truly disembodied.” 333 Therefore, according to him,
though not being clear as to what that state exactly is, the survival of the disembodied
mind is not something completely odd but a special form of embodied postmortem
existence. By not totally denying the possibility of disembodied survival, 334 Hick opens a
possibility to discuss more about human survival in terms of different forms.
Then as I have discussed, Hick draws our attention to the Christian conception of
what he calls the re-creation of the psycho-physical person. He introduces his own
“replica” theory in the Bible, maybe to present resurrection in a more intelligible way for
postmodern minds. This putative “replica” does not simultaneously exist with its original,
or else it is not a “replica” at all but only a replica. Hick tries to show that resurrection is
possible with the idea of “replica” that he presents. All he tries to accomplish, though
admitting that it is a speculation, is that it is conceivable that resurrection is “the divine
re-creation of the individual after his earthly death as a total psycho-physical ‘replica’ in
another place.” 335 However, though functionally the “replica” can be treated as me in the
premortem existence, it is doubtful that this “replica” is really me from my own
perspective. Yates argues that Hick’s “replica” is a mere “replica, an imitation.” 336
Then I have dealt with Hick’s alternative from Eastern religions, reincarnation.
The doctrine of reincarnation is getting more and more attention in Western society as
interaction of cultures and religions between East and West increases. Hick’s main reason
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for considering the Indian version of eschatology is that it may answer the vexing
problem of the unfairness of life, which appears to be in contradiction with the notion of
a good and powerful God. Hick’s suggested solution to inequality or evil in human
existence is made through his appeal to the God of love, 337 which is extensively
discussed in his book, Evil and the God of Love. The basis of Hick’s search for a new
model of eschatology is his Irenaean type of theodicy that a good and powerful God is
not in contradiction with the existence of evil, which is a necessary part of creation.
Accordingly, looking for some insights from Eastern religions, Hick argues, while
Western people have difficulty answering human inequalities of life, Hinduism and
Buddhism may offer a better alternative to answering these questions. According to the
reincarnation doctrine, present conditions of our life are “a direct consequence of our
previous lives.” 338 By drawing our attention to the previous lives, the doctrine of
reincarnation answers the questions of physical and social inequalities of human life.
Again in the discussion of reincarnation, the issue of the identity of a certain person is
one of the main concerns. After discussing three strands of continuity—memory, bodily
continuity, and the psychological continuity—which may provide for personal identity,
Hick dismisses the first two on the basis of the fact that we bear virtually no memories of
past lives and any change of sex, race, or turning into other species. Psychological
continuity, though being able to solve the problem of sexual, racial, and special changes
337
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between existences, is too vague to prove reincarnation, because there are so many
people with the almost identical personality traits. Thus, going back to the issue of
memory, Hick argues for the existence of an unconscious thread of memory connecting
existences which will “remain latent until a final moment of total recall as the
reincarnating soul at last attains to enlightenment.” 339 I have discussed Hick’s view of
another version of reincarnation. Buddhism suggests that, though nama-rupa (embodied
existence) does not survive, there will be another form of existence called “a formation of
non-conscious psychic elements” 340 —linga sharira (psychic factor)—after bodily death.
By presenting the rebirth in different types of worlds—the kama-worlds (sense worlds),
the rupa-worlds (worlds of visible form though not sense), and the arupa-worlds
(incorporeal worlds of thought) 341 —Hick contends that the rebirth or rebecoming may
not necessarily occur in this earthly life, which opens the possibility of reincarnation in
other worlds. Moreover, I have included Hick’s discussion of reincarnation in
relationship with Christianity. Using four arguments that are originally employed by
Christians to argue against reincarnation, Hick reversed them to support the possibility of
reincarnation doctrine in Christianity. At least, he seems to claim that the reincarnation
doctrine is not completely incompatible with Christian gospel. And again regarding the
issue of memory, as Hick notes, that is thought to be a link between existences but cannot
provide emperical evidence for confirmation or disconfirmation.
At the final stage I have dealt with Hick’s conclusion of the work, Death and
Eternal Life. In Hick’s discussion of pareschatology, two issues are to be borne in mind.
339

Ibid., 308.

340

Ibid., 344.

341

Ibid., 346.
206

First of all, the issue of identity is crucial, because without a self-conscious ego we are
not able to say that the resurrected or reincarnated person is the same person. Second, the
fact that there are only a few who seem to reach human perfection or salvation,
necessitates the state of pareschatolgy which may give equitable opportunities to
everyone. In order to reach this objective, Hick presents the picture of the bardo world,
which shows that the soul goes through three stages 342 before going back to the cycle of
birth and death. This idea of the bardo world gives some kind of process of soul-making.
Also according to Western spiritualism, there are seven planes of existence before the
soul is finally one with God, which implies the transition or movement from one level to
another, Hick calls “a movement towards a goal.” 343 Then I have included Hick’s
discussion on the issue of the immortal ego. Based on Duncan-Jones’s discussion about
the relationship between personal identity and memory, Hick notes that if we live forever,
we cannot remember an increasingly long past because of our limited memory capacity.
The human being in the process of soul-making throughout eternity is also a sociocultural
being, who is being formed not only by his memories but also his own cultures that he is
born into. Thus, Hick argues that there will be a series of different egos through periodic
death and life, rather than an immortal ego living forever. According to him a person will
experience the process of soul-making through a successive series of existences rather
than in one continuous unity.
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Basically, combining eschatologies of East (reincarnation) and West (heaven or
hell), Hick finally suggests his idea of “many lives in many worlds” as his solution for
the conflicting views of humanity’s final state, namely eschatologies. Interestingly, Hick
employs these two ideas to formulate his own model, yet disregards the elements that are
in conflict. Hick’s thesis of a global theology of death pushes him to a theology that may
include all possible forms of eschatology, and then ironically disregards many of their
elements by presenting his own. As a result of combining eschatological models of East
and West, Hick presents the broad picture of human existence through higher forms of
life towards a final state. By adopting the Irenaean anthrolopology of the double creation
of humanity, Hick has applied an evolutionary principle of humanity evolving from the
lower to the higher and even to the state of human perfection in his pareschatology.
Interestingly, Hick even tries to connect the idea of higher spheres of existence towards
human perfection with “many mansions” in the Gospel of John, which shows his use of
Bible texts in a mythological and nonliteral sense.
In conclusion, after many lives in many worlds, argues Hick, people will
eventually arrive at the final state of human perfection. In this state, the individual’s
series of lives reaches its culmination “in a last life beyond which there is no further
embodiment but instead entry into the common Vision of God, or nirvana, or the eternal
consciousness of the atman in its relation to Ultimate Reality.” 344 At this final moment of
Hick’s pareschatological stage, man’s self-centeredness is replaced by realitycenteredness. Hick understands this eschatological state as “a total community which is
one-in-many and many-in-one.” 345 However, this egoless community that Hick calls “the
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unity of mankind” 346 is an intriguing concept that can hardly be viewed as a desirable
experience or existence of human beings. Now, this chapter, along with previous ones,
has prepared us to turn our eyes to the main part of the dissertation, where I present a
critical evaluation of Hick’s religious pluralism in light of his pareschatology, which will
follow in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
CRITICAL EVALUTATION OF HICK’S PLURALISM
IN LIGHT OF PARESCHATOLOGY
Introduction
Whereas in the previous chapters I have focused on factual descriptions of Hick’s
life, his philosophy of religious pluralism, and particularly his pareschatology, in this
chapter I evaluate his pareschatology in light of two basic theories of truth, namely, the
correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth 1 that Hick himself
employs in his discussion of religious pluralism.
The criticisms presented in this chapter are informed in light of Hick’s Kantian
shift as indicated in his writings which contain, according to Hick, “the more fully
1

I employ these two as Hick does in his arguments for his theory of world
religions. They are the two most generally accepted theories of truth to verify the validity
of an argument. See Peter A. Angeles, “Coherence Theory of Truth,” Dictionary of
Philosophy, ed. Peter A. Angeles (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1981), 297–298;
Peter A. Angeles, “Correspondence Theory of Truth,” Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Peter
A. Angeles (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1981), 298; A. Cornelius Benjamin,
“Coherence Theory of Truth,” Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (Savage,
MD: Littlefield, Adams Quality Paperbacks, 1983), 74; Max Black, “Correspondence
Theory of Truth,” Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (Savage, MD:
Littlefield, Adams Quality Paperbacks, 1983); Simon Blackburn, “Coherence Theory of
Truth,” The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Simon Blackburn (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 67; Simon Blackburn, “Correspondence Theory of Truth,” The
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Simon Blackburn (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996); Antony Flew, “Coherence Theory of Truth,” A Dictionary of Philosophy, ed.
Antony Flew (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984), 66; Antony Flew, “Correspondence
Theory of Truth,” A Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Antony Flew (New York: St. Martin’s,
1984), 76-77; Horwich, “Truth,” 929–931.
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developed pluralistic hypothesis.” 2 These writings include titles such as, “Straightening
the Record” (1990), An Interpretation of Religions: Human Responses to the
Transcendent (1989), A Christian Theology of Religions: The Rainbow of Faiths (1993),
and Who or What Is God? And Other Investigations (2008). Based upon his Kantian shift,
Hick seeks more explicitely to characterize religious discourse as mythological. For
example, Hick contends that “we speak mythologically about the noumenal Real by
speaking literally or analogically about its phenomenal manifestations.” 3 Regarding his
theodicy, Hick claims that “such a theodicy is mythological in the sense that the language
in which it speaks about the Real, as a personal being carrying out intentions through
time, cannot apply to the ultimate transcendent Reality in itself.” 4 However, Hick
considers Irenaean theodicy in which humans are created in the image and likeness of
God as “a true myth” in the sense that “such a theodicy nevertheless constitutes a true
myth in so far as the practical attitudes which it tends to evoke amid the evils of human
life are appropriate to our present existence in relation to the Real.” 5 Moreover, Hick says,
“this theodicy may be—and indeed I believe it is—mythologically true. That is to say, it
may be the case that seeking to bring good and mutual caring in face of disasters, and by
cherishing an ultimate hope beyond this life, is appropriate to the actual character of our
situation in the presence of the Real.” 6 Thus, Hick’s pareschatology which is based upon
his Irenaean theodicy will be evaluated in this perspective.
2

Hick, “Straightening the Record: Some Response to Critics,” 194.
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Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, 351.
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Pareschatology Criticisized in Light of Correspondence Theory
As other serious thinkers and philosophers do, Hick tries to be as strong as
possible in his arguments for religious pluralism, particularly his pareschatology. The
most fundamental theory of truth that he employs is no doubt the correspondence theory
of truth on which he builds his arguments for the theory of world religions.
Correspondence Theory of Truth
The correspondence theory of truth is perhaps the most well-known and widely
accepted theory of truth, which is often summed up, as Kirkham says, “with the slogan
‘truth is correspondent with the facts’ or ‘truth is agreement with reality.’” 7 A wellknown formula of this theory is given by Aristotle: “To say that [either] that which is is
not or that which is not is, is a falsehood; and to say that that which is is and that which is
not is not, is true.” 8 Thus, this theory is considered one of the most basic tools for testing
the validity of statements. It seems that most philosophers, including Hick, use this theory
of truth to defend their arguments.
Though there are generally two types of the correspondence theory of truth—
“correspondence as correlation, and correspondence as congruence” 9 —the situation may
7

Richard L. Kirkham, “Correspondence Theory of Truth,” Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Graig (New York: Routhledge, 1998), 472. See
Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Home University Library of Modern
Knowledge, vol. 35 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, n.d.), 186–203.
8

Kirkham, “Correspondence Theory of Truth,” 473.
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Ibid. The former view claims that “every truth bearer (proposition, sentence,
belief, and so on) is correlated to a possible fact. If the possible fact to which a given
truth bearer is correlated actually obtains, the truth bearer is true; otherwise it is false”
(ibid.). The latter view claims that “truth bearers and the possible facts to which they
correspond have parallel structures” (ibid.).
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be summarized as Kirkham does, “A truth bearer is true if and only if it corresponds to a
state of affairs and that state of affairs obtains.” 10
The term “correspondence theory of truth” has been popularized through the
influence of Bertrand Russell, who formulates the view that truth consists in some form
of correspondence between statement and fact. 11 Bertrand Russell’s own description
clearly sums up the essence of the theory as follows:
It is perfectly evident as soon as you think of it, that a proposition is not a name
for a fact, from the mere circumstance that there are two propositions
corresponding to each fact. Suppose it is a fact that Socrates is dead. You have
two propositions: “Socrates is dead” and “Socrates is not dead.” And those two
propositions corresponding to the same fact, there is one fact in the world, that
which makes one true and one false. . . . There are two different relations . . . that
a proposition can have to a fact: the one the relation that you may call being true
to the fact, and the other being false to the fact. 12
In other words, two contradictory claims about one fact cannot both be true at the
same time because they do not both correspond to the fact. The basis of evaluation
depends on true correspondence between a statement about a fact and the actual state of
the fact. 13
10

Ibid.
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Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, 190, 202–203.
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Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 187.
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This view is also closely connected with what is known as the law of
noncontradiction, which claims that contradictory statements cannot both at the same
time be true. For instance, the two propositions A is B and A is non-B cannot both be true
at the same time because they are mutually exclusive. If one is true, the other is not.
Whatever statement we may want to make, in a sense, we base our argument on the basis
of the correspondence theory of truth. According to Bertrand Russell, three traditional
laws of thought—(1) the law of identity: “Whatever is, is”; (2) the law of
[non]contradiction: “Nothing can both be and not be”; (3) The law of excluded middle:
“Everything can both either be or not be”—form the logical bases of the correspondence
theory of truth (Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, 113).
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Pareschatology and Criticisms from Correspondence Theory
In this section, I will make a critical evaluation of Hick’s pareschatology from the
viewpoint of correspondence theory of truth. In so doing, I will include four major issues
which are critical to and inform his concept of pareschatology: (1) The Real, (2)
anthropology, (3) death, and (4) afterlife.
One: The Real, Pareschatology and
Correspondence Theory
As noted earlier, Hick’s theory of world religions, including pareschatology, is
first built upon his pre-Kantian notion of God 14 who is at the center of the universe of
faiths, and later upon his Kantian understanding of the Real as it is in itself that is at the
center of its various manifestations. According to the later or Kantian Hick, the “Real an
sich” is beyond the realm of human cognitive ability 15 in the sense that “things known are
in the knower according to the mode of the knower.” 16 Thus, Hick argues, “that infinite
reality as it is in itself cannot be represented in our finite human terms.” 17 Hick, on the
basis of his adoption of the Kantian insight between noumenon and phenomenon, has
arrived at the Kantian revolution, a dichotomy between noumenon and phenomenon—as
Eddy notes, “a synthesis that forms the foundation for his response to the problem of
14

Hick’s early pre-Kantian God is replaced by his tradition-neutral term the Real
in his later writings, yet it does not indicate that he has canceled the idea of God but
shows that he broadens the idea of God in light of his Kantian shift.
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conflicting conceptions” about the Real. 18 Hick insists that “we postulate the Real an sich
as the ultimate ground of the intentional objects of the different forms of religious
thought-and-experience,” 19 without which his theory of religious pluralism is impossible.
Though hesitating to spell out any concrete idea of the Real, whether it is “one or many,
person or thing, conscious or unconscious, purposive or nonpurposive, substance or
process, good or evil, loving or hating.” 20 Hick centers his theory of world religions
including pareschatology on the notion of this central reality, the Real. Thus, Hick’s
pareschatology inevitably involves openness to the Real conceived in this fashion. 21
I offer two criticisms regarding pareschatology in relationship to the Real in this
section. The first criticism has to do with Hick’s arguments concerning pareschatology in
relation to his notion of the Real. If we have no definite knowledge of the Real an sich,
whether it is good or evil, purposive or nonpurposive, one or many, there seems to be no
incentive to seek a salvific relationship that is claimed to occur in this life or in a
pareschatological life through our openness to the Real. In other words, as Rose notes, “If
the Real an sich, as Hick contends, is beyond speech, knowledge, and experience, then
18
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another but that all somehow were constructed manifestations of the real” (Alan F. Segal,
Life after Death: A History of the Afterlife in the Religions of the West [New York:
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one has no choice but to remain silent about it.” 22 If we admit that there is no possible
knowledge about the Real, it seems rather meaningless to talk about human experience
with the Real which Hick wishes to do. Whatever the speculations we make about the
intermediate state, there seems to be no way of establishing here and now that our
assumed improving relationships even here and now correspond with the Real.
A second criticism concerns Hick’s attempt to move beyond his earlier
theocentrism. Hick, on the one hand and working from a Christian background, does not
want to be blinded by Christianity and does not want to call the Real the God of the Bible.
He must choose a term that is not biased by any religious tradition and that can satisfy
any world religion. 23 Hick’s attitude leads him, particularly in his Kantian orientation in
which he distinguishes between nounmenon and phenonomenon, to adopt the language of
“an ultimate transcendent reality, the Real,” 24 which has no theistic color in it. However,
on the other hand, whatever terminology he may adapt for the Real, it seems that Hick
has a tendency to describe the Real with theistic elements by connecting the word
“divine” with the theistically colored word “God” in his most recent book, Who or What
Is God? And Other Investigations (2008). For example, he refers to “the ultimate light of
the universal divine presence” which seems to imply a theistic presence. 25 This does not
22
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seem to correspond with Hick’s own attempt to describe the Real in nontheistic and
impersonal terms. 26
Two: Anthropology, Pareschatology and
Correspondence Theory
Perceiving man as a psycho-physical unity 27 in which two inseparable parts—
mind and body—interact with each other, Hick begins his discussion from the biblical
account of the first two chapters of Genesis and combines it with the modern scientific
viewpoint. Though coming from a Christian background as a descendent of liberalism
which insists that “there is no conflict between science and religion,”28 Hick must do his
anthropology more on the basis of science than religion. Whenever science and religion
clash with each other, Hick is ready to give the priority to science and is willing to
reinterpret the account of the Bible concerning the nature of human beings. As a result,
though using biblical accounts for understanding the human being, he uses the lens of
science to interpret them. For instance, as for Scripture’s description of man’s creation as
being made out of dust from the ground, Hick reinterprets the creative process of the
human being as emerging “from dust to the immensely complex religious and valuing
human animal.” 29 However, Hick’s man is neither the man of the Bible classically
26

See Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the
Transcendent, 249; idem, A Christian Theology of Religions: The Rainbow of Faiths, 47.
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Hick’s understanding of the human being as a psycho-physical unity is close to
the biblical picture of man as a holistic being, though sometimes seen as spirit, soul, and
body.
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Pierard, “Theological Liberalism,” 683.
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Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 47. Hick also views man as God’s creature, but
with an immature condition, who needs to go through the process of soul-making as
Irenaean anthropology suggests.
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interpreted who was created on the sixth day of creation week by God’s miraculous
power, nor the man of evolution who comes to existence through a wholly natural
process of evolution without any supernatural power. 30 Hick’s man is a being who is ever
in the process of soul-making in relation to the Real, 31 as Hick’s evolutionary principle of
pareschatology suggests. This means that while Hick seems to embrace a wholly
naturalistic ideological evolutionary theory of origins, his own account of human origins
does not correspond to a wholly naturalistically interpreted biological evolutionary theory.
In regard to the notion of the human soul, Hick claims that “the soul is the locus
of our personal and moral freedom.” 32 Then, we should understand the soul with certain
basic moral and religious characteristics with which we are born, besides heredity and
environments, which make one person different from another person in basic dispositions.
However, this does not mean that Hick considers the soul as “the name of a spiritual
substance or entity.” 33 That is to say, Hick does not claim that the soul is some kind of
30

Today, though many scholars believe that the creation in Genesis did not take
place within six days, some scholars still believe that they are literal and historical days.
In regard to the days of Gen 1, Gerhard F. Hasel argues that “both liberal and nonliberal
scholars have concluded that the word ‘day’ (Hebrew yôm) in Genesis 1 must be
understood in a literal sense” (Gerhard F. Hasel, “The ‘Days’ of Creation in Genesis 1:
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Calvary, ed. John T. Baldwin [Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000], 53). See
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separable entity. Later, he suggests that the word soul can be understood “as an indicator
of value,” 34 which speaks of the entire human being as a soul rather than part of the the
human being. However, Hick’s understanding, on the one hand, that the human mind
could possibly survive bodily death in disembodied form 35 and, on the other hand, his
claim that humans are in some sense inseparable psycho-physical unities 36 both in this
world and in other worlds are two mutually exclusive claims that cannot at the same time
correspond to reality. 37
Three: Death, Pareschatology and
Correspondence Theory
Acknowledging the universality of death, Hick tries to develop a new approach in
theology called “a global theology of death,” which attempts to provide an interpretation
that reconciles different views and understandings of religious experience. Perceiving
apparent differences among religions concerning death, Hick argues that the differences
are not religiously significant insofar as they provide salvific transformation within a
religious community. In other words, to Hick, various theologies seem less important
than salvation. 38
34

Ibid. This understanding of a human being as soul is mythological rather than
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Articulating the global theology of death from the perspective of human origin,
Hick prefers the Irenaean view 39 of man to the Augustinian view, which inevitably leads
him to think that death is not a negative reality occurring as the result of the fall. Death is
not only an inevitable passage but a necessary step towards the transition from one world
to another and helps one to grow in God’s likeness, as Hick’s evolutionary principle of
pareschatology suggests. To Hick, death is seen not as a moment of eternal judgment but
as a moment of transition to a higher level of existence. This view of death, which Hick
claims to be the Irenaean understanding of death, 40 is not compatible with the
Augustinian notion of death, which considers death as a direct result of the fall and which
will finally be overcome at the second coming of Jesus Christ. 41 From a correspondence
point of view we can note that though providing a very optimistic and positive notion of
death inspired by Irenaean anthropology, in the real world there seems to be no
corresponding fact that the real character of death is like that which is described by Hick.
In this respect, correspondence theory uncovers a difficulty of correspondence
verification in Hick’s theory of death and pareschatology.
39

George Panthanmackel notes: “Instead of the Augustinian doctrine that God
created man perfect, but because of his sin, he became imperfect and sinful, Irenaeus
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Four: Afterlife, Pareschatology and
Correspondence Theory
Though admitting that there is no sure evidence of life after death, 42 Hick tries to
present some empirical evidences of afterlife such as parapsychology and burial practices
of ancient people. 43 Hick acknowledges that these cannot be proof for the existence of an
afterlife, yet he argues “the fact that we cannot as of now establish life after death by
empirical evidence does not mean that there is no life after death.” 44
Another interesting argument Hick presents to ground his reasons in support of an
afterlife is taken from rational and moral perspectives. Hick argues, “The objections to
the doctrine of eternal torment which . . . now seem so strong are well known: for a
conscious creature to undergo physical and mental torture through unending time . . . is
horrible and disturbing beyond words; and the thought of such torment being deliberately
inflicted by divine decree is totally incompatible with the idea of God as infinite love.” 45
Hick in effect shows that a judgment of eternal conscious torment following a brief
earthly life is simply unfair. Hick has now suggested that after death humans are not
suffering in hell, but he also claims that they are not extinct. 46 This leads to Hick’s theory
of afterlife noted below.
Starting from the appeal to unfairness of life and the rejection of hell, Hick now
argues for the existence of afterlife on the basis of the purpose of human existence. Hick
42
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says, “The basic thought here is that one life-span is not enough for the transformation of
human beings from the self-centredness of our natural state to the unity or community
with the divine reality which is the ultimate aim of human existence.” 47 Thus, on
answering a Christian question, as La Due asks, “How could divine justice ever demand
as a punishment for finite human sins an infinite penalty of eternal torture?” 48 Hick
invokes “a series of lives, each bounded by something analogous to birth and death, lived
in other worlds in spaces other than that in which we now are.” 49
From a purely moral and rational point of view, Hick’s view seems to be a more
attractive alternative than the idea of eternal torment in hell. However, Hick’s speculation
on afterlife has no corresponding facts with which it can be compared, since afterlife is
outside of our knowledge. Due to human limitation, correspondence theory underscores a
verification limitation in Hick’s pareschatological account of life after death.
Another correspondence criticism concerns Hick’s notion that this earthly life is
too short for most people to experience moral and spiritual growth. In other words,
Hick’s reasoning implies that if people could live long enough on earth, their life will
become better and better morally and spiritually up to the point of perfection. However
this claim does not seem to correspond with observable reality because a person’s
longevity does not necessarily improve his moral and spiritual life. 50 On the contrary, for
47
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us is as it is” (Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 259).
222

many people, longevity may lead their life in the opposite way and their moral life may
deteriorate. 51 For example, the twentieth century did not turn out to be the Christian
century as expected. Two world wars cut short the hope of human development. Thus, if
Hick acknowledges that some people do not progress but “on the contrary regress” in this
life, 52 and if he assumes that the strength of the Real’s salvific influence is the same in
this life as it is in the lives to come, on what compelling ground does he claim that those
who “regress” in this life will be healed in their next lives up to the point of final
perfection?
Pareschatology Critisized in Light of Coherence Theory
Hick also applies the coherence theory of truth in his arguments. 53 Hick tries to be
as coherent as possible in his system of religious pluralism, because without having
internal consistency, his theory will not stand firm but collapse.
Coherence Theory of Truth
The coherence theory of truth is one of the most well-known traditional theories
of truth along with the correspondence theory. Whereas the correspondence theory holds
that a statement is true when it corresponds with the fact, the coherence theory holds that
51

For instance, on a literal reading of Gen 6–9, many antediluvian people lived at
least ten or more times longer than we now do, but instead of getting better, they became
spiritually worse and worse, causing God to send the flood of judgment.
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foundations of his theological arguments. Thus, as Swinburne notes, “Hick seeks to
construct a picture of the after-life which draws on what is most coherent and best
justified in both Western (Judaism-Christianity-Islam) and Eastern (Hinduism-Buddhism)
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a statement is true when it is coherent with other ideas within a system as a whole.
Though it has not been precisely defined, the use of coherence theory is characteristic of
the great philosophers in the history of philosophy. 54 Alan R. White characterizes
coherence theory in these words: “To say that a statement (usually called a judgment) is
true or false is to say that it coheres or fails to cohere with a system of other
statements.” 55 Kirkham says, “Typically, then, a coherence theory of truth would claim
that the beliefs of a given individual are true to the extent that the set of all their beliefs is
coherent.” 56 According to Kirkham, it can be argued that John Locke was the first who
introduced this theory when he said that “ideas are true if they agree with each other.” 57
Therefore, the credibility of one’s argument largely depends on whether it is coherent
with his or her other ideas.
Pareschatology and Criticisms from Coherence Theory
Every component of his religious pluralism, such as theology, Christology,
soteriology, and eschatology, must work together to make Hick’s system stand firm. For
Hick, not a single component is an insignificant part that can be ignored. Hick has taken a
significant amount of time in dealing with some of those issues, particularly theology,
Christology, and soteriology.
Because Hick’s pareschatology has a crucial function in his entire system of
religious theory, it may serve as a testing measure of the validity or credibility for his
54
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system as a whole. Like the previous discussion of correspondence theory, I shall now in
light of coherence theory discuss three similar and three additional major theological
topics that are relevant to Hick’s pareschatology: (1) principles of method, (2)
anthropology, (3) theology of death, (4) afterlife, (5) soul-making, and (6) universal
salvation.
One: Principles of Method, Pareschatology
and Coherence Theory
As noted earlier, Hick offers a new approach in eschatology called pareschatology,
“the doctrine of the para-eschata, or next-to-last things.” 58 Its major concern is “the
human future between the present life and man’s ultimate state,” 59 that is, the human
state between the moment of death and ultimate salvation. A complete monograph, Death
and Eternal Life, spells out his own model of eschatology, which can be summarized as a
combination of eschatologies from East and West. 60
In dealing with his new eschatological model, Hick presents two principles of
method. The first principle of method is his claim to articulate only “possibilities” rather
than “alleged certainties.” 61 However, what Hick actually is doing is more than
presenting possibilities, but instead is, as he says, “building speculations upon
58
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speculations,” 62 which in the end tend to coalesce into a specific pluralistic system, which,
in my view, represents more than shifting possibilities. In fact, Hick’s reasoning behind
doing pareschatology rather than eschatology is that “the subject-matter of
pareschatologies is less remote and may be less incommensurate with our present
existence than that of eschatologies.” 63 This choice suggests that Hick wishes his theories
to be more than possibilities but to correspond to reality.
Hick states his second principle of method as follows: “We must take account of
the teachings of all the main religious traditions and philosophies, and also of work in the
still fairly new parascience of psychical research, as well as of the relevant findings of
such orthodox sciences as anthropology, sociology, psychology and genetics.” 64 In other
words, Hick’s pluralism leads him to claim that his theory is informed by all possible data
for his inquiry of pareschatology, yet he ends up limiting himself to two major options
from East and West. 65
Returning to his first methodological principle of offering only possibilities, I
suggest that Hick is not completely consistent within his own system. The main purpose
of his hypothesis, as he notes, is to “spell out possibilities rather than to deal in alleged
certainties.” 66 In doing so, he differentiates his eschatological model (pareschatology)
62
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from conventional eschatology in the sense that the former is less remote and may be less
incommensurate with the present life than the latter. Though admitting the obscure nature
of the subject matter of pareschatology, Hick argues that “there may be degrees of
obscurity.” 67 Here, Hick seems to claim that pareschatololgy is more easily accessible
than eschatology as if there exist degrees of ambiguity in knowledge of the future. And
he adds, “If there is life after death there may be a better possibility of picturing its more
proximate than its more ultimate phases.” 68 Regardless of his distinction between them,
the bottom line is that they both deal with the human future, which is the unknown world.
Nevertheless, Hick insists that the fact that relative nearness of the subject matter of
pareschatology to our present existence convinces him that his speculation about it is “not
wholly misleading.” 69 In other words, he wants to claim his pareschatology is looking in
“a right direction, or . . . not looking in a totally wrong direction.” 70 This claim seems
more than a possibility, and more like an assured claim, which seems inconsistent with
Hick’s general method of dealing only with possibilities.
A further example that Hick presents more than just possibilities is evident in his
book entitled, Death and Eternal Life. In this volume Hick presents a theory represented
as a global theology of death, which trumps all other eschatologies and pareschatologies.
The manner of his writing in Death and Eternal Life is not merely spelling out a potential
direction or a possibility, but rather a well-developed theory or strong conviction. He
dismisses some theories and beliefs as less probable, while he accepts others as more
67
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probable. In this Hick is charting a right way and in so doing seems to contradict his
stated method of dealing only with possibilities.
Returning to the second principle of method that he calls “the principle of
openness to all data,” Hick is inconsistent by limiting his discussion first to three then to
two models concerning human future after death, namely, eschatologies from East and
West. Hick says, “Taking seriously the variety of human views concerning man’s destiny
does not necessarily require an encyclopedic treatment of after-life beliefs throughout the
world and throughout ages.” 71 Though claiming in the sentence just quoted that he is not
obliged to take every eschatological model into consideration, his all-data principle points
toward an inconsistency in his acceptance of only three and later two options in
eschatology. One would think that Hick should at least include some major eschatologies
from, for example, Chinese, African, and South American religions. While Hick may feel
that the rest of eschatological beliefs can be seen as “the details of the innumerable
overlapping religious and philosophical thought-worlds,” 72 which can, therefore, be
categorized into these two major options, it seems to me that such uncritical theoretical
enfolding of such large world religion eschatological views into two representative
options from East and West seems like an act of overgeneralization, and one that is out of
harmony with his idea that his pareschatology needs to be informed by an “all data”
principle. For instance, I find little if any discussion of the eschatologies from Chinese,
African, or South American religions.
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Two: Anthropology, Pareschatology and
Coherence Theory
It is important here to review again Hick’s view of man in a slightly expanded
version, because his anthropology, particularly how humans came to exist, will have a
significant impact on Hick’s account of man’s future destiny beyond death. As a serious
thinker Hick, of course, tries to be as consistent as possible in his theory of human being
within the system of his religious pluralism. Hick argues, “I have tried not to be blinded
by my own particular starting-point to insights and suggestions coming from beyond the
Christian and Western traditions.” 73 Though he claims in this sentence not to be blinded
by a Christian perspective, his approach to anthropology is grounded upon a Christian
foundation. In this sense, he is not completely free from a criticism of being inconsistent
in his claim of not being influenced by a Christian vantage point.
Another point of inconsistency concerns Hick’s use of evolutionary science in his
account of human origin. Hick understands humanity as God’s creation whom God is
forming into his own image and likeness as described in Gen 1 and 2. However, due to
Hick’s alliance with the liberal theology which claims that when the Scriptures are
properly understood and interpreted there is no conflict between science and theology, 74
he reinterprets the Genesis account of human creation by changing the method of creation.
Rather than interpreting the Genesis account as a literal and historical event, he
understands it as mythology.
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Accordingly, Hick argues that “man was brought into existence by the slow
process of evolution out of lower forms of life” 75 through the invisible hand of God. In
other words, as he notes, “God’s creative work is progressive and continuous and that
biological evolution is a part of it.” 76 He does not want to completely relinquish his
Christian background, affording him a firm conviction in ultimate divine Reality.
However, though acknowledging man as God’s creature, Hick adopts a middle way
between creationism and evolution in regard to human origin, 77 known as theistic
evolution. Keith Ward defines theistic evolution as a process in which “natural causal
processes are influenced or modified (not violated or ‘broken’) by specific divine
intentions. . . . [Thus] God causally influences evolution.” 78 This is a compromise
position respecting both creationism and evolution. From the creationist point of view,
Hick’s God is subordinated to the power of natural laws. From an evolutionist point of
view, which excludes any teleological supernatural action within the realm of natural
75
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Dembski and Michael Ruse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 273. Hick
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laws, the idea of divine creative action that Hick assumes to be operative within the
evolutionary process is simply unacceptable. To conventional evolutionists there is no
place for in any sense to be guiding or teleologically influencing the evolutionary process.
In a naturalistic evolutionary model, man is the sheer result of a wholly natural process
called evolution without any supernatural Reality involved.
According to the above analysis, it seems inconsistent or incoherent for Hick to
claim that biological evolution, conventionally understood, is part of God’s creative work,
because Hick does not actually accept the evolutionary process per se, since he allows
God to guide in the so-called evolutionary process. As noted above, wholly naturalistic
evolution and theistic evolution represent mutually exclusive methodologies of origin. In
the former, humans emerge without reference to or the need of divine action. In the latter,
humans cannot emerge without reference to or the need of God’s action.
A further point that needs to be noted is that Hick’s strong reliance on scientific
theory in his anthropology may become problematic, because it involves a potential
inconsistency currently contested. 79 Knowing that scientific theories that were believed to
be true have changed throughout time, the question is, How much can we rely on a
79

The question is What is science? I think it is better to say, scientific knowledge
rather than just saying science, because the word science can be too vague and broad to
be defined. To Hick science roughly means “the physical sciences [or natural science] as
distinguished from psychology and the social sciences” (Hick, Science and Religion, para.
1). This, however, does not mean what is usually called naturalism or physicalism which
claims that “the physical universe constitutes the totality of reality” (ibid.). In the most
general sense, science means natural (or physical) science which used to be understood as
permanent truth due to the influence of Aristotle’s or Newton’s principles. But as Stephen
Toulmin notes, “natural science no longer makes any claim to permanent or fixed ideas”
(Stephen Toulmin, “The Historicization of Natural Science: Its Implications for
Theology,” in Paradigm Change in Theology, ed. Hans Küng and David Tracy [New
York: Crossroad, 1991], 236.). If natural science is in constant radical change, Toulmin
argues that “it will be better if theologians heed the skeptics, free themselves from the
seduction of ‘new paradigms,’ and become frankly reconciled to being (in that sense)
‘paradigmless’” (ibid., 237).
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particularly scientific theory? 80 Hick’s evolutionary approach in anthropology, 81 which is
based essentially on a nineteenth-century scientific hypothesis, is now becoming in some
academic circles an unconvincing hypothesis that requires major revisions. 82 The way
Hick has treated other issues 83 shows that he would change his views whenever
convincing new scientific findings become available. It is evident that historically
scientific theories have been modified and changed in proportion to the amount of
scientific knowledge people have acquired. By adopting the basic nineteenth-century
80

In regard to continuous modification of evolutionism throughout history,
Gregory P. Elder rightly notes, “To accept any current scientific position as the sole basis
for doctrine is to doom any such doctrinal system to eventual obsolescence” (Gregory P.
Elder, Chronic Vigour: Darwin, Anglicans, Catholics, and the Development of a
Doctrine of Providential Evolution [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996],
184).
81

Hick, “The Problem of Evil in First and Last Things,” 596, 597. Hick considers
the story of Genesis as “the Hebrew myth of the beginning.” And he says, “All the
evidence that we have suggests man’s continuity with lower forms of life and indeed with
nature as whole, and his complete involvement from the beginning in the harsh
necessities of the struggle for survival” (ibid., 596).
82

William A. Dembski, “Introduction: The Myths of Darwinism,” in Uncommon
Dissent, ed. William A. Dembski (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004). William A.
Dembski claims that evolutionism (or Darwinism) is not a convincing argument anymore.
Thus he says that “Darwinism will be history” (ibid.). Thus, John Polkinghorne, a theistic
evolutionist, notes, “At the scientific level, there were contemporary biological critics of
the idea of evolution by natural selection, like Sir Richard Owen, the greatest anatomist
of the day, who pointed to difficulties in Darwin’s thesis. . . . The greatest British
physicists of the nineteenth century, such as Faraday, Maxwell and Strokes, were silent in
public but privately had doubts about the unaided adequacy of natural selection to explain
the development of life in the timescale available” (John Polkinghorne, Science and
Theology: An Introduction [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998], 7). See also William
A. Dembski and James M. Kushiner, eds., Signs of Intelligence: Understanding
Intelligent Design (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001); Michael Ruse, Darwin and
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2003); Howard J. van Till, Davis A. Young, and Clarence Menninga, Science Held
Hostage: What’s Wrong with Creation Science and Evolutionism (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 1988).
83

For instance, he has changed his views on Christology several times as his
theological journey matured.
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evolutionary model as the fundamental basis for his understanding of human origin, death,
and pareschatology, Hick may find himself in a dilemma of being tied to a scientific
theory which may be doomed to possible “eventual obsolescence,” 84 and thus to
incoherence unless Hick would be willing to change his views.
Three: Theology of Death, Pareschatology
and Coherence Theory
In dealing with an issue universal to every religion, namely the reality of death,
Hick shows his pluralistic approach in an apologetic tone by not only discussing it in the
realm of religions but in the realm of other disciplines such as science, philosophy,
anthropology, sociology, biology, etc. This open attitude to all available data leads Hick
to have a global approach in doing theology, particularly a global theology of death. The
global theology of death is a very important task in Hick’s whole agenda of doing
religious pluralism, because his theology of death is a good test case revealing whether
one component fits coherently into his entire system of religious pluralism.
In the section discussing “The Idea of a Global Theology of Death,” 85 Hick
mentions the distinction between religions’ central affirmations and the mythology which
comes with them. Whereas central affirmations of religions are mainly a matter of either
true or false, Hick argues that the mythology in the religions is not in the same sense true
or false. 86 Thus, Hick divides religious beliefs into two classes, one class being central,
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thus either true or false, and the other class being myth or marginal. 87 Criteria formation
for this distinction seems fluid. Some ideas which are central at times become marginal,
thus often being treated as “poetic elaborations . . . cultic expressions” 88 in Hick’s
model. 89 For instance, to a conservative Christian the story of the Fall and death
described in Gen 3 are literal and historical events; thus they are considered as central
Christian doctrines, but they are understood and categorized as mythology by Hick. By
applying this method of distinguishing between these two categories, Hick opens the way
to anticipate the possibility of constructing a global theology. 90
According to the distinction between what is central and what is marginal,
theological differences between religions regarding death appear not to be religiously
critical. Thus, Hick finds no difficulty in doing “a comprehensive global theology,” 91 in
which agreements and disagreements can coexist. As long as “both correct and incorrect
trans-historical beliefs . . . can form part of a religious totality” 92 and allow us to
experience the Real and salvific transformation, Hick thereby renders all religions valid.
Evidently, according to this understanding, the correctness or incorrectness of theology
87
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Though Hick pursues the possibility of a global theology, he does not look for a
global religion that will dominate all world religions. The question is, then, What is the
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seems to be of little importance. In other words, Hick’s theological view, that correctness
or incorrectness in theology is not significant as long as these conflicting concepts form
part of a religious totality, suggests to me that Hick believes that differences between the
theologies of death among world religions appear not to be religiously critical. However,
this view seems to be inconsistent with his own effort to develop what he considers to be
a true hypothesis of death.
Looking at the reality of death from a different angle inspired by Irenaean
theology, Hick introduces a new vision regarding death. Whereas traditional Christianity
understands death as the result of sin, thus seen as “a divinely inflicted punishment for
sin,” 93 Hick understands death as part of the original will of God for humans. This
understanding allows people to move from one world to another, and enables personal
growth in the likeness of God after death. If at the moment of death people move from
this world to another to have another and better chance than they now have, death is
something to be seen not only positively but something desirable. As Robison notes, Hick
“almost glorifies death. He sees death as a point of transition, a progress report on one’s
journey toward God.” 94 This line of argument is presented in his Evil and the God of
Love, where the Irenaean model is favored over the Augustinian in theodicy. Then the
question can be raised in response to Hick’s position: Why in reality do the majority of
people fear death rather than facing it with joy? 95 Empirically speaking, it is very
unlikely to say that death is something people desire. On the contrary, if Hick is willing
93
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This question also involves the correspondence issue because it is not what we
normally perceive in the real world.
235

to be open to all possible data including the general negative experience of people toward
death, 96 it seems incoherent, as Hick proposes, that all people should reject the idea that
death is something to be avoided and feared by everyone. The theories of death held by
these other people groups declare otherwise. For example, in Oriental culture where death
is sometimes interpreted as offering another chance, death is still regarded as an
undiscovered realm and thus remains a fearful experience that takes away everything
from us.
Four: Afterlife, Pareschatology and
Coherence Theory
Though Hick seems to be somewhat uncertain about empirical evidence
concerning life after death, relying largely on parapsychology 97 in the form of spirit
communications through mediums, he tries to provide some evidences. His use and
acknowledgment of parapsychology shows the mystic and meta-scientific nature of his
thinking, which is rather surprising to be found in the work of one who gives such high
credit to the conventional scientific method. Admitting the uncertain nature of empirical
evidence of life after death, Hick contends that this situation “does not mean that there is
no life after death.” 98
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Hick presents a line of argument for the existence of a soul-making afterlife upon
the rational and moral argument that the idea of an eternal hell following a short sinful
earthly life is not morally acceptable. Hick thinks the concept is inconsistent with the idea
of a loving God. 99 I suggest that Hick’s pareschatology represents his response to the
classical theodicy problem, the existence of evil in the presence of the perfectly good
God, or in his Kantian term, in view of his “cosmic optimism.” As Wilko van Holten
notes, “the idea of eternal punishment is not compatible with the perfect goodness of
God.” 100 Hick’s pareschatological soul-making process ideationally solves the hell
problem in an effort to support the perfect goodness of the Real, which will be discussed
more fully later.
While Hick’s motive to preserve the goodness of the Real is commendable, I will
briefly spell out one criticism concerning his views on the issue. The criticism comes
from recent New Testament research suggesting that Hick misunderstands the biblical
teaching about hell. 101 In his interpretations of biblical accounts, whenever Hick finds
99
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Hell in the Bible, as conditionalists note, is not an actual place where the
eternal fire is burning sinners forever. Rather it is understood as a state of punishment
that the lost will face at the time of judgment. The extermination of sinners will occur and
its result will be eternal. Thus, Donald Guthrie says, “The doctrine of eternal punishment
is not an attractive doctrine and the desire to substitute for it the view that, at the
judgment, the souls of the wicked will cease to exist, is understandable” (Donald Guthrie,
New Testament Theology [Leicester: IVP, 1981], 892). For more about the traditional
understanding of hell see Jaime Clark-Soles, Death and the Afterlife in the New
Testament (New York: T & T Clark, 2006); Tony Gray, “The Nature of Hell: Reflections
on the Debate between Conditionalism and the Traditional View of Hell,” in Eschatology
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conflicts between the Bible and science, he simply reinterprets the biblical texts in order
not to be in conflict with science. The mythological interpretation of biblical texts is his
way of getting rid of these apparent conflicts. However, in the case of the notion of hell
as it appears in the Bible and is interpreted in his Calvinistic tradition as a literal place
where the lost would suffer forever right after death,102 Hick does not apply the
mythological interpretation as he does with other texts, which could have saved him from
several difficulties regarding hell as classically understood. This shows an inconsistency
in Hick’s biblical interpretation of hell and the afterlife. Thus, the inconsistency of Hick’s
biblical hermeneutic along with his resultant misunderstanding of hell leads him to
develop his pareschatology as the solution to the original theodicy issue.
Five: Soul-Making, Pareschatology and
Coherence Theory
As one who inherits the theological legacy of Irenaeus and later of
Schleiermacher, 103 Hick emphasizes the importance of the soul-making aspect of the
in the Bible and Theology: Evangelical Essays at the Dawn of a New Millennium, ed.
Kent E. Brower and Mark W. Elliott (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997);
Xavier Léon-Dufour, Life and Death in the New Testament: The Teachings of Jesus and
Paul (New York: Harper & Row, 1979); René Pache, The Future Life (Chicago: Moody,
1962); Geoffrey Rowell, Hell and Victorians (New York: Oxford University Press,
1974); Daniel P. Walker, The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of
Eternal Torment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
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The reason behind this thought is that the idea of hell is incompatible with
God’s goodness (Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 201). Hick’s Irenaean theodicy is based
upon his Christian understanding of God and his goodness. Ironically, however, he
considers this whole idea of theodicy proposed in Evil and the God of Love as mythology
in his An Interpretation of Religion. This does not mean that Hick has relinquished his
theodicy as a whole. By claiming that it is “a true myth,” he has kept the basic structure
of theodicy that evil contributes something in our soul-making in the view of his “cosmic
optimism” (ibid., 360, 361).
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present world. 104 Hick says that “our present world is not intended to be a paradise . . .
but rather a place of soul-making, an environment in which creatures made as rational
and personal in the image of God can grow towards the finite likeness of their maker.” 105
Furthermore, as Mesle notes, Hick suggests that “the world is designed to begin a process
of soul-making that continues into eternal life.” 106 That is, Hick’s process of soul-making
will continue to take place until it will be completed at the point of perfection in the
intermediary state involving many afterlives if needed. The basic idea is that the Real,
who exercises infinite love toward us in eternity, can and will bring everyone to the
salvific relationship with him at last.
The notion of soul-making is crucial to Hick’s project of pareschatology because
it helps us to understand the meaning of life and its toilsome journey with a different
view. In other words, Hick’s theology of soul-making does not emerge merely from his
104
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intellectual exercise but from a totality of religious, academic, and social struggles
concerning human existence. People often see life as full of unfairness, injustice, and
suffering, which seems to torture us and block our steps to the Real. However, with an
insight that he received from Irenaeus, who sees, in the words of Hick, “moral evil as an
inevitable result of God’s creation of man as an immature creature,” 107 Hick offers a
different view of the meaning of life and as Graves notes, “emphasizes the positive and
educative value of evil.” 108 Hick points out that the traditional Christian view of evil
leads us to overlook “the positive reality in moral evil.” 109 He even says that “morally
evil actions are authentically and positively evil, not only as causes of pain and suffering
but also as expressions of the evil willing that produces them.” 110
All of these arguments noted above bring us to the anthropological issue of how
human beings emerged as God’s creatures. Based on Irenaean theology and a
mythological understanding of Genesis, 111 Hick seems to argue that if God purposely
created us as fallen beings, because such a condition is necessary to achieve salvation
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In regard to the state of human beings at creation, Hick says: “If we use the
mythological language of Genesis we have to say that man was created in a fallen state.
He was not created as a righteous and holy being who later fell into animal selfcentredness in the struggle for survival within a harsh environment, but he was created in
these conditions, and yet with a potentiality to transcend them. He was brought into
existence as an immature creature, at the beginning of a long spiritual pilgrimage” (Hick,
“Coherence and the God of Love Again,” 523–524.).
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through pareschatological soul-making, we must say that it is not only positive but good
that we are sinful. Hick himself applies the “O flex culpa” (in his own translation “O
fortunate crime”) 112 principle in his treatment with evil and human suffering, thus making
evil as a part of human existence. This line of reasoning leads us to think that evil is not
only positive, but instrumental, and is necessary for the soul-making process. 113 In order
to emphasize the instrumental value of evil, Hick claims that “some forms of
environmental challenge and danger are needed if the world is to function as a place of
person-making for morally and spiritually immature creatures.” 114 The same conditions
would seem to pertain also to the intermediate or to the pareschatological state. Clearly,
evil, as Illtyd Trethowan states, “is a necessary means to an end.” 115 However, if, as Hick
claims, a morally perfect, infinitely good, and powerful God must use evil instrumentally
in soul-making, it seems that God does so on pain of moral inconsistency.
In this context, the question can be raised whether the Law of God itself or any
state of God itself, not evil, can sufficiently test free agents in an evil-free environment. If
so, this renders evil instrumentally unnecessary for the soul-making process. However,
112
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Hick’s mythological interpretation of Gen 1–3 prevents him from considering or adopting
such a world view.
Six: Universal Salvation, Pareschatology and
Coherence Theory
An inevitable notion that emerges out of Hick’s pareschatology is the doctrine of
universal salvation that everyone will eventually be saved after many repeated lives as “a
gradual move toward God.” 116 Hick develops his doctrine of universalism on the basis of
two ideas: the goodness of God (or the Real) 117 and the omnipotence of God. 118 It is
important to recall Hick’s attitude toward such qualities of the Real. Hick makes the
following comment regarding these qualities: “[W]hen it is said that God is wise or that
God is good, these qualities are thought to be analogous to rather than identical with
human wisdom and goodness.” 119
The basic reasoning is that if God is good and all-powerful, he can and will save
all. These two attributes of God guarantee the salvation of all no matter how wicked they
are. Thus, as van Holten notes, “Hick repudiates the idea of eternal punishment for this
doctrine has as its implied premise either that God is only limitedly good (he does not
116
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want to save all) or he is only limitedly sovereign (he cannot save all).” 120 In doing so,
Hick confronts the problem of human freedom. Does God overrule the will of rebellious
human beings, so that all humanity will be saved? As van Holten observes, “Genuine
human freedom seems to prohibit drawing the universalist conclusion” that everyone will
be saved eventually. 121
In response to this apparent “antinomy” 122 Hick provides a twofold solution
mainly by giving a new interpretation of human freedom 123 and the postulation of
multiple afterlives. Concerning the first dimension of the solution, Hick, as one who
espouses the minority view of Irenaean theodicy against the majority view of Augustinian
theodicy, adopts at least one significant point in Augustinian anthropology that, in Hick’s
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words, “God has so made us that the inherent gravitation of our being is towards him.” 124
Hick argues that because of God’s image in us, “man’s nature is not neutral or alien
towards his maker . . . but is inwardly structured towards him.” 125 However, Hick also
indicates that in this world the whole life of some individuals represents a “regress” 126
from the Real. Hick’s thought that some never progress toward the Real in this life, but
regress, is in conflict with his idea of the inherent gravitation of our being toward the
Real and that humans are naturally not alien toward their maker.
Nevertheless, according to Hick, our natural inward gravity towards God means
that God does not have to coerce us to save us, for he has already created us in such a
way that all humans will come to love and worship him. Thus, Hick offers the following
conclusion: “The faith that God has made us for fellowship with himself, and that he so
works in his creative power as to enable us to reach that fulfillment, carries with it the
faith that in the end all human life will . . . be saved.” 127 In this way, Hick’s
pareschatology leads to universal salvation in a real sense. However, this result seems to
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place Hick’s notion of universal salvation into the category of a certainty, and not only a
possibility, and so stands in conflict with Hick’s method of advancing only possibilities.
The second aspect of the solution comes in the form of his core idea of
pareschatology, which can be expressed as follows. An “intermediate state” or the
multiple repetitions of life after death allow God’s salvific presence to act upon us until
we reach the final perfection of humanity. Assuming the reality of an intermediate state,
Hick contends, “If there is continued life after death, and if the Real is ceaselessly at
work for the salvation of his children, it follows that he will continue to be at work until
the work is done.” 128
By acknowledging the gap between the individual’s imperfection at death and the
person’s needed perfect heavenly state, I suggest that Hick in effect argues that there
must be an intermediate state or bridge similar to purgatory in which “progressive
sanctification after death” is to take place before the final perfection of being. 129 In other
words, Hick’s notion of an intermediate state is a revised and expanded version of the
Roman Catholic idea of purgatory that he characterizes as “the period between this life
and man’s ultimate state.” 130 Whereas the Catholic notion of purgatory limits its efficacy
to some, Hick’s pareschatology is efficacious for all. This means that the notion of
“intermediate state” has an assumption that there are, as van Holten notes, “afterlife
possibilities of reform for all those not yet saved.”131 This intermediate state between
death and the ultimate salvation is a core part of Hick’s pareschatology, in which the Real
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continues to work for his beloved people to save them all. Thus, Hick’s pareschatology,
which originally had emerged from his struggle with the problem of theodicy, now
expands the Roman Catholic notion of purgatory to solve the original problem of evil. 132
Concerning the temporal aspect of pareschatology, Hick argues that the duration
of the intermediate state is different among people depending on their personal distance
from the Real in their soul-making process.133 Hick does not provide an answer regarding
why it takes almost an infinite time of afterlives for some, if God wills to save them.
Hick’s notion of almost infinite duration of afterlives for some humans seems
inconsistent with the efficaciousness of God’s love and omnipotence.
As a final consideration in this section, I return to the fundamental antinomy, and
respond to a rhetorical question by Hick in support of an intermediate state for
universalism: “Why should he (man) ever desire to reject the Lordship of the infinite
Love in which, above all else, he rejoices?” 134 For Hick, “it seems morally . . . impossible
that the infinite resourcefulness of infinite love working in unlimited time would be
eternally frustrated, and the creature reject its own good, presented to it in an endless
range of ways.” 135 However, Hick’s appeal to universal salvation can also be posed in
exactly the opposite way: Why should rebellious and wicked humans wish to accept the
Lordship of the Real? The question then is, If the omnipotent God works successfully for
the salvation of all, does this divine effort actually include all humans such as vicious
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criminals and even fallen angels? 136 In other words, Hick’s argument in favor of
universalism with the postulate of an intermediate state in the context of the theodicy
problem, whether the intermediate state is short or almost infinitely long, does not seem
to be coherent with the idea of genuine human freedom. Though Hick himself may not
wish God to coerce human freedom, and though Hick’s use of a nearly infinite amount of
time may be his attempt of enabling God to avoid overruling human freedom, and
assuming that the human mind can become hardened in rebellion against God, it seems
inevitable that in order for universal salvation to be accomplished, the omnipotent God
sooner or later must overrule the will of hardened rebellious humans. This can be seen as
a divine act of coercion. In other words, a God who brings all humanity, both repentant
and unrepentant, to a state of loving God, must inevitably coerce those who reject him
constantly which nullifies their freedom to choose him with their own will. In short,
while Hick’s universalism seems to offer a desirable answer for the theodicy problem, yet
as a result, it has an internal incoherency problem with human freedom.
Conclusion: Criticism of Hick’s Religious Pluralism as a Whole
By way of introduction, the fact that Hick’s pareschatology has not received
sufficient attention by philosophers and theologians has been a leading factor prompting
me to write this dissertation. It has been my purpose to take a critical look at Hick’s
religious pluralism as a whole. As the purpose of the dissertation notes, my goal is to
criticize Hick’s religious pluralism as a whole in light of his pareschatology through two
136
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major theories of truth that he himself uses. Though this final section is rather short, it is
a crucial part of the chapter and dissertation.
Since one’s theology is a result of one’s personal as well as one’s theological
experience, it must be seen in one’s lifelong context rather than as a disconnected issue.
Thus we must consider Hick’s theology as a whole to be the result of his spiritual
pilgrimage from a conservative Christian, to a liberal theologian, and finally to a religious
pluralist, to understand Hick’s theological views. From this perspective, Hick’s
theological pluralism seems to reflect a general coherence. However, this whole process
of changing views seems to suggest that his theory is open to further revision and change
at any time as he develops his theological understanding. Hick claims that his writings,
which were produced over several decades, may embody “considerable developments,
and even reversals of viewpoint,” which represents “a continuing intellectual
pilgrimage.” 137 Therefore, his pareschatology may be revised and changed in the future if
he reaches additional theological insights.
Moreover, according to Hick’s religious pluralism, Christianity is only one of
many different yet equally valid “perceptions and conceptions of . . . the real or the
ultimate.” 138 Therefore, all religions are only different responses to the ultimate Real and
thus have different perceptions of human destinies after death. Within this theological
framework, Hick’s postulate of pareschatology is fitting. However, Hick’s
pareschatology itself shows lack of solidity due to its own correspondence difficulties and
internal inconsistency challenges, as I have elaborated in this chapter.
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In sum, because Hick’s pareschatology is not free from critical correspondence
and coherence problems, I conclude that Hick’s religious pluralism as a whole is
weakened. Accordingly, this whole circumstance can be compared with a building
structure with several columns supporting the entire structure. If one foundational
column—pareschatology—is disintegrating, the whole building—Hick’s religious
pluralism per se—sooner or later collapses.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapters I have discussed possible issues regarding Hick’s
pareschatology. In this concluding chapter, I turn first to a review of my findings
regarding Hick’s life, religious pluralism and the nature of Hick’s pareschatology. Then I
summarize my main criticisms of pareschatology in as sharp and succinct detail as
possible. After discussing these major issues, I draw some final conclusions for the
dissertation.
Summary of Findings
Hick’s Life and Religious Pluralism
Hick’s life sketch shows that his religious pluralism was not merely a fruit of his
intellectual experience, but of a lifelong struggle with his multidimensional religious,
academic, and social life experiences. Accordingly, Hick’s religious pluralism must be
seen in the light of his spiritual pilgrimage, from a conservative Christian, to a liberal
theologian, and finally to a religious pluralist. This journey forms the context of the
development of his pareschatology.
Hick’s pluralism combines four central theological themes such as theocentrism,
theology of the Real, Christology, and soteriology. These theological foci are addressed
in this dissertation, because they all together, along with pareschatology, form Hick’s
religious pluralism as a whole.
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At the center of Hick’s theology of world religions lies the notion of the Real.
Hick calls this theocentric approach in doing theology a “Copernican revolution,” which
marks a major shift from emphasis on ecclesiology and Christology to a focus on
theocentrism. By this concept of the Real, who is at the center of the universe of faiths,
Hick finds a solution for conflicts among world religions.
Though Hick acknowledges that the Real an sich is unknown and unknowable, he
postulates it on the basis of its multiple phenomenal appearances in various world
religions through his adoption of Kantian epistemological insight of distinction between
noumenon and phenomenon. However, I suggest, in so doing, Hick’s notion of the Real,
the unknowable or the ultimate noumenon, becomes knowable only as a hypothetical
construct, about which I comment in the section below entitled, “Criticisms of Hick’s
Pareschatology.”
Hick’s theocentrism inevitably leads him to reinterpret the classic doctrine of the
Incarnation. No matter how subtly Hick articulates Christology, the final result of Hick’s
theocentrism is a denial of the Incarnation, which in turn is one factor leading him to a
mythological reinterpretation of the Scriptures.
Finally, Hick’s soteriology reveals his religious pluralism which claims that all
religious traditions offer salvation by their own responses to the Real. Hick’s notion of
the process of human salvation involves not only present salvific transformation but also
Hick’s notion of pareschatology, that is, afterlife soul-making. This latter concept will be
the topic of review in the next section.
Hick’s Pareschatology
Hick’s pareschatology forms a major center of his theological contributions and
also forms the special concept addressed by in this dissertation. I review my findings of
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pareschatology under four headings: anthropology, death, afterlife, and pareschatology as
a product of pluralism.
Anthropology
Hick’s anthropology serves as a prerequisite to the understanding of his
pareschatology, because it deals with the possibility of human existence after death.
Though arguing that man is created in the image of God, Hick’s man is not a completed
creature as described in Gen 1 and 2. Rather Hick applies the evolutionary principle to
man’s creation and adopts Irenaean anthropology. This means that humans remain in the
process of being created finally into God’s likeness. Thus, Hick claims that humans are
involved in person-making in this life and in future lives, if necessary, until God’s
likeness is fully realized.
Death
On the basis of his Irenaean anthropology, Hick presents a unconventional
understanding of death, as discussed in his Death and Eternal Life, which is integral to
his understanding of pareschatology. The whole approach on the issue of death in Death
and Eternal Life is global in nature. This attempt of doing a global theology of death is an
example of putting his religious pluralism into practice. In doing so, in order to deal with
apparent conflicts and contradicting views of death among the world religions, Hick
distinguishes religious claims into two classes, one central, the other marginal. While the
former is a matter of true or false, the latter is a matter of mythology.
Furthermore, applying Irenaean anthropology, Hick views death as a necessary
part of man’s existence of acquiring the likeness of God, rather than a divine punishment
for sin. Thus, the moment of death is not understood as a moment of eternal judgment,
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but as a moment of transition to a higher level of existence, which opens the discussion of
pareschatology. This new idea of death leads Hick to the discussion of the possibility of
an afterlife which is the central issue of the general agenda of his pareschatology.
Afterlife
Hick suggests three possible options regarding afterlife: the materialist view of
non-afterlife, the Western notions of heaven or hell, and the Eastern concept of
reincarnation. Hick indicates that the latter two are useful options to be considered.
Though acknowledging that eschatologies from East and West are mutually
exclusive, Hick argues that, nevertheless, they point to some reality beyond themselves.
Hick supports the Eastern model of afterlife, which suggests a series of several afterlives,
because the concept offers a response to the present life situation about which Hick
claims that one short life is not enough for a complete transformation of humanity.
In regard to the possibility of an afterlife, applying a moral argument, Hick argues
that it would be only fair if there is afterlife or afterlives in which earthly injustices or
acts of unfairness are remedied. In response to this need Hick articulates an afterlife soulmaking process which represents his pareschatology.
Pareschatology as a Product of Pluralsim
Hick differentiates his pareschatological model from conventional eschatologies
in the sense that the former is less remote and may be less incommensurate with the
present life than the latter. After considering three major possible options such as Price’s
psychological survival hypothesis, his own version of Christian resurrection as replica
theory, and Eastern reincarnation, Hick finally accepts the latter two models from East
and West. Though he acknowledges that they are two mutually exclusive models, one
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suggesting only one life before final salvation and the other model suggesting many lives
after death before the final human state, Hick finds something in common which renders
their coexistence as a possible model. Hick contends that the two models seem to be
mutually exclusive to each other, yet they agree, for instance, in their view that a human
being is “a psycho-physical unity,” which can be said to live again as an embodied being.
In this fashion, Hick argues that while his notion of resurrection and the Eastern notion of
reincarnation are superficially different, they are essentially in agreement.
As a result, combining eschatologies from East and West, Hick articulates his
own model of “many lives in many different worlds” before the final perfection of
humanity as his solution for conflicting views of different eschatologies. This account
shows how Hick’s pareschatology is a product of his pluralism.
Criticisms of Hick’s Pareschatology
I have discovered seven aspects integral or related to pareschatology which are
open to a total of twenty criticisms by correspondence and coherence theories of truth.
The seven aspects regarding pareschatology include: methodology, the Real,
anthropology, death, afterlife, soul-making, and universal salvation.
Principles of Method: Two Criticisms
Two coherence criticisms can be noted regarding Hick’s principles of method. In
his discussion of a global theology of death in relationship to pareschatology, Hick
employs the following two principles of method: suggest possibilities rather than
certainties, and be open to all data. I refer to Hick’s first methological principle as the
“possibilities only” principle, and to the second methodological principle as the “all data”
principle.
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The first criticism deals with Hick’s “possibilities only” principle. I find that Hick
could have followed this principle much more closely than he does. For example,
concerning the first principle, as the dissertation shows, Hick in effect suggests that his
pareschatology is not leading us completely in a “wrong” direction but in the “right”
direction. A right direction seems more like a clear and certain direction than a possible
one. This circumstance seems to exclude other directions as possible directions, thereby
transforming Hick’s own pareschatological direction into a theological construct that
could more appropriately be called a certainty than a possibility.
In addition, in Death and Eternal Life, the way Hick sorts out eschatological
options into two accounts, excluding some as less probable, and including others as more
probable, seems to be crossing the line drawn by his first principle. Thus, Hick seems to
step over the line of his “possibilities only” principle in the actual development of his
pareschatology.
The second criticism concerns the second principle, namely the “all data”
principle, in which Hick also seems to show inconsistency in his discussion of
pareschatological options. Rather than including all major religious views on
pareschatology, Hick ends with two major options from East and West. For example,
Hick’s theology of death does not include discussions of the eschatologies from Chinese,
African, or South American religions. Because Hick considers some but not all major
eschatologies, his “all data” principle could be applied more consistently than apparent in
Hick’s exposition of pareschatology.
The Real: Two Criticisms
The discussion of pareschatology in its relationship with the Real is necessary,
because it is a crucial key to understanding Hick’s pluralism as a whole. Two
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correspondence concerns can be identified in this context. One, while Hick never is able
to clearly spell out the identity of the Real because of its inaccessibility, his soteriological
and eschatological concerns lead him to postulate the notion of the Real as the center of
the universe of the faiths. While on the one hand, the mature Hick considers religious
experience as “a cognitive response to the ultimate nature of reality,” 1 he also insists that
the descriptive terms such as good or evil, loving or hating cannot be applied literally to
“the unexperiencable reality that underlies that realm.” 2 If this is the case, Hick’s
proposal seems to represent a generalization of tentative imaginary scenarios about
human responses to a postulated Real an sich. Hick’s model appears unable to move
beyond epistemic equivocation about the Real an sich.
Two, Hick’s attempt to move beyond his earlier theocentrism leads him,
particularly in his Kantian orientation in which he distinguishes between nounmenon and
phenonomenon, to adopt the language of “an ultimate transcendent reality, the Real,” 3
which has no theistic color in it. However, on the other hand, whatever terminology he
may adapt for the Real, it seems that Hick has a tendency to describe the Real with
theistic elements by connecting the word “divine” with the theistically colored word
“God” in his most recent book, Who or What Is God? And Other Investigations (2008).
For example, he refers to “the ultimate light of the universal divine presence” which
seems to imply a theistic presence. This does not seem to fully correspond with Hick’s
own attempt to describe the Real in nontheistic and impersonal terms.
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Anthropology: Three Criticisms
Hick’s understanding of man is an issue which is integral to his account of
pareschatology. His anthropology raises three internal concerns. First, Hick’s idea that
humans, on the one hand, may survive bodily death in disembodied form and, on the
other hand, that humans are inseparable psycho-physical unities are two mutually
exclusive notions that cannot at the same time correspond with reality.
A second internal difficulty arises from the fact that Hick connects the Real as
creator with the biological evolution of humanity. While Hick seems to embrace a wholly
naturalistic biological evolutionary theory of human origins, his own account of human
origins does not correspond to a wholly naturalistically interpreted biological
evolutionary theory. In Hick’s accounts, the Real works creatively and teleologically in
the emergence of humans in the evolutionary process in which divine action is excluded
in wholly naturalistic evolutionary theory.
Third, Hick’s account of the biological evolution of humanity raises a potential
difficulty. Hick bases his anthropology on a nineteenth-century hypothesis that is
becoming unconvincing in some scientific circles. If this orientation becomes widespread,
Hick may find himself in a dilemma of being tied to a scientific theory which may be
doomed to possible eventual obsolescence, and thus to incoherence unless Hick would be
willing to change his views.
Death: Three Criticisms
In his discussion concerning the issue of death, Hick’s new perspective suggests
that death represents a moment of transition to another higher existence. Three criticisms
can be raised. One, from a correspondence point of view, we can note that though
providing a very optimistic and positive notion of death inspired by Irenaean
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anthropology, in the real world there seems to be no corresponding fact that the real
character of death is like that which is described by Hick. In this respect, correspondence
theory uncovers a difficulty of correspondence verification in Hick’s theory of death and
pareschatology.
Two, Hick’s theological view, that correctness or incorrectness in theology is not
significant as long as these conflicting concepts form part of a religious totality, suggests
to me that Hick believes that differences between the teachings of death among world
religions appear not to be religiously critical. However, this view seems to be inconsistent
with his own effort to develop what he considers to be a true hypothesis of death.
Three, because in Hick’s account of death people move from one world to another
thus enabling personal growth toward the Real, death is seen not only positively but as
something desirable. However, the theories of death held by other major religious people
groups declare otherwise. Therefore, if Hick is willing to be open to all possible data
including the general negative experience of people toward death, it seems to be
incoherent for Hick to effectively suggest that death should not be avoided and feared but
embraced by everyone.
Afterlife: Three Criticisms
The notion of the Real as infinite love and goodness is terminus a quo of Hick’s
theology of the afterlife. In light of this starting point, the idea of eternal conscious
torment in hell, adopted from a literal understanding of hell from Augustinian and
Calvinistic ideas, which Hick strongly believes is incompatible with the perfect goodness
of God, leads him to present his own account of the afterlife. While this morally based
argument for intermediate afterlives providing sufficient opportunities for the final
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perfection of humanity seems to be a more attractive view than the idea of an eternal hell,
three concerns involving correspondence and coherence can be identified.
First, since the afterlife is outside of our knowledge as Hick himself
acknowledges, his speculation regarding the nature of the afterlife has no corresponding
reality with which it can be compared, thus underscoring a verification limitation. For
instance, an implication flowing from Hick’s concept of afterlife that millions of people
who have died in the past and who are now supposedly in the process of being perfected
in other worlds cannot to be confirmed by being shown to correspond with reality.
Second, Hick’s notion that in the afterlives people may have more opportunities
for soul-making because this life is too short to experience moral and spiritual growth
faces another correspondence limitation including a coherence difficulty. Because Hick
acknowledges that some people do not progress but on the contrary regress in this life
under the influence of God’s salvific activity, and if Hick assumes that the strength of
God’s salvific influence is the same in this life as it is in the afterlives, on what
compelling grounds can we expect Hick’s claim, that those who “regress” in this life will
be healed in the afterlife, will correspond to reality in the future? In other words, it seems
inconsistent for Hick to claim that if the application of God’s salvific action causes a
person to regress in this life, then simply more application of the same salvific action will
make this regressor perfect in the afterlife.
Third, Hick bases his criticism of hell upon the Calvinistic literalistic
interpretation of the biblical teaching of hell. He does not apply his mythological
interpretation principle to the Calvinistic understanding of hell as he does with other
cosmological biblical texts, which could have saved him from several difficulties
regarding hell as classically interpreted. This hermeneutical inconsistency serves as one
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factor which leads Hick to develop his pareschatology as the solution to the original
theodicy issue.
Soul-making: Three Criticisms
According to Hick, this world is a realm in which a process of person-making is
only begun for most of humanity. This means that more afterlives will follow after this
world, as needed. In this process of soul-making, evil has a key function. Stressing the
instrumental and positive value of evil, Hick claims that evils are needed and even
necessary if the world is to function as a place of person-making for morally and
spiritually immature humans. In so doing, Hick applies the idea of the traditional “O felix
culpa” theology in his own way and claims that it is “the heart of Christian theodicy.” 4
Thus, according to Hick, in a way God needs sin, that is, evil is a necessary means to an
end. Three concerns can be raised regarding the issue of soul-making in this regard.
One, does a good end justify evil means?
Two, the soul-making theology that necessitates the existence of evil seems to
face the problem of internal consistency. The evil described by Hick does not seem to be
compatible with Hick’s conception of the infinite goodness of the Real. If, as Hick claims,
a morally perfect, infinitely good, and powerful God must use evil instrumentally in soulmaking, it seems that God does so on pain of moral inconsistency.
Three, in this context, the question can be raised whether the Law of God, or any
stated will of God itself, not evil, can sufficiently test free agents in an evil-free
environment. If so, this renders evil instrumentally unnecessary for the soul-making
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process. However, Hick’s mythological interpretation of Gen 1–3 forecloses the
possibility of considering or adopting such a worldview.
Universal Salvation: Four Criticisms
The terminus ad quem of Hick’s pareschatology is the actuality of universal
salvation, the condition in which “all human life will . . . be saved.” 5 Four internal
criticisms can be raised in regard to this notion of universal salvation.
One, Hick’s pareschatology leads to universal salvation in a real and practical
sense. However, this result seems to place Hick’s notion of universalism into the category
of a certainty, and not only a possibility, and so stands in conflict with Hick’s method of
advancing only possibilities.
Two, Hick claims that in this world the whole life of some individuals represents
a “regress” from the Real. Hick’s thought that some never progress toward the Real in
this life, but regress, is in conflict with his idea of the inherent gravitation of our being
toward the Real and that humans are naturally not alien toward their maker.
Three, if Hick’s Real is infinitely good, and also humans are created as naturally
gravitating toward the Real, Hick does not provide an answer as to why, for some, it
takes nearly an infinite time to come to the salvific relationship with the Real. Hick’s
notion of an almost infinite duration of afterlives for some humans, and that these
5
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humans are created as gravitating toward God, seems inconsistent with the
efficaciousness of God’s love and omnipotence as characterized by Hick.
Four, in articulating the issue of universal salvation, Hick confronts the problem
of human freedom. Does the Real overrule the will of rebellious human beings, so that all
humanity will be saved? Hick’s argument in favor of universalism with the postulate of
an intermediate state in the context of the theodicy problem, whether the intermediate
state is short or almost infinitely long, is not coherent with the idea of genuine human
freedom. In order for universal salvation to be accomplished, and assuming that the
human mind can by free choices become hardened against the Real, the omnipotent God
must overrule the will of hardened rebellious humans. This can be seen as a divine act of
coercion. In other words, a good and omnipotent God, who wishes to save all humanity,
must inevitably sooner or later coerce those who reject him constantly, thereby nullifying
their freedom to choose him with their own will. In short, while Hick’s universalism
seems to offer a desirable answer for the theodicy problem, yet as a result, it has an
internal incoherency problem with human freedom.
Conclusions
Before drawing my conclusions, I wish to articulate my appreciation of Hick as a
philosopher of religion. From my research for this dissertation I have observed that
Hick’s pluralism, particularly his pareschatology, has been the result of Hick’s own
honest struggle concerning the questions of human existence, such as unfairness, injustice,
and suffering. I laud his effort to find theodical answers for life problems not only with
his academic expertise, but also with his spiritual and social dimensions of life as a whole.
As a true lover of wisdom and as one who shows a real search for the truth, Hick tries to
be open to all possible data available. As one with a Christian background, Hick shows
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bravery by moving beyond conventional thinking on certain theological issues. I admire
his temerity in standing for his views in face of other people’s severe criticisms from both
liberal and conservative sides, and from both Christian and non-Christian circles. This
encourages me to stand for my own Christian view of biblical truths in the face of this
irreligious world. I turn now to the conclusions of the dissertation.
It has been my purpose in this dissertation to address and critically evaluate the
external correspondency and internal consistency of Hick’s pareschatology, which in turn
may form the basis for a critical evaluation of his religious pluralism as a whole.
Regarding pareschatology, as discussed in the summary of findings in this chapter
and in detail in chapter 5, Hick’s pareschatology is open to various criticisms when
judged by correspondence and coherence theories of truth. From my research of
pareschatology, I have discovered and present reasons which back twenty criticisms of
Hick’s concept of pareschatology. Based upon these twenty criticisms stated above in the
concluding chapter, the first general conclusion of my dissertation is that Hick’s notion of
pareschatology does not show sufficient internal coherence and, also, it is not fully
coherent with his pluralistic model of world religions. The second general conclusion is
that there is lack of external correspondence with the noumenal Real and with the
phenomenal pareschatological manifestations of religious experiences in the particular
religions. As a result, questions may be raised whether his pareschatological model can
be regarded as a convincing theological philosophical scientific construct.
These considerations also have important implications for Hick’s religious
pluralism, which lead to the final conclusion of my dissertation. I find Hick’s religious
pluralism as a whole to be weakened by the problematic condition of his pareschatology.
This whole circumstance can be compared with a building with several columns
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supporting the entire structure. If one foundational column—Hick’s pareschatology—is
problematic, the whole building—Hick’s religious pluralism per se—is sooner or later
open to collapse.
In closing the dissertation, as one standing in the Seventh-day Adventist
theological community, I have gained from my study of Hick’s theology of world
religions some theological insights which are not conventional Christian concepts. For
example, I appreciate Hick’s understanding and rejection of hell which is different from
the traditional Christian view. I have been encouraged and benefited by Hick’s insight of
the human being as a psycho-physical unity rather than as two separable entities. Thus, in
Hick’s religious, academic, and social struggles concerning human existence, there are
areas where we can share the same burdens and further develop our theological
understanding.
Some Suggestions for Further Study
Having been involved in focused research regarding Hick’s religious pluralism in
general and his pareschatolical model in particular, I have found three areas that have
drawn my attention to possible further study. One, a comparative project could be done
on Hick’s soteriology in relationship to the various aspects of the traditional central
Christian concept of grace. Two, regarding Hick’s understanding of man as a psychophysical unity, a research project could study the relationship between Hick’s
understanding in this regard, with the recent “embodiment movement” as exemplified by
Nancey Murphy’s book Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological
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Portraits of Human Nature 6 Three, a comparative study could be undertaken regarding
Hick’s notion of hell with biblical and the Seventh-day Adventist understanding of the
concept of hell. Such further research holds promise of fruitful advancement of the
theological understandings of these issues.
6

Nancey Murphy, Warren S. Brown, and H. Newton Malony, eds., Whatever
Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Güttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998).
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